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THE DECLINE OF CLASS ACTIONS 
ROBERT H. KLONOFF

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that in recent years courts have cut back sharply on 
plaintiffs’ ability to bring class action lawsuits, thereby undermining the 
compensation, deterrence, and efficiency functions of the class action 
device. Starting in the mid-1990s, courts began expressing concern about 
the pressure on defendants to settle after a decision certifying a class. The 
business community also raised concerns that many multi-state class 
actions were brought in pro-plaintiff, state-court venues. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(f), adopted in 1998, enabled defendants to obtain 
interlocutory review of federal district court decisions certifying class 
actions, and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), adopted in 2005, had 
the effect of shifting most major class actions to federal court. There is 
now a large body of federal appellate court case law, and as a result of 
that case law, several disturbing trends have emerged. 
First, many courts now require that plaintiffs prove substantial 
portions of their cases on the merits at class certification. Second, several 
of the class certification requirements (class definition, numerosity, 
commonality, adequacy of representation, Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 
23(b)(3)), are now considerably more difficult to establish. Third, a 
number of courts have rejected class settlements by rigidly applying the 
requirements for class certification, even though the settlement eliminates 
the need for a trial. Fourth, a number of courts have essentially nullified 
so-called “issues classes” under Rule 23(c)(4) by requiring courts to 
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examine whether the case as a whole satisfies the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Finally, the Supreme Court has upheld 
binding arbitration clauses that prohibit resolution of disputes on a 
classwide basis. 
Although some class actions remain viable, such as certain securities 
fraud, wage and hour, and antitrust class actions, the overall impact of 
these case law trends has been to curtail substantially the ability of 
plaintiffs to obtain class treatment. This Article thus concludes by urging 
courts, rule makers, and Congress to return to a more balanced approach 
to classwide adjudication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The class action device, once considered a “revolutionary” vehicle for 
achieving mass justice,
1
 has fallen into disfavor. Numerous courts have 
become skeptical about certifying class actions. Some have emphasized 
the pressures on defendants to settle after class certification is granted, 
stating that such pressure “is a factor [the court] weigh[s] in [the] 
certification calculus.”2 These court decisions impact virtually every 
element of the class certification process. Even requirements that 
defendants rarely disputed in the past, such as “numerosity”3 and 
“commonality,”4 are now potential impediments to class certification. 
Moreover, many courts now require that plaintiffs put forward 
considerably more evidentiary proof at the class certification stage than 
ever before.
5
 In some instances, to obtain class treatment, plaintiffs must 
now prove major portions of their cases on the merits, as opposed to 
simply showing that they possess evidence capable of convincing a jury of 
classwide liability and damages.
6
 As a result of these developments, 
experienced class action defense counsel can frequently identify a number 
of promising arguments to defeat certification, even in fairly routine 
cases.
7
 
 
 
 1. Owen W. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 25 
(1996). 
 2. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable”). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the class”). 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Several law firms tout specialties in class action defense. Among them are: SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, http://www.skadden.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); SEYFARTH 
SHAW LLP, http://www.seyfarth.com/Commercial-Class-Action-Defense (last visited Sept. 29. 2012); 
SQUIRE SANDERS, http://www.squiresanders.com/class_actions (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); KIRLAND 
& ELLIS LLP, http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=218&itemid=673&displaymore=1 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012); SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/financialservices/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2012); JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/experiencepractices/servicedetail.aspx? 
serviceid=166 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); DLA PIPER, http://www.dlapiper.com/us/services/detail 
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Until relatively recently, defendants faced three major roadblocks in 
challenging class certification: 
First, for many years following the adoption of the modern federal 
class action rule (Rule 23) in 1966, most courts believed that the class 
action device was a salutary tool for the administration of justice.
8
 This 
perception has changed to a significant degree, in part because of judicial 
experience in applying Rule 23, and in part because of isolated—but 
highly publicized—instances of abuse in which class attorneys obtained 
handsome fees while class members received meager recoveries or 
worthless coupons.
9
 
Second, prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) 
in 1998, defendants typically could not seek immediate appellate review of 
an order granting class certification.
10
 If plaintiffs convinced the district 
court to certify the class, defendants generally settled prior to trial without 
the ability to challenge class certification on appeal.
11
 Now, under Rule 
23(f), defendants can seek discretionary interlocutory review of an order 
granting or denying class certification.
12
 As a result, federal appellate 
courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) now play a major role in 
developing class action jurisprudence. 
Third, class counsel with state-law claims often filed their cases in a 
relatively small number of pro-plaintiff state-court jurisdictions. These 
cases were handled by elected judges who frequently lacked experience in 
class actions and were not sympathetic to large, out-of-state defendants. 
Because of strict limitations on removal in diversity cases, defendants 
could rarely remove state-law cases to federal court. That situation 
changed significantly in 2005, when Congress enacted the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA).
13
 The majority of sizable class actions are now 
brought in federal court in the first instance or immediately removed to 
federal court.
14
 
Rule 23(f) and CAFA have altered the procedural landscape. 
Defendants can now secure a federal forum much more frequently, and 
 
 
.aspx?service=124 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, http://www.gibson 
dunn.com/practices/pages/CCA.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); and O’MELVENY & MEYERS LLP, 
http://www.omm.com/classactions/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).  
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See id. 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 13. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
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they now have a tool for obtaining immediate appellate review of an order 
certifying a class. With many more class actions in federal court, and with 
more class certification decisions being reviewed by appellate courts, 
federal courts have created new hurdles for plaintiffs seeking class 
certification. As explained below, these rulings have impacted multiple 
requirements for class certification.
15
 In addition, as discussed below, it is 
now exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to secure arbitration on a classwide 
basis in cases involving signed arbitration agreements. 
A critical event leading to Rule 23(f) and CAFA occurred in 1995 
when the Seventh Circuit decided In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.
16
 In an 
opinion authored by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit granted mandamus 
and reversed a decision certifying a class of hemophiliacs who had 
received transfers of blood contaminated by the HIV virus. The Seventh 
Circuit found that mandamus was justified in part because the potentially 
bankrupting classwide verdict put the defendant “under intense pressure to 
settle.”17 The Supreme Court and several federal circuits quickly followed 
Rhone-Poulenc with important decisions curtailing class actions.
18
 These 
decisions, in turn, created a climate for the adoption of Rule 23(f) and 
CAFA. 
This Article analyzes the key developments that have impacted modern 
class action law. Part I briefly describes the period from the enactment of 
modern Rule 23 in 1966 to the mid-1990s. It shows that for much of this 
period, courts were generally receptive to class actions, even for sprawling 
mass tort cases such as asbestos suits. Part II describes events leading to 
 
 
 15. To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy three threshold requirements (a proper 
class definition, and a representative who is both a member of the class and has a live claim); four 
requirements under Rule 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation); 
and a requirement that the putative class satisfy all the elements of one subdivision of Rule 23(b)—
(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), or (b)(3). See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-
PARTY LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 23–25, 30–133 (West, 4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter KLONOFF, 
NUTSHELL]. 
 16. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 17. Id. at 1298. The court noted that “Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called 
settlements induced by a small probability of an immerse judgment in a class action ‘blackmail 
settlements.’” Id. (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
 18. For example, one year after Rhone-Poulenc, the Fifth Circuit overturned a decision certifying 
a nationwide class action by cigarette smokers, reasoning that “[t]he risk of facing an all-or-nothing 
verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.” Castano v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298). In 1996, 
the Sixth Circuit granted mandamus and overturned the certification of a class of individuals claiming 
injuries as a result of penile implants manufactured by the defendants. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 
F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). In 1997, and again in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed massive class 
settlements involving asbestos-related injuries. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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the adoption of Rule 23(f) in 1998 and the enactment of CAFA in 2005. 
Part III identifies and critiques the most important changes in the case law 
that have taken place. These include federal district court and appellate 
decisions that: 
 apply heightened evidentiary standards that require the court to 
resolve disputed issues bearing on class certification, even if 
those issues overlap with the merits; 
 impose more demanding criteria in evaluating the class 
definition; 
 find Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement unsatisfied based on a 
lack of supporting evidence in circumstances where, as a matter 
of common sense, the class includes far more than the minimum 
number necessary to establish numerosity; 
 heighten the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a) by 
requiring not only a common question of law or fact but a 
question that is central to the outcome of the case; 
 reject class certification out of fear that, because plaintiffs have 
not brought all possible claims, class members may be later 
barred from bringing those claims as a result of issue or claim 
preclusion—and therefore the class representatives and counsel 
are inadequate to represent the putative class; 
 reject class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because monetary 
claims are included with claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, even though the declaratory and injunctive claims are the 
most important part of the case; 
 reject class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because 
individualized issues are involved, without analyzing whether 
the common issues outweigh the individualized issues; 
 reject class settlements by rigidly applying the criteria for class 
certification, as if the case were being tried as a class action, 
even though the settlement eliminates the need for a trial; 
 reject proposals to try individual issues on a classwide basis 
under Rule 23(c)(4) on the ground that the cause of action as a 
whole must satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3) or because bifurcation purportedly violates the Seventh 
Amendment; and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/6
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 enforce arbitration clauses that prohibit the adjudication of 
disputes on a classwide basis on the ground that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)
19
 overrides the enforcement of both state 
and federal laws. 
Not all courts have taken these approaches. Courts are sharply divided 
on some of these issues. Yet, the emergence of myriad cases that cut back 
the ability to pursue classwide relief represents a troublesome trend that 
undermines the compensation, deterrence, and efficiency functions of the 
class action device.
20
  
Part IV assesses the current state of the law in light of the 
developments discussed in Part III. It notes that some plaintiffs have 
deliberately chosen to file their cases in federal circuits (such as the Ninth) 
that are more receptive to class actions. It also identifies some areas, such 
as securities fraud cases, wage and hour cases, ERISA cases, and antitrust 
cases, in which class actions continue to flourish. It nonetheless concludes 
that, although some classes continue to be certified, the jurisprudential 
trends discussed in this Article are disturbing. Unless these trends are 
corrected by courts, rule makers, and Congress, the compensation, 
deterrence, and efficiency functions of the class action device will 
continue to be compromised.
21
 
 
 
 19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Amchem, at 617–18 (“A class action solves [the] problem” that “small recoveries do 
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights” by 
“aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, 
Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain 
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, 
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action 
device.”); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A class action is the 
more efficient procedure for determining liability and damages in a case such as this involving a defect 
that may have imposed costs on tens of thousands of consumers, yet not a cost to any one of them 
large enough to justify the expense of an individual suit.”), vacated and remanded, No. 12-1067, 2013 
U.S. WL 775366 (June 3, 2013); Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(noting that class actions “accomplish judicial economy by avoiding multiple suits,” and “protect the 
rights of persons who might not be able to present claims on an individual basis” (citing Crown, Cork 
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 
1966 amendment (stating that (b)(3) classes will “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and 
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness 
or bringing about other undesirable results.”). 
 21. This Article is not an empirical study, and it does not purport to review all recent orders that 
certify or refuse to certify classes. Instead, the focus is on published federal decisions (including those 
on Lexis and Westlaw). Because of the magnitude of the class certification decision and the fact that 
courts are required by Rule 23(e) to review class settlements, the published opinions provide a fertile 
source of case law. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. FROM 1966 TO ADOPTION OF RULE 23(F) IN 1998 
It is useful to provide some historical context.
22
 Modern Rule 23, which 
originated in 1966, was “a bold and well-intentioned attempt to encourage 
more frequent use of class actions.”23 The prior version, from 1938, 
contained several classifications—“true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” 
classes—that were difficult to apply and “baffled both courts and 
commentators.”24 The 1966 version also contained several categories of 
class suits, but “the new categories [were] described functionally rather 
than conceptually.”25 
Despite the new rule’s encouragement of courts to utilize class actions, 
courts were reluctant at first to permit the certification of sprawling class 
actions, especially in the mass torts area. For instance, federal courts 
refused to permit class certification in litigation involving collapsed 
skywalks at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency
26
 and in litigation involving 
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.
27
 
The courts’ cautious attitude changed in the mid-1980s. Responding to 
dockets clogged with mass torts cases, courts became far more receptive to 
approving major class actions. For instance, significant class actions 
involving asbestos
28
 and Agent Orange
29
 received the green light from 
federal appellate courts, and the Fourth Circuit upheld class treatment in 
the “Dalkon Shield” intrauterine device litigation.30 
Perhaps the most notable decision during this period came from the 
Fifth Circuit, which today is arguably the circuit most reluctant to uphold 
class actions.
31
 In Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
32
 the court upheld 
 
 
 22. This brief discussion does not include all of the pendulum swings. For a thorough discussion 
of the 1966–1979 time period, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: 
Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§§ 1751–1753.1 (2011) (providing overview of the history and purpose of the class action from its 
roots in English common-law courts to modern Rule 23). 
 23. Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970). 
 24. Id. at 176 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 177. 
 26. In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 27. In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 28. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). 
 29. In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 30. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 31. See Nicole Ochi, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation 
Strategies After CAFA & MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 1033 (2008) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit seems 
to be a particularly hostile venue in which to try to certify a class . . . .”). For example, the Fifth 
Circuit—alone among the federal circuits—held that plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions were 
required to prove “loss causation” (in addition to reliance) in order to obtain class certification, an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/6
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class certification in a case in which thousands of class members alleged 
asbestos-related personal injuries. The court noted that “courts are now 
being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current 
volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters.”33 In assessing the 
choice between a class action and individualized adjudications, the court 
noted that a class action was “clearly superior to the alternative of 
repeating, hundreds of times over, the litigation of [the same factual 
issues].”34 In contrast to later federal appellate decisions, which 
emphasized that the class action device imposed unfair pressure on 
defendants to settle,
35
 the Jenkins court believed that “the defendants enjoy 
all the advantages, and the plaintiffs incur the disadvantages, of the class 
action—with one exception: the cases are to be brought to trial.”36 
Summarizing its rationale, the court stated that, because of the wave of 
mass tort cases, “[n]ecessity moves us to change and invent.”37 
Class actions in the 1980s and 1990s (and even into the 2000s) resulted 
in numerous multi-million dollar and billion dollar settlements.
38
 
Attorneys’ fees for class counsel—mainly from settlements—came under 
attack as being excessive.
39
 Few, if any, class action lawsuits went to 
trial,
40
 and in many of the settlements, the benefits received by the class 
members were minimal.
41
 Class settlements were not limited to mass tort 
cases. Plaintiff firms brought class actions involving securities fraud, 
antitrust, consumer protection, and many other areas of law.
42
 
During this time, while many plaintiff lawyers amassed great wealth, 
the class action device began to receive significant unfavorable press.
43
 
 
 
approach since overruled unanimously by the Supreme Court. Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance 
Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled in relevant part by Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 32. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (review granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). 
 33. Id. at 473 (citation omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
 36. Raymark, 782 F.2d at 473. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14–20 (2005) (discussing numerous settlements in which 
most of the recovery went to class counsel). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Robert H. Klonoff, Edward K.M. Bilich & Suzette M. Malveaux, CLASS ACTIONS AND 
OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 356 (West, 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
KLONOFF ET AL., CASEBOOK]. 
 41. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14–20. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Leaky System: Suits Over Plastic Pipe Finally Bring Relief, 
Especially for Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A1; Michelle Singletary, Coupon Settlements 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because of the high stakes, defendants often felt compelled to settle large 
class actions rather than risk a potentially bankrupting judgment.
44
 And, in 
most of these cases, defendants settled without having had an opportunity 
for immediate appellate review of the decision granting class certification. 
In 1995, the Rhone-Poulenc court was persuaded to invoke mandamus 
to review a class certification order.
45
 At the time the Seventh Circuit 
rendered its decision, interlocutory review under Rule 23(f) did not exist, 
and few other options were available.
46
 Other than the stringent review 
criteria provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
47
 the only immediate appellate 
remedy for most defendants facing a grant of class certification was the 
extraordinary writ of mandamus.
48
 
Most appellate courts were unwilling to invoke mandamus.
49
 In 1996, 
in Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
50
 the Fifth Circuit exercised its 
jurisdiction to review the district court’s certification order, but it did so 
only because the district court certified the issue for appeal under 28 
 
 
Fall Short, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1999, at H1. These and numerous other articles are cited in CAFA’s 
legislative history. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 19 n.76, 20 n.79. 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20–22 (section entitled “Judicial blackmail forces settlement of 
frivolous cases”). 
 45. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); see also In re Am. Med. 
Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting mandamus and reversing class certification in penile 
implant case); Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting 
mandamus and reversing class certification in race discrimination case). 
 46. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), the Supreme Court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that the denial of class certification should be immediately appealable as a 
“collateral order” (and thus subject to an exception to finality under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469. The Court in Coopers & 
Lybrand also rejected the “death knell” argument, i.e., that a denial of class certification was a final 
judgment because, as a practical matter, the case would not be pursued absent a class action. Id. at 
474–76. For a discussion of the various options for immediate appellate review prior to Rule 23(f), see 
KLONOFF ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 690–95. 
 47. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006), if a district court certifies in writing that an “order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion 
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation,” the court of appeals has discretion to grant immediate review. 
 48. The power to issue a writ of mandamus stems from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2006). This power is exceedingly narrow: “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 
‘usurpation of power’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” Will v. United States, 
389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citation omitted). 
 49. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action 
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1557–62 (2000) (discussing Rhone-Poulenc and noting that while 
“[s]ome increased use of the writ of mandamus ha[d] occurred, it [was] hardly clear that it ha[d] been 
used in enough instances to constitute a trend”); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. 
Dist. of Cal., 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (unreported) (post Rhone-Poulenc decision denying petition 
for mandamus seeking to overturn order certifying class). 
 50. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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U.S.C. § 1292(b),
51
 something most other district courts were unwilling to 
do.
52
 Thus, despite isolated federal appellate court decisions, a rulemaking 
solution was needed to provide interlocutory appellate review. 
II. REFORMS IN APPELLATE REVIEW AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) 
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began looking at possible 
amendments to Rule 23 in 1991 and recognized a need for an interlocutory 
appellate remedy. It was not until 1995, however, with the decision in 
Rhone-Poulenc, that the Committee focused extensively on such an 
amendment to Rule 23.
53
 Although there was much support for the 
addition, there was strong opposition as well, especially from plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, who worried that such a rule lacked clear guidelines and would 
result in increased costs and unnecessary delay.
54
 The Committee 
concluded that both plaintiffs and defendants needed interlocutory review. 
For plaintiffs, securing review of a denial of class certification (absent an 
interlocutory appeal) meant taking an individual plaintiff’s case to trial and 
obtaining a final judgment, thereby incurring expensive discovery, often 
with only a slight hope of ultimately overturning the denial of certification 
on appeal.
55
 For defendants, securing a final judgment meant risking a 
potentially bankrupting verdict at trial, with no guarantee of ultimately 
prevailing on class certification.
56
 Indeed, the very fact that a trial had 
already occurred would, as a practical matter, pose great obstacles for 
defendants in arguing that the case could not feasibly be tried on a 
classwide basis. Defendants no doubt feared that appellate courts, faced 
with a trial verdict and years of litigation, would do everything possible to 
uphold the verdict. And even if counsel for defendants predicted favorable 
odds for ultimate reversal, the potentially significant impact of a large 
verdict on a company’s stock during the appeals process made corporate 
officials reluctant to commit to a protracted battle. Settlements, even for 
many millions (or billions) of dollars, appeared the lesser of evils. 
 
 
 51. See supra note 47. 
 52. Granting 1292(b) review essentially requires the district court to concede the serious 
possibility of error in its ruling by finding, inter alia, “a controlling question of law as to which there is 
a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 53. See Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. 
REV. 97, 102 (2001). 
 54. See id. at 104–05. 
 55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 56. Id. 
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With these competing interests in mind, the drafters crafted Rule 23(f) 
in neutral language: 
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an 
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification 
if application is made to it within ten [now 14] days after the entry 
of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district 
court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
57
 
Under Rule 23(f), either plaintiff (upon denial of certification) or 
defendant (upon the grant of certification) can ask the appellate court to 
grant interlocutory review. The rule gives the appellate court “unfettered 
discretion whether to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by 
the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for certiorari.”58 Permission of 
the district court is not required. Rule 23(f) has enabled not only federal 
circuit courts, but also the Supreme Court (when reviewing a Rule 23(f) 
circuit court decision) to hear interlocutory appeals.
59
 
Following the adoption of Rule 23(f), appellate courts wrestled with 
the criteria for granting review. A few variations evolved.
60
 For instance, 
in Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc.,
61
 the Seventh Circuit construed 
Rule 23(f) to authorize review: (1) where the “denial of the class status 
sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the representative 
plaintiff’s claim is too small to justify the expense of the litigation”; 
(2) where the grant of class certification sounds the “death knell” for 
defendants because an order certifying a class “can put considerable 
pressure on the defendant to settle”; and (3) where an interlocutory appeal 
“may facilitate the development of the law” of class actions.62 Some 
circuits have limited the third Blair category to “issues that are both 
important to the particular litigation and likely to escape effective review 
 
 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 58. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
 59. For instance, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari from an en banc decision that stemmed originally from the granting of Rule 23(f) 
review by a Ninth Circuit panel. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The case of Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), also reached the Supreme Court on certiorari 
after the Fifth Circuit granted 23(f) review and rendered its decision. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee 
Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2179 
(2011). Other examples involving Rule 23(f) include Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 60. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802.1 (3d ed. 
2011) (discussing courts’ various approaches to Rule 23(f)). 
 61. 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 62. Id. at 834–35. 
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after the conclusion of the trial.”63 Several circuits have added a fourth 
situation in which interlocutory review would be justified, i.e., when the 
decision of the district court is “manifestly erroneous.”64 In those circuits, 
a “manifestly erroneous” ruling will justify Rule 23(f) review without the 
need to satisfy any other criterion.
65
 While these formulations differ 
somewhat, all are neutral in the sense that, on their face, they do not favor 
either plaintiffs or defendants. Either side is permitted to seek review of a 
class certification ruling (granting or denying certification) if one or more 
of the criteria are satisfied. 
In fact, however, in terms of sheer numbers, Rule 23(f) has served 
primarily as a device to protect defendants. Appendix A reflects all Rule 
23(f) appeals accepted from November 30, 1998 through May 31, 2012.
66
 
Out of the 209 Rule 23(f) appeals accepted, 144 (or about 69 percent) were 
appeals by defendants after the grant of class certification, whereas only 
65 (31 percent) were appeals by plaintiffs after the denial of class 
certification. Of the 144 appeals by defendants, defendants were 
successful in 101 cases (a 70 percent reversal rate).
67
 Of the 65 appeals by 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs prevailed in only 26 cases (or 30 percent of the time). 
Thus, even when plaintiffs convinced the appellate court to grant review, 
they lost in the majority of cases. In short, with respect to appellate court 
review pursuant to Rule 23(f), defendants have benefited more from Rule 
23(f) than have plaintiffs. As Part III reveals, federal appellate courts have 
rendered decisions that impose new hurdles that make certification even 
more challenging for plaintiffs. 
In a number of the cases granting review at the request of defendants, 
the reviewing courts cited the pressure to settle as a reason for granting 
review.
68
 This reason for granting interlocutory review is troublesome. In 
 
 
 63. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Waste Mgmt. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294 (1st Cir. 2000)); see also In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 
262 F.3d 134, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 64. See, e.g., Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prodo v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2000); In 
re Lorazepam & Chlorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 259 F.3d 154, 163–65 (3d Cir. 2001); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 
255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 65. See, e.g., Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. 
 66. The analysis includes only cases found on LEXIS or Westlaw. 
 67. It should be noted that because courts do not always cite Rule 23(f), it is difficult to be sure 
that every single case has been located. 
 68. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8, 26 (1st 
Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008); Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. 
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:729 
 
 
 
 
every case in which a class is certified, a defendant can argue as a ground 
for appeal that it faces intense pressure to settle. Pressure to settle (or to 
plead guilty in criminal cases) is a reality in our judicial system—in 
traditional, bipolar civil litigation, agency enforcement actions, or criminal 
prosecutions. The law does not, for example, provide for immediate 
appellate review of a decision upholding the sufficiency of an indictment 
merely because a trial court’s refusal to dismiss that indictment puts 
pressure on the defendant to enter a guilty plea. But even if it were 
possible to separate out cases in which a defendant is not under pressure to 
settle,
69
 the appellate courts, in the context of Rule 23(f), are in no position 
to engage in the case-specific factfinding necessary to gauge the true 
pressure on the defendant. Likewise, at least in cases involving relatively 
small individual claims, plaintiffs can argue that denial of class 
certification will effectively end the case. Thus, the fact that a plaintiff will 
not pursue a case absent class certification should not be a reason for 
plaintiff to secure immediate review of a decision denying certification.
70
 
Even if it were possible to isolate which class action suits truly involved 
claims that were so small that the denial of certification was in fact the 
death knell, “[t]he formulation of an appealability rule that turns on the 
amount of the plaintiff’s claim is plainly a legislative, not a judicial, 
function.”71 Review under Rule 23(f) should be limited to cases in which 
such review is necessary to resolve conflicts among the courts or to 
address an issue of exceptional importance. The test should not turn on 
whether the certification ruling is the “death knell” for either the plaintiff 
or the defendant.
72
 
 
 
(7th Cir. 2001); Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2001); West v. Prudential Secs., 
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th 
Cir. 2002); Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 
2011); CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011); Elizabeth 
M. v. Monetenez, 458 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 69. Cf. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“Merrill Lynch is in no danger of being destroyed by a binding class-wide determination that it 
has committed disparate impact discrimination against 700 brokers.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 
(2012); Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 960–61 (denying defendant’s request for Rule 23(f) review in part 
because of defendant’s failure to submit evidence that certification would coerce a settlement). 
 70. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (holding that “death knell” of 
plaintiffs’ case absent appellate review did not create a final judgment). 
 71. Id. at 472. 
 72. According to the Advisory Committee notes, pressure on defendant to settle (or the death 
knell for plaintiff) is the reason for an interlocutory appellate rule, but is not the criterion upon which 
review should be granted. Virtually every grant of class certification puts pressure on defendants to 
settle; and plaintiffs will rarely go forward with an individual case, when class certification is denied. 
Thus, it is not appropriate for a court to grant review because of pressure to settle or death knell. 
Rather, review should depend on whether there is an issue that justifies immediate review. The 
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B. The Class Action Fairness Act 
Federal Rule 23(f) had one serious limitation: it only operated for class 
actions in federal court. If the case was brought in state court and was not 
successfully removed, Rule 23(f) did not apply. Even if, in addition to the 
state case, there was overlapping litigation in federal court involving the 
same or a similar class, the federal court could rarely control what the state 
court did. The reason is that federal courts have only limited authority to 
enjoin class actions in state court.
73
 Yet, many of the most egregious 
examples of class action abuse had occurred in the state courts, often by 
elected judges who favored class members over large, out-of-state 
corporations.
74
 
The concerns about abuses in state court were not without foundation. 
During the hearings on CAFA, members of Congress heard about myriad 
instances of alleged abuse by state-court judges and plaintiffs’ counsel.75 
These included many examples in which class members recovered only 
small sums of money or undesirable coupons, rebates, or vouchers.
76
 In 
one well-publicized example, the Bank of Boston settlement, class 
 
 
Advisory Committee notes support this interpretation. After noting that a grant of certification can 
pressure the defendant to settle and that the denial of certification can be the death knell of the case, 
the Notes state, “These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a 
discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues 
. . . . Permission is most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a novel or 
unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the decision on certification is likely 
dispositive of the litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendments 
(emphasis added). Thus, the appellate court’s decision whether to grant review should depend on 
whether there are “appeal-worthy” issues. 
 73. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011) (holding that the district court, after 
refusing to certify class action in federal court, lacked authority under the Anti-Injunction Act’s 
“relitigation exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006), to enjoin similar class action brought under West 
Virginia’s class action rule); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (after the Third Circuit overturned defective products settlement in 
federal court, the parties entered into a restructured settlement in Louisiana state court; the Third 
Circuit upheld district court’s refusal to enjoin state-court settlement, holding, inter alia, that the 
district court lacked personal jurisdiction, and federal court review of the state-court settlement would 
have violated the Full Faith and Credit Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 
 74. See, e.g., Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class 
Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1802–03 (2009); Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for 
National Cases: Preserving Citizen Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 
423 (2008); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1649, 1664–65 (2008); Jacob R. Karabell, Note, The Implementation of “Balanced Diversity” 
Through the Class Action Fairness Act, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 304 (2009). 
 75. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 13–23; 151 CONG. REC. S1225, S1228 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); 151 CONG. REC. H723, S726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner); 151 CONG. REC. S999-02, S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 76. See supra note 74. 
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members actually ended up losing money (for instance, one class member 
recovered $4 but the bank charged her an $80 fee that went towards the 
$8.5 million attorneys’ fee award).77 
Thus, based on some legitimate—if at times exaggerated—concerns, 
Congress adopted a landmark statute to ensure that most major class 
actions could be removed to federal court.
78
 President George W. Bush 
signed CAFA into law on February 18, 2005.
79
 
CAFA was deemed necessary because the then-existing law on 
diversity and removal made it difficult for defendants to remove even 
nationwide state-law class actions to federal court. Although cases 
involving federal questions are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1441,
80
 the general law of removal, which applied pre-CAFA, 
permitted removal of state-law class actions to federal court only if a case 
satisfied the stringent requirements for diversity jurisdiction—complete 
diversity between plaintiffs and defendants
81
 and (absent supplemental 
jurisdiction) an amount-in-controversy of $75,000 per claimant.
82
 
Moreover, prior to CAFA, defendants had only one year from the date of 
filing to remove a class action to federal court,
83
 and one defendant in a 
multi-defendant case could not remove a case to federal court without the 
 
 
 77. S. REP. No. 109-14 at 14–15 (discussing Bank of Boston Alabama state-court settlement). See 
also Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining, despite concerns, to 
review the Alabama settlement). 
 78. Congress carved out narrow exceptions in CAFA for suits that impact primarily the forum 
state. See KLONOFF, ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 470–73. 
 79. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The very name of the statute, the Class Action Fairness Act 
(emphasis added), underscored that, in Congress’s view, defendants needed a federal forum—
especially in cases impacting multiple states—to secure fair treatment. A separate set of CAFA 
provisions established new rules for class settlements in federal court, including government 
notification of class settlements, limits on so-called “coupon settlements,” restrictions on “net loss 
settlements” (where class members pay counsel more in fees than their share of recovery), and 
prohibitions on settlements that favor some class members over others based on their proximity to the 
forum court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1714, 1715(b), (d), (e)(l) (2006); see generally KLONOFF, ET AL., 
CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 621–22 (summarizing CAFA settlement provisions). 
 80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (2006). 
 81. Id. at § 1441(b). 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 
549 (2005) (holding that when named plaintiff satisfies $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 allows supplemental jurisdiction over class members who do not satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). But see Federal Courts Venue and Jurisdiction Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (one-year requirement no longer 
applies if the district court finds that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the amount in 
controversy to prevent removal). 
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consent of all defendants.
84
 Finally, removal was not allowed when any of 
the defendants was a citizen of the state where the suit was brought.
85
 
CAFA eliminated these restrictions by (1) permitting removal with 
“minimal diversity,” i.e., any class member diverse from any defendant 
and an amount in controversy for the entire case of more than $5 million;
86
 
(2) permitting removal without regard to the one-year deadline for removal 
prior to CAFA;
87
 (3) permitting removal by one defendant without the 
consent of the other defendants;
88
 and (4) permitting removal even when a 
defendant is a citizen of the state where the suit was brought.
89
 Through 
these and other provisions, 
90
 CAFA became an important vehicle to 
ensure that the vast majority of significant class actions were heard in 
federal court. 
CAFA has in fact had an enormous impact in shifting most class 
actions to federal court.
91
 The combination of CAFA and Rule 23(f) gave 
federal courts the opportunity to address a host of important class 
certification issues. 
III. NEW RIGOROUS FEDERAL CASE LAW 
Federal courts have not simply heard and decided more cases as a 
result of Rule 23(f) and CAFA; they have adopted troublesome new 
standards applicable to plaintiffs seeking classwide relief. This Part 
 
 
 84. See, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1446). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B). See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348 (2013) (noting that CAFA provides federal courts with original 
jurisdiction “if the class [action] has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and 
the ‘matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 
(d)(5)(B)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See KLONOFF ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 467–77 (summarizing CAFA’s 
jurisdictional provisions and discussing case law, commentary, and legislative history). 
 91. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1593, 1610 (2008) (“CAFA has increased not only the number of class action removals to federal 
court, but also the number of class action original filings in federal court” (footnote omitted)); Emery 
G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: 
An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1754 (2008) (analysis of 
class actions in federal courts “provides support for the conclusion that the federal courts have seen an 
increase in diversity removals and, especially, original proceedings in the post-CAFA period as a 
result of the expansion of the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction”); Gail E. Lees, et al., 
Year in Review on Class Actions, 13 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) No.4, Feb. 24, 2012, at 225 
(noting—indeed, exclaiming—that, following CAFA’s enactment, “[C]onsumer class action filings 
increased by 577% in the district courts in the Ninth Circuit!”). 
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analyzes the key areas in which federal courts have made class actions 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring.
92
 Not all courts have adopted these 
approaches, and in some areas the courts are sharply divided. This Part 
discusses new evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs; various class certification 
requirements (the class definition, numerosity, commonality, adequacy, 
and classes under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)); certification of settlement 
classes; “issues classes” under Rule 23(c)(4); and classwide arbitration.93 
These decisions share a common premise: the class certification 
decision is the defining moment in a class action, and thus a district court 
should not permit a classwide proceeding to go forward unless the most 
exacting criteria are met. The Rule 23(a) and (b) criteria, by their terms, 
have not changed in any significant way since 1966,
94
 but some courts 
 
 
 92. This section does not identify all areas in which courts have imposed new rigorous standards. 
Rather, the purpose is to identify the most important trends. For instance, the Supreme Court in Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815 (1999), has imposed rigorous criteria for certifying so-called “limited 
fund” classes under Rule (23)(b)(1)(B), and it has suggested in dictum that limited fund class actions 
may never be suitable in mass tort cases. See KLONOFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 15, at 337–38; In re 
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010) (reversing certification of a limited fund 
(b)(1)(A) class seeking recovery for victims of Hurricane Katrina); Doe v. Karadzic 192 F.R.D. 133 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (in light of Ortiz, court reversed prior certification of a limited fund class seeking 
damages for human rights violations allegedly committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the behest of 
Radovan Karadzic). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) has never been a key subdivision for certifying classes, so the 
practical impact of Ortiz is limited. Similarly, courts have held that under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), which is 
designed to protect a defendant from being subject to conflicting court orders, KLONOFF, NUTSHELL, 
supra note 15, at 76, only claims for declaratory and injunction relief can be certified. See, e.g., 
Babineau v. Fed. Express Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1195 (11th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming prior Eleventh 
Circuit law). Such a holding renders (b)(1)(A) essentially meaningless given the availability of (b)(2) 
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Like (b)(1)(B), however, (b)(1)(A) has not been widely utilized, 
so the practical impact of cases such as Babineau is limited. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Class 
Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require Notice 
and Opt-Out Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1)(B)), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216082. Finally, 
some courts have made it more difficult to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. In most 
instances, however, the same reasoning would lead to an identical outcome under commonality 
((a)(2)), adequacy ((a)(4)), or predominance ((b)(3)) See, e.g., Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. 
Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s denial of class certification 
based on failure to satisfy typicality and adequacy of representation requirements); Skipper v. Giant 
Food Inc., 68 F. App’x 393, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s denial of class 
certification for failure to satisfy typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation 
requirements). 
 93. The discussion is presented in logical order, not in order of importance. It begins with the 
evidentiary standard for class certification, then focuses on the requirements for class certification 
(threshold, Rule 23(a), and Rule 23(b), see supra note 15), and then discusses classwide arbitration. 
 94. As discussed infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 
eased the timeline somewhat (see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1), changing timing of the certification 
decision from “as soon as practicable” after the filing of suit to “an early practicable time”) and also 
eliminated so-called “conditional” certification. They also added provisions relating to settlement 
(Rule 23(e)), appointment of class counsel (Rule 23(g)), and attorneys’ fees (Rule 23(h)). The 
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have become increasingly skeptical in reviewing whether a particular case 
satisfies those requirements.
95
 
A. Heightened Evidentiary Burdens 
1. Resolving Merits-Based Disputes at the Class Certification Stage 
Rule 23 defines in detail the requirements for class certification,
96
 but it 
says nothing about whether those requirements must be satisfied by 
evidence (as opposed to merely by pleading). Prior to a landmark 2001 
Seventh Circuit decision, Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,
97
 authored 
by Judge Easterbrook, most courts permitted plaintiffs to seek class 
certification based on the pleadings or on only minimal evidentiary 
support.
98
 
For instance, in Krueger v. New York Telephone Co.,
99
 the court stated 
that “[t]he Court should not resolve any material factual disputes in the 
process of determining whether plaintiffs have provided a reasonable basis 
for their assertions.”100 Similarly, in Newman v. CheckRite California, 
Inc.,
101
 the court stated that “[w]hen evaluating a motion for class 
certification, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true.”102 
Rule 23(f) provided the Seventh Circuit the opportunity to decide what 
quantum of evidence, if any, plaintiffs needed to submit in support of class 
certification. In examining the case law, the Seventh Circuit determined 
that the prevailing approach of looking primarily at the pleadings stemmed 
from a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacqueline.
103
 
 
 
amendments did not, however, alter the certification criteria of Rule 23(a) and (b) or the evidentiary 
burdens to establish those criteria. 
 95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b); see also supra note 15. 
 97. 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 98. See infra note 102. 
 99. 163 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 100. Id. at 438 (citations omitted). 
 101. No. Civ. S-93-1557 LKK, 1996 WL 1118092 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1996) 
 102. Id. at *2 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Avila v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 94 C 3234, 1995 
WL 22866, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1995) (“In considering a motion for class certification, the 
allegations of the complaint are taken as true and the merits are not considered” (citation omitted)). 
 103. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Numerous cases had relied on Eisen in holding that courts could not 
examine the merits in deciding class certification. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (“The Court made clear in [Eisen] that [the class certification] determination does not 
permit or require a preliminary inquiry into the merits”); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 
403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (citing Eisen in stating: “In evaluating a motion for class certification, . . . 
the court does not have the authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case, and 
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The issue in Eisen was whether a court had discretion to shift the cost 
of class notice from the plaintiff (who normally incurred the cost) to the 
defendant based on the court’s assessment that the plaintiff was likely to 
prevail on the merits. The Eisen district court (having been previously 
reversed by the Second Circuit for denying class certification) had adopted 
this approach. After conducting a hearing and finding that plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail on the merits, the district court ordered defendants to pay 
ninety percent of the cost of notifying millions of class members.
104
 In 
rejecting that approach, the Supreme Court stated: “We find nothing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”105 According to 
the Court, “[i]n determining the propriety of a class action, the question is 
not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will 
prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are 
met.”106 Numerous courts interpreted this language to mean that they could 
not address the merits of a case in addressing class certification, even if an 
element of class certification overlapped with the merits.
107
 
Another Supreme Court case, however, pointed in a different direction. 
In General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,
108
 a Title VII case, the Court stated: 
“Sometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine 
whether the interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within 
the named plaintiff’s claim, and sometimes it may be necessary for the 
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question.”109 The Court concluded “that a Title VII class 
action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
[and at least one subdivision of 23(b)] have been satisfied.”110 
By the mid-1990s, and especially in light of Falcon, some courts 
retreated from a strict construction of Eisen, articulating the principle that 
courts should look beyond the pleadings as part of a rigorous class 
 
 
hence the substantive allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true”); Kallus v. Gen. 
Host Corp., Civ. No. B-87-160, 1988 WL 124074, at *3 (D. Conn. June 30, 1988) (citing Eisen in 
holding that at the class certification stage, “the Court need not inquire into the merits of the case, but 
need only examine the plaintiffs’ allegations”). 
 104. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 168. 
 105. Id. at 177. 
 106. Id. at 178 (citation omitted). 
 107. See supra note 103. 
 108. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 109. Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
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certification analysis.
111
 Even these courts, however, generally looked only 
to see if there was some evidence to support class certification and did not 
take it upon themselves to resolve conflicting testimony going to the 
merits.
112
 In Szabo, the Seventh Circuit squarely held that Eisen did not 
prohibit courts from deciding the merits when the merits overlapped with 
an element of class certification.
113
 The Seventh Circuit endorsed not only 
rigorous review of the evidence, but also the resolution of conflicting 
evidence bearing on the merits. 
Szabo involved a nationwide class of individuals who purchased 
allegedly defective machine tools from Bridgeport Machines. The 
complaint asserted fraud and breach of warranty claims. In attempting to 
avoid individualized issues involving oral representations by Bridgeport’s 
distributors, the putative class alleged that all of the misrepresentations 
were authorized or ratified by Bridgeport.
114
 Bridgeport denied that 
assertion. The putative class also argued that the machine tool at issue was 
“unsuited to any machine tool with which it may be mated,” whereas 
Bridgeport argued that the unit’s “operation depends at least in part on the 
tool it is controlling.”115 In addition to these disputes, which were relevant 
both to the merits and class certification, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
there were other important disputes and that these “disputes . . . strongly 
influence the wisdom of class treatment.”116 Indeed, the court said that the 
resolution of the ratification issue was “vital to any sensible decision about 
class certification.”117 
The Seventh Circuit thus ruled that the district court had erred in 
declining to resolve these disputes. As the appellate court explained, 
“nothing in . . . Eisen . . . prevents the district court from looking beneath 
the surface of a complaint to conduct the inquiries identified in [Rule 23] 
and exercise the discretion it confers.”118 The Szabo court reasoned that, 
unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in which the factual sufficiency 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) (“A district court 
certainly may look past the pleadings to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been 
met.”); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Ordinarily the [class 
certification] determination should be predicated on more information than the pleadings will 
provide.” (citation omitted).). 
 112. See, e.g., In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531–32 (M.D. Fla. 
1996) (evidence demonstrating “a ‘colorable method’ of proving [antitrust] impact” was sufficient) 
(citation omitted). 
 113. 249 F.3d at 676–77. 
 114. Id. at 674. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 675. 
 117. Id. at 674. 
 118. Id. at 677. 
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of a case will be determined later by a motion for summary judgment and 
(possibly) a trial, “an order certifying a class usually is the district judge’s 
last word on the subject; there is no later test of the decision’s factual 
premises (and, if the case is settled, there could not be such an 
examination even if the district judge viewed the certification as 
provisional).”119 As a result, the Seventh Circuit held that “[b]efore 
deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action . . . a judge 
should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 
23.”120 Thus, on remand, the Szabo district court needed to resolve all 
disputed merits issues that overlapped with the elements of class 
certification.
121
 
Virtually every federal circuit to rule on the issue has followed the 
Szabo court’s analysis.122 For instance, a Second Circuit panel, in In re 
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation (“IPO”),123 repudiated an 
earlier decision (without even ordering en banc review) and held that “the 
fact that Rule 23 requirement might overlap with an issue on the merits 
does not avoid the court’s obligation to make a ruling as to whether the 
requirement is met[.]”124 
The decision containing the most extensive discussion of this issue is 
the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litigation.
125
 Citing cases such as Szabo and IPO, the Third Circuit 
summarized its detailed analysis as follows: 
[W]e clarify three key aspects of class certification procedure. First, 
the decision to certify a class calls for findings by the court, not 
 
 
 119. Id. at 676. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. On remand, the district court ordered a period of more than six months of class discovery, 
to be followed by a five-day bench trial on class certification. Bridgeport, however, declared 
bankruptcy before these additional proceedings were completed. Id. See Steig D. Olson, “Chipping 
Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification 
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 955–56 (2009) (discussing events on remand in Szabo and quoting 
district court orders). 
 122. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 582 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting 
that “every circuit to have considered this issue . . . has reached essentially the same conclusion: 
Falcon’s central command requires district courts to ensure that Rule 23 requirements are actually met, 
not simply presumed from the pleadings”), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 123. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 124. Id. at 27 (criticizing In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2001), which held that the court’s role at certification was simply to determine whether the 
evidence supporting satisfaction of Rule 23’s requirements was “fatally flawed”); accord, e.g., Oscar 
Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007); Vallario v. 
Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1265–67 (10th Cir. 2009); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 
1266 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 125. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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merely a “threshold showing” by a party, that each requirement of 
Rule 23 is met. Factual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings 
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the 
court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class 
certification, even if they overlap with the merits—including 
disputes touching on elements of the cause of action. Third, the 
court’s obligation to consider all relevant evidence and arguments 
extends to expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking 
class certification or by a party opposing it.
126
 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
127
 the Supreme Court touched upon 
the issues raised in Szabo and Hydrogen Peroxide. By 2011, when the 
Court rendered its decision, the proposition that Eisen did not preclude 
courts from rigorously examining the evidence was so clear that the 
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the pre-Szabo reading of Eisen as 
“mistaken[]” and constituting “the purest dictum.”128 The Court stated that 
“[t]he class determination generally involves considerations that are 
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action.”129 
The Court has continued to reaffirm this approach in more recent cases. 
Thus, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, the 
Court explained that “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent—
but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the 
Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”130 Similarly, in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the Court quoted Dukes for the proposition 
that Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere pleading standard”; instead, a party 
must “be prepared to prove . . . in fact” that the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b) have been satisfied.
131
  
2. Resolving Conflicting Expert Testimony 
The Szabo issue is of particular significance in the context of expert 
witnesses. In many class actions, such as employment and antitrust class 
actions, plaintiffs rely heavily on expert testimony to demonstrate that 
 
 
 126. Id. at 307. The issue of expert testimony is discussed immediately below. 
 127. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 128. Id. at 2552 n.6. 
 129. Id. at 2551–52 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). 
 131. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2551–52) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis by Dukes Court). 
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liability and damages can be proven on a classwide basis. Defendants, in 
turn, rely on expert testimony to show that individualized proof is 
necessary. In these instances, the propriety of class certification will 
depend heavily on what approach the court uses to assess such testimony. 
In Hydrogen Peroxide, the court held that, even if an expert’s 
testimony survives a challenge under Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
132
 when a class certification issue involves 
competing expert testimony by the plaintiff’s expert and the defendant’s 
expert, the court at class certification must decide which side’s expert is 
more credible.
133
 In Hydrogen Peroxide, plaintiffs and defendants 
proffered expert testimony in an antitrust suit on whether the alleged 
conspiracy could be established at trial through evidence common to the 
class. Plaintiffs’ economist opined that the alleged conspiracy could be 
established by common proof, but defendant’s economist testified to the 
contrary. The district court held that “‘[p]laintiffs need only make a 
threshold showing that the element of impact will predominately involve 
generalized issues of proof, rather than questions which are particular to 
each member of the plaintiff class.’”134 The Third Circuit reversed, 
holding that: 
[T]he question at class certification stage is whether, if [impact on 
the entire class from a conspiracy] is plausible in theory, it is also 
susceptible to proof at trial through available evidence common to 
the class. When the latter issue is genuinely disputed, the district 
court must resolve it after considering all relevant evidence.
135
 
The Third Circuit thus rejected the district court’s “threshold showing” 
test, holding instead that “[f]actual determinations necessary to make Rule 
23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence,” and that 
“to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence more likely 
than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 
 
 
 132. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert directed federal courts to perform a gatekeeping function with 
respect to expert testimony. Specifically, Daubert and its progeny instructed courts to consider 
whether the putative expert’s theory or methodology (1) can be tested; (2) has been published or peer-
reviewed; (3) has a known rate of error; and (4) is generally accepted within the “relevant scientific 
community.” 509 U.S. at 589–95. In a subsequent case, the Court held that Daubert was not limited to 
scientific testimony, but rather, applied to all expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
 133. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 134. Id. at 321 (quoting district court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in 
original). 
 135. Id. at 325. 
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23.”136 In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit—echoing the theme in 
Rhone-Poulenc and the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f)—stated 
that class certification is “often the defining moment in class actions (for it 
may . . . create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the 
part of defendants).”137 The court also found support for its ruling in two 
amendments to Rule 23 adopted in 2003. First, the court cited Rule 
23(c)(1)(A), which changed the timing requirement for certification from 
“as soon as practicable” after the filing of suit to “an early practicable 
time” following suit.138 Second, the court cited the elimination in 2003 of 
Rule 23(c)(1)’s language that a class certification “may be conditional.”139 
The court viewed these changes as instructions to the trial court to 
“consider carefully all relevant evidence and make a definitive 
determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met before 
certifying a class.”140 In short, as the Seventh Circuit held in Szabo, the 
Third Circuit held in Hydrogen Peroxide that the district court must 
resolve conflicting evidence bearing on class certification and merits 
issues. 
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of what a 
district court should do when plaintiff and defendant have introduced 
conflicting evidence bearing on both class certification and the merits of 
the claims. Should the court resolve the conflict, as the Third and Seventh 
Circuits have held?  
The Dukes Court did not squarely decide the issue because it found that 
plaintiffs’ expert evidence, standing alone, did not support commonality. 
Likewise, in its most recent opinion on the subject, Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend,
141
 the Court did not address the issue—even in dictum—because 
it found that plaintiffs’ expert evidence, standing alone, did not support 
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). Nevertheless, the Comcast case is 
important because of the strong signal it sends to lower courts to be 
skeptical of class actions as well as rigorous in evaluating plaintiffs’ expert 
evidence. 
In Comcast, the Court held out the possibility that it would deal in 
depth with how courts should treat expert testimony at the class 
certification stage. The Court granted certiorari on the question 
 
 
 136. Id. at 320 (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 310 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 
(3d Cir. 2001)). 
 138. Id. at 318–19. 
 139. Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. at 320. 
 141. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
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“[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving 
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including 
expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages 
on a class-wide basis.”142 Although the question presented did not raise the 
“battle of the experts” issue, the fact that the Court agreed to address 
expert testimony at the class certification stage raised the possibility that 
the Court might comment (in dictum) on the proper approach when 
plaintiffs and defendants have submitted conflicting expert testimony. 
In Comcast, the plaintiff consumers brought an antitrust class action 
under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs alleged that Comcast’s strategy of 
concentrating operations in sixteen counties in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
and Delaware had allowed it to charge supra-competitive prices, thereby 
harming competition and violating the federal antitrust laws.
143
 At the 
district court level, plaintiffs’ expert proposed four theories of “antitrust 
impact”—means by which Comcast’s activities had caused economic 
harm to the class, and which could be proven on a classwide basis. The 
district court accepted one of the theories, rejected the other three, and 
certified the class.
144
 A divided Third Circuit panel affirmed, but the 
Supreme Court reversed in a 5–4 decision.  
As it turned out, the Court did not reach the question on which it had 
granted certiorari because defendant had failed to preserve the argument 
that the expert evidence was inadmissible.
145
 Nonetheless, the Court 
reviewed the certification order and found that “certification was improper 
 
 
 142. 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012). This was not the question upon which Comcast sought review. 
Comcast’s question presented was “whether a district court may certify a class action without 
resolving ‘merits arguments’ that bear on [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23’s prerequisites for 
certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under 
Rule 23(b)(3).” 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ, dissenting) (citation omitted; 
alterations by Court). 
 143. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430 (2013). 
 144. The four theories of antitrust impact stemmed from Comcast’s strategy of concentrating or 
“clustering” its operations in the designated geographical area. Those four theories were: (1) clustering 
“made it profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports programming from its competitors, resulting 
in decreased market penetration by direct broadcast satellite providers”; (2) Comcast’s activities 
reduced competition from “overbuilders”—companies that build competing cable networks in areas 
where another cable company already operates; (3) Comcast “reduced the level of ‘benchmark’ 
competition on which cable customers rely to compare prices”; and (4) the clustering “increased 
Comcast’s bargaining power relative to content providers.” Id. at 1430–31. Of these four theories, the 
district court found that only the second one, the “overbuilder” theory, was capable of classwide proof. 
Id. at 1431. 
 145. See id. at 1431 n.4 (noting that Comcast’s failure to object to the admission of plaintiffs’ 
expert evidence “would make it impossible for petitioners to argue that [plaintiffs’ expert’s] testimony 
was not ‘admissible evidence’” under the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also id. at 1436 (Ginsburg & 
Breyer, J.J., dissenting) (“At this late date, Comcast may no longer argue that respondents’ damages 
evidence was inadmissible.”). 
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because respondents had failed to establish that damages could be 
measured on a classwide basis.”146 Because plaintiffs’ proposed economic 
model was not specific to the only theory of antitrust impact that the 
district court had accepted, the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to 
meet the predominance standard of Rule 23(b)(3). 
The Court’s opinion provoked a strong dissent, jointly authored by 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. First, the dissent argued that the Court 
should have dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari after it became 
evident that the question the Court had agreed to decide was no longer in 
the case (because of Comcast’s failure to raise it below). The dissent noted 
that the failure to dismiss the petition ran counter to the Court’s usual 
practice of dismissing cases as improvidently granted when unforeseen 
procedural obstacles prevent the Court from reaching the question it 
originally agreed to decide.
147
 Moreover, the dissent contended that the 
Court’s holding represented a “profoundly mistaken view of antitrust 
law.”148 Finally, the dissent found fault with the majority’s willingness, 
contrary to its usual practice, to “disturb findings of fact in which two 
courts below have concurred.”149 
3. Reactions to the Szabo/Hydrogen Peroxide Approach 
Although Comcast was decided only recently and thus has not 
generated substantial commentary, a number of scholars have analyzed 
and praised the Szabo/Hydrogen Peroxide line of cases. The late Professor 
Richard Nagareda, for example, called this case law a “welcome step 
forward,”150 while Professor Richard Marcus described that law as a 
“positive development.”151 Not all courts and commentators, however, 
have embraced this authority. Several judges and commentators have 
expressed concern about imposing this high burden on plaintiffs at the 
class certification stage.
152
 Such an approach must inevitably mean that 
 
 
 146. Id. at 1431 n.4. 
 147. Id. at 1435 (“This case comes to the Court infected by our misguided reformulation of the 
question presented. For that reason alone, we would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.”). 
 148. Id. at 1437. 
 149. Id. at 1439 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
97, 111, 113 (2009). 
 151. Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on 
Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 372 (2011). 
 152. See, e.g., In re Mills Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 101, 108 (E.D. Va. 2009) (stating that 
inquiry into merits at the class certification stage is “putting the cart before the horse”); Ross v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 257 F.R.D. 435, 441 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“the court’s rigorous analysis must 
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significant (or even complete) merits discovery must occur before class 
certification. Plaintiffs cannot be held to the high evidentiary burden 
imposed by Szabo and Hydrogen Peroxide without being given every 
chance to develop all relevant evidence. The result, however, is that the 
class certification decision must inevitably be delayed, possibly until the 
end of full merits discovery. 
In the author’s view, delaying certification until late in the case is 
contrary to the sequencing set forth in Rule 23. As noted above,
153
 the 
1966 version of Rule 23 provided that the court should rule on class 
certification “as soon as practicable after commencement of an action.”154 
Although, as the Hydrogen Peroxide court noted, Rule 23 was amended in 
2003 to alter this language, the new language, “at an early practicable 
time,”155 still envisions that the certification decision will occur relatively 
early in the case. Likewise, the removal of language in Rule 23(c)(1) 
providing that class certification may be conditional provides no support 
for imposing a new standard of proof on plaintiffs—especially one that 
materially alters the timing of, and the discovery necessary for, the 
certification decision. 
Requiring district courts to resolve conflicting evidence in ruling on 
class certification impacts more than just timing and discovery issues. 
Ultimately, in cases in which the court denies certification because it 
credits defendant’s evidence over plaintiff’s evidence, the Hydrogen 
Peroxide approach usurps the jury’s role to weigh and adjudicate 
conflicting evidence. If, for example, both plaintiffs and defendants in an 
antitrust case have presented admissible, probative expert testimony on 
how classwide impact will be established, the weighing of such evidence 
should be done by the jury at trial. 
While courts have imposed strict new evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs, 
they have increasingly permitted defendants to seek denial of class 
certification without submitting to discovery. For instance, in Pilgrim v. 
Universal Health Card, LLC,
156
 the Sixth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of class allegations in a nationwide class action, 
 
 
be limited to the substance and structure of Plaintiff’s claims, rather than an inquiry into the merits”); 
Michael S. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification 
Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323 (2010); Steig D. Olson, 
“Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class 
Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935 (2009). 
 153. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (amended 1966). 
 155. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 156. 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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reasoning that “we cannot see how discovery or for that matter more time 
would have helped [plaintiffs].”157 Other courts have taken this approach 
as well.
158
 Case law requiring plaintiffs to put forward exacting evidentiary 
proof in support of class certification is difficult to square with case law 
permitting defendants to move to strike class allegations without allowing 
plaintiffs even minimal discovery. While it is theoretically possible to 
reconcile the case law, ultimately these cases—taken as a whole—
demonstrate that courts are more skeptical about certifying classes than in 
the past. 
This author submits that courts should not resolve disputed factual 
issues as part of the class certification process. As long as plaintiffs offer 
substantial, admissible proof from which a jury could adjudicate important 
issues on a classwide basis, plaintiffs should not be required to convince 
the court that their evidence is more persuasive than defendant’s evidence. 
This approach is consistent with the Court’s decision in Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, which held that plaintiffs 
did not need to prove materiality at the certification stage because “the 
focus of Rule 23(b)(3) is on the predominance of common questions,” not 
on the merits answers to those questions.
159
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Comcast did not resolve the 
Hydrogen Peroxide issue (whether the court must resolve conflicting 
evidence). Nonetheless, the fact that the Court decided the case at all 
might signal to lower courts that the safest approach in most cases is to 
reject class certification. As the dissent persuasively argued, the Court 
should have dismissed the case as improvidently granted instead of relying 
on arguments not encompassed by the question presented. The Court 
delved deeply into the highly technical facts, all to the end of reversing a 
fact-based class certification decision rendered by the district court and 
upheld by the Third Circuit. Plainly, the message conveyed by the 
majority is that courts should review motions for class certification with 
great skepticism. That message was especially clear because the Court 
subsequently vacated and remanded three other class certification rulings 
in light of Comcast.
160
 
 
 
 157. Id. at 949. 
 158. See, e.g., Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651 (D. Nev. 2009) (granting 
defendants’ motion to deny class certification despite recognizing that “the better course is to deny 
such a motion because the shape and form of a class action evolves only through the process of 
discovery”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013) (emphasis in original). 
 160. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding class certification 
appropriate in case alleging product defects in washing machines), vacated and remanded, No. 12-
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Because Comcast was rendered shortly before this article went to press, 
it is too early to say with certainty what the precise impact of the case will 
be.
161
 Most likely, however, the decision will cause district courts to be 
even more reluctant than before in certifying class actions, especially 
when plaintiffs are relying heavily on expert testimony. 
4. Resolving Challenges to Admissibility (Including Daubert 
Challenges) at the Class Certification Stage 
This author’s approach—which cuts back considerably on Hydrogen 
Peroxide and Szabo—does not mean that courts should never resolve 
contested issues at class certification. If defendant contends that the 
evidence relied upon by plaintiffs for class certification would be 
inadmissible at trial, the court must decide the admissibility question at the 
class certification stage. For example, if testimony relied on by plaintiffs 
in support of certification would be admissible under one view of the 
substantive law but inadmissible under another, the court must decide the 
legal issue to ensure that, in fact, plaintiffs’ evidence supporting class 
certification would in fact be admissible at trial.
162
 
The issue of admissibility frequently arises in the expert witness 
context, where the defendant raises a Daubert challenge to the 
admissibility of an expert’s testimony bearing on class certification on the 
ground that it is not generally accepted in the relevant scientific, technical, 
or professional community. Some recent decisions have held that the court 
 
 
1067, 2013 S. Ct. WL 775366 (June 3, 2013); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products 
Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming certification of similar claims for breach of 
warranty, negligent design, and failure to warn), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (No. 12-322) 
(Apr. 1, 2013); Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming certification 
of labor class action; finding in particular that “Dukes does not change the district court’s commonality 
result”), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (No. 12-165) (Apr. 1, 2013). 
 161. Compare, e.g., Stephen A. Fogdall & Christian D. Sheehan, Expert Testimony at the 
Certification Stage: The Impact of Comcast v. Behrend, 123 DLR I-1, 2013, 2013 WL 3201173, at *1 
(June 26, 2013) (suggesting that Comcast “will likely have a significant impact on the treatment of 
expert evidence at the class certification stage” and that under Comcast, “courts may not sidestep a 
battle of the experts”), with 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1436, 1437 (Breyer & Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the majority’s opinion “breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)” and that “[t]he Court’s ruling is good for this day and case only”). 
 162. For instance, in Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), the 
Second Circuit held that, in a dispute between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts involving how 
antitrust damages should be calculated, the district court was not required to resolve the underlying 
legal question about how damages should be calculated. That holding was erroneous, in the author’s 
view, as a subsequent Second Circuit panel held in In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
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must resolve the Daubert challenge at the class certification stage.
163
 As 
the Seventh Circuit stated in American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen:
164
 
[W]hen an expert’s report or testimony is critical to class 
certification . . . a district court must conclusively rule on any 
challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior to 
ruling on a class certification motion. That is, the district court must 
perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the 
situation warrants.
165
 
The Eleventh Circuit has followed American Honda, finding that the 
district court erred in refusing to apply Daubert at the class certification 
stage.
166
 
The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, has squarely rejected American Honda 
in In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation.
167
 There, the 
defendant moved to strike the testimony of two experts on Daubert 
grounds. The district court declined to conduct a full-blown Daubert 
inquiry but instead conducted a “focused” inquiry based on the evidence 
produced thus far.
168
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
refusal to conduct a full-blown Daubert analysis, reasoning: 
Zurn’s desire for an exhaustive and conclusive Daubert inquiry 
before the completion of merits discovery cannot be reconciled with 
the inherently preliminary nature of pretrial evidentiary and class 
certification rulings. The main purpose of [the] Daubert exclusion is 
to protect juries from being swayed by dubious scientific testimony. 
That interest is not implicated at the class certification stage where 
the judge is the decision maker.
169
 
Several district courts have similarly adopted a modified, less rigorous 
Daubert inquiry.
170
 Moreover, some district courts have refused to apply 
 
 
 163. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812–14 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Reed v. Advocate 
Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573, 594 n.20 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 164. 600 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 165. Id. at 815–16. 
 166. Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App’x 887, 890–91 (11th Cir. 2011) (endorsing American 
Honda). 
 167. 644 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1752 (2013). 
 168. Id. at 614. 
 169. Id. at 613 (paragraph break omitted). 
 170. See, e.g., Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp. No. 09-cv-1669 WQH (POR), 2011 WL 
2200631, at *15 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2011); La Bauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 644 (S.D. Ala. 
2005); Midwestern Mach. v. Nw. Airlines, 211 F.R.D. 562, 565–66 (D. Minn. 2001). 
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even a modified version of Daubert, holding that Daubert is entirely 
inapplicable at class certification.
171
 
The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue. In Dukes, the Supreme 
Court suggested that it was sympathetic with the approach in American 
Honda, but it did not definitively decide the issue. The Court stated: “The 
District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at 
the class certification stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt that is 
so, but even if properly considered, [the expert’s] testimony does nothing 
to advance [plaintiffs’] case.”172 As noted, the Supreme Court did not 
resolve the Daubert issue in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, even though that 
issue was encompassed in the question presented, because defendant had 
failed to object to the admission of plaintiffs’ expert evidence at the trial 
level, thus waiving the issue.
173
 
Although Hydrogen Peroxide requires plaintiffs to satisfy too high of a 
standard at the class certification stage, the same cannot be said of the 
American Honda approach. If an expert will not be permitted to testify at 
all at trial, plaintiff should not be able to rely on that inadmissible 
testimony in support of class certification. As one court put it, “class 
certification decisions must be made based on admissible evidence.”174 A 
Daubert inquiry ensures that plaintiffs’ evidence meets minimal standards 
of reliability and admissibility, and it therefore enables the court to assess 
whether plaintiffs can prove their claims on a classwide basis with 
evidence the jury will be permitted to consider. But once the court 
determines that plaintiffs’ evidence satisfies the Daubert threshold for 
admissibility, the court should not resolve the question of whether 
plaintiffs’ or defendants’ evidence is more persuasive.  
In sum, the court at class certification should conduct a rigorous review 
of the evidence supporting class certification. That means it should satisfy 
itself that plaintiffs’ evidence, if credited by the fact finder, would 
establish the elements of the claims on a classwide basis. The court should 
also satisfy itself that the evidence is admissible, and this determination 
may involve a full-scale Daubert review in the case of expert witness 
evidence. Once the court determines that plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficiently 
probative to be admissible at trial, however, it should not weigh plaintiffs’ 
 
 
 171. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 2009 WL 910702, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2009); Cole 
v. ASARCO Inc., 256 F.R.D. 690, 696 n.3 (N.D. Okla. 2009). 
 172. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–54 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 173. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 174. DeRosa v. Mass. Bay Commuter Rail Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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evidence against defendant’s evidence in an effort to determine which 
side’s evidence to credit. 
B. Stringent Requirement of a Class Definition 
Recent case law has also imposed rigorous obligations on plaintiffs in 
defining the scope of the putative class action. A class definition, of 
course, is critical to ascertain who is in the class, who is subject to notice, 
and who is bound by the judgment.
175
 Prior to 2003, the requirement of a 
class definition was solely a matter of case law,
176
 and it was not even 
mentioned in Rule 23.
177
 In 2003, Rule 23 was amended to state that “[a]n 
order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims, 
issues, or defenses.”178 The rule, however, does not elaborate on what 
constitutes an adequate class definition. 
The Manual for Complex Litigation contains some general guidance. 
First, the definition should contain “objective criteria” and “avoid 
subjective standards (e.g., a plaintiff’s state of mind) or terms that depend 
on resolution of the merits (e.g., persons who were discriminated 
against).”179 A definition that turns on the merits is sometimes called a 
“fail-safe” class, because the class is certified (and a binding judgment 
entered) only if plaintiff wins the case.
180
 Second, “the class definition 
[should] capture[] all members necessary for efficient and fair resolution 
of common questions of fact and law in a single proceeding.”181 Third, 
“[t]he class definition should describe the operative claims, issues, or 
defenses.”182 The Manual also recognizes that more specificity is needed 
for (b)(3) classes, which allow opt-outs, than for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, 
which are mandatory.
183
 In the case of a putative Rule 23(b)(2) class, it 
states that “[t]here is no need to identify every individual member at the 
time of certification . . . as long as the court can determine at any given 
time whether a particular individual is member of the class.”184 A Rule 
 
 
 175. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter “MCL 
(4th)”]. 
 176. See KLONOFF, ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 37. 
 177. Id. 
 178. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
 179. MCL (4th), supra note 175 at § 21.222. 
 180. See, e.g., Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 181. MCL (4th), supra note 175, § 21.222. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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23(b)(3) class, however, “require[s] a class definition that will permit 
identification of individual class members.”185 
Between 1966 and 2000, relatively few cases turned on the adequacy of 
the class definition.
186
 In most cases, courts allowed plaintiffs to 
reformulate the definition to satisfy any concerns.
187
 In recent years, 
however, a significant number of courts have utilized the requirement of 
an adequate class definition to deny class certification. In the last five 
years alone, dozens of cases have denied class certification because of a 
flawed definition (either solely on that ground or as one of alternative 
grounds).
188
 Although some of these decisions can be justified on their 
 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Although there have been instances in which courts denied certification because of a flawed 
class definition throughout the existence of modern Rule 23, until recently, the overwhelming majority 
of certification decisions relied primarily on Rule 23’s explicit requirements. Indeed, one leading 
treatise states that, under the traditional approach, “[i]f the general outlines of the membership of the 
class are determinable at the outset of the litigation, a class will be deemed to exist.” 7A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 (3d ed. 2011) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter 7A WRIGHT ET AL.]. As a summary of the entire body of jurisprudence from the 1966 
adoption of Rule 23 to the present, this assessment may be accurate, but if one focuses solely on the 
last few years, a very different picture emerges, in which an increasing number of courts are giving 
short shrift to the Rule 23(a) and (b) elements and instead going directly to the class definition to deny 
certification. 
 187. See, e.g., id. (noting the “liberal judicial attitude toward defining the class” and that “it 
normally is not essential to delimit its membership with a high degree of precision at the class-
certification stage”). 
 188. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012); Romberio v. 
Unumprovident Corp., 385 Fed. App’x. 423, 430–31 (6th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Oberon Media, Inc., 
468 Fed. App’x 768, 770 (9th Cir. 2012); Abby v. Paige, 282 F.R.D. 576 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Berndt v. 
California Dept. of Corr., No. C03-3174 PJH, 2012 WL 950625, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012); 
Gonzales v. Comcast Corp., No. 10-cv-01010-LJO-BAM 2012 WL 10621, at *20–21 (E.D. Cal. Jan 3, 
2012); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2012 WL 2061883, at *3–5 (E.D. La. June 6, 
2012); Korsmo v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 11 C 1176, 2012 WL 1655969, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. 
May 10, 2012); Melton ex rel. Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 283 F.R.D. 280, 288–89 (D.S.C. 
2012); Oginski v. Paragon Properties of Costa Rica, LLC, 282 F.R.D. 672, 677–78 (S.D. Fla. 2012); 
Rowden v. Pacific Parking Systems, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 585–86 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Allen v. Int’l 
Truck & Engine Corp., No. 3:07-cv-361, 2011 WL 2975543, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2011); Bauer 
v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., No. 08-5013, 2011 WL 3924963, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2011); Clavell v. 
Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 10-3593, 2011 WL 2462046, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011); Colapinto 
v. Esquire Deposition Svcs., LLC, No. CV 09-07584 SJO (PLAx), 2011 WL 913251, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 8, 2011); Rader v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 524, 528–29 (D. Nev. 2011); 
Schilling v. Kenton Cnty., Ky., No. 10-143-DLB, 2011 WL 293759, at *7–8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2011); 
Shanley v. Cadle, 277 F.R.D. 63, 67–68 (D. Mass. 2011); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–91 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Benefield v. Int’l Paper Co., 270 F.R.D. 640, 644–45 (M.D. 
Ala. 2010); Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 264 F.R.D. 659, 664–66 (N.D. Ala. 
2010); Kissling v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 5:10-22-JMH, 2010 WL 1978862, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 14, 
2010); Konik v. Time Warner Cable, No. CV 07-763 SVW (RZx), 2010 WL 8471923, at *10 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 24, 2010); Mann v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 09-1062 (RBK/AMD), 2010 WL 4226526, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2010); McDonald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV-09-00781-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 
4572758, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); Tech v. United States, 271 F.R.D. 451, 456–57 (M.D. Pa. 
2010); Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437, 478–79 (D.N.J. 2009); Cunningham 
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particular facts, others have adopted an overly demanding approach to 
evaluating class definitions. 
An example of the latter approach is Cole v. ASARCO Inc.
189
 In that 
case, a district court found plaintiffs’ proposed class definition of “[a]ll 
individuals and entities who owned or had an interest in real property in 
the Class Area as of May 14, 2001” to be “untenable.”190 The court 
concluded that, “[a]bsent a cognizable class, determining whether 
plaintiffs or the putative class satisfy the other Rule 23(a) and 
(b) requirements is unnecessary.”191 Similarly, in Sanders v. Apple Inc.,192 
the court granted defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s class 
allegations.
193
 The Sanders court couched its discussion of 
unascertainability in terms of Article III standing, stating that the class 
needed to “be defined in such a way that anyone within it would have 
standing.”194 In Brazil v. Dell, Inc.,195 the court struck plaintiffs’ class 
allegations on the ground that the proposed definition, including 
“California persons or entities who purchased Dell computer products that 
‘[defendant] falsely advertised,’” was an impermissible fail-safe class.196 
And in Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co.,
197
 the court found the proposed 
definition of “[a]ll commercial fisherman whose oyster leases were 
contaminated by oil discharged during Hurricane Katrina due to the 
 
 
Charter Corp. v. Learjet Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325–27 (S.D. Ill. 2009); Cole v. ASARCO Inc., 256 
F.R.D. 690, 696–97 (N.D. Okla. 2009); In re McDonald’s French Fries Litig., 257 F.R.D. 669, 673 
(N.D. Ill. 2009); Johnson v. Geico Cas. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 255, 268 (D. Del. 2009); Mazur v. eBay 
Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567–68 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 257 F.R.D. 159, 172 (S.D. 
Ind. 2009); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Solo v. Bausch & Lomb 
Inc., No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2009 WL 4287706, at *4–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2009); Walls v. 
Sagamore Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-1020, 2009 WL 890528, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2009); Barasich v. 
Shell Pipeline Co., No. 05-4180, 2008 WL 6468611, at *4 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008); Burkhead v. 
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 250 F.R.D. 287, 294 (W.D. Ky. 2008); Cohen v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 259 F.R.D. 617, 630–31 (S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 397 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354, 362 (S.D. Iowa 2008); In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2008 WL 4681368, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008). 
 189. 256 F.R.D. 690 (N.D. Okla. 2009). 
 190. Id. at 696. 
 191. Id. at 696–97 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 192. 672 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 193. Id. at 991. 
 194. Id. at 991 (quoting Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 195. 585 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also Brazil v. Dell, Inc., No. C-07-07100 RMW, 
2010 WL 5387831, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010) (certifying class with modified definition that 
included “all California citizens (with limited exclusions) who purchased through [defendant’s] 
website certain models of Dell computers within specified date ranges . . .”). The court explained that, 
“[u]nlike earlier proposed class definitions, this class definition does not require a legal determination 
in order to ascertain class membership.” Id. 
 196. Id. at 1167. 
 197. No. 05-4180, 2008 WL 6468611 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008). 
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negligence of defendants” to be inadequate, noting in particular that 
plaintiffs had not included any geographical boundaries in their 
definition.
198
 To the extent that the definitions in those cases were flawed 
at all, they could have been fixed with minor tinkering. Denying class 
certification is a judicial overreaction—an approach that is the polar 
opposite of the approach taken by most courts in the 1960s through the 
mid-1990s. 
In many instances, what courts are doing under the guise of reviewing 
the class definition is applying the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a) and 
(b). Indeed, several courts have acknowledged as much.
199
 The problem 
with this approach is that it leaves plaintiffs without clear guidance as to 
what constitutes an adequate class definition, and also injects confusion 
over what is required to satisfy each element of Rule 23(a) and (b). 
A striking example of confusing the Rule 23 elements with the 
question of whether the class definition is adequate is Romberio v. 
Unumprovident Corp.,
200
 in which the Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) ERISA class. The district court had 
“defined the class to include only those plan participants and beneficiaries 
whose long-term disability benefits were denied or terminated ‘after being 
subjected to any of the practices alleged in the Complaint.’”201 The lower 
court had rejected defendant’s argument that the class definition was 
flawed because it was indefinite.
202
 In an unpublished 2–1 disposition, the 
appellate court reversed, finding that the only way to determine whether 
someone’s claims were improperly denied was “to engage in 
individualized fact-finding, and the need for such individualized fact-
finding makes the district court’s class definition unsatisfactory.”203 The 
court found that these same concerns meant that the typicality requirement 
(Rule 23(a)(3)) also was not satisfied, and that the class was not cohesive 
under Rule 23(b)(2).
204
 But the court’s class definition analysis confuses 
 
 
 198. Id. at *4 (alteration by court). 
 199. See, e.g., Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-CV-06634-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4788207, at *2–
3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (finding numerosity not met due to unascertainability of class definition); 
Cole v. ASARCO Inc., 256 F.R.D. 690, 696–97 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (to similar effect); Mann v. TD 
Bank, N.A., No. 09-1062 (RBK/AMD), 2010 WL 4226526, at *11–17 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2010) (finding, 
as a result of a flawed class definition, that plaintiffs failed predominance, superiority, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation). 
 200. 385 Fed. App’x 423 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 201. Id. at 430. 
 202. In re UnumProvident Corp. ERISA Benefits Denial Actions, 245 F.R.D. 317, 322 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2007). 
 203. Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp, 385 Fed. App’x 423, 431 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 204. Id. at 431–33. 
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the questions of whether the putative class violates Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 
23(b)(2)—because individualized factfinding is necessary to determine if a 
class member has a valid claim—with the question of whether a person is 
in the class at all, regardless of whether the class member ultimately 
prevails on his or her claim. The approach in Romberio is especially 
troublesome because courts are supposed to be less exacting in assessing 
class definitions in (b)(2) cases than in (b)(3) cases.
205
 
The trend of more exacting scrutiny of class definitions has not gone 
unnoticed. In fact, it has been recognized by one of the nation’s leading 
class action defense attorneys, John Beisner. In a recent article, Beisner 
noted that “more and more decisions are turning on [the requirement of an 
ascertainable class definition].”206 He thus urged class action defense 
counsel to look for ways to challenge the class definition.
207
 
Some decisions have not followed this trend, but instead have taken a 
more measured approach in addressing class definitions. For instance, the 
Seventh Circuit has said that crafting a proper class definition “is more of 
an art than a science.”208 According to the court, problems with a class 
definition, such as overinclusiveness or a “fail-safe” concern, “can and 
often should be solved by refining the class definition rather than by flatly 
denying class certification on that basis.”209 In another case, Kamar v. 
RadioShack Corp.,
210
 the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to a definition 
as creating a fail-safe class. In Kamar, the district court had certified a 
class of 
[a]ll California employees of defendant paid on an hourly basis as 
nonexempt employees for the period of March 2003 to the present 
who (a) were instructed to and attended a Saturday store meeting or 
district office meeting without receiving the full amount of 
mandated premium pay, or (b) worked a split shift schedule without 
receiving the full amount of mandated premium pay, or (c) fit into 
both (a) and (b).
211
 
 
 
 205. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text. 
 206. John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Ascertainability: Reading Between 
the Lines of Rule 23, TOXICS L. REP. (BNA), 2011 WL 899331 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Messner v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 209. Id. The court cited several decisions in which the courts revised the class definition instead of 
denying class certification. Id. 
 210. 375 Fed. App’x 734 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 211. Id. at 735. 
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The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the fail-safe argument, instead 
characterizing the defendant’s argument as an “assert[ion] that, in effect, 
the district court was required to decide the common legal issues before it 
certified the class.”212 The appellate court noted that the class definition 
was “not a circular one that determines the scope of the class only once it 
is decided that a class member was actually wronged,” but rather, unlike in 
a fail-safe class, “if a class member was not legally wronged, [defendant] 
will be protected against liability to that person.”213 
The Fifth Circuit has gone even further and has explicitly rejected any 
prohibition on “fail-safe” classes. In Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc.,
214
 the defendant argued that the lower court had erred in 
certifying a class “whose membership [could] only be ascertained,” 
according to defendant, “by a determination of the merits of the case 
because the class is defined in terms of the ultimate question of 
liability.”215 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed, affirming the lower 
court and noting that “our precedent rejects the fail-safe class 
prohibition . . . .”216 The Fifth Circuit explained that a class is 
appropriately defined where the class members “are linked by [a] common 
complaint, and the possibility that some may fail to prevail on their 
individual claims will not defeat class membership.”217  
Other courts have taken a similarly flexible approach to class 
definition. These courts have not allowed plaintiffs to proceed with ill-
defined classes. Rather, instead of denying class certification outright, they 
have worked with the plaintiffs to address alleged flaws. An example of 
this approach is Campbell v. First American Title Insurance Co.,
218
 a 
putative class action against a title insurer for violations of Maine statutory 
and common law. In evaluating plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, 
the district court found that plaintiffs had offered an impermissible “fail-
safe” class definition, under which the membership of the class was 
 
 
 212. Id. at 736. 
 213. Id. 
 214. 695 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 215. Id. at 369–70. 
 216. Id. at 370; accord, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620, 623, 624 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (rejecting fail-safe argument for class defined as “all members of the crew of the M/V 
Treasure Chest Casino who have been stricken with occupational respiratory illness caused by or 
exacerbated by the defective ventilation system in place aboard the vessel”); Forbush v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant’s fail-safe argument was “meritless and, if 
accepted, would preclude certification of just about any class of persons alleging injury from a 
particular action”). 
 217. Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 370 (quoting Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1105 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 218. 269 F.R.D. 68 (D. Me. 2010). 
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dependent upon a legal conclusion.
219
 Rather than denying certification, 
however, the court exercised its discretion to revise the class definition so 
as to rectify the problem, and it then certified the class.
220
 
Consistent with the aforementioned line of cases, the Fifth Circuit 
recently endorsed a similarly pragmatic approach in the settlement context. 
In Union Asset Management Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc.,
221
 it affirmed a 
district court’s certification of a securities class. The appellate court 
rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the class definition, which 
defined the class as “[a]ll persons who purchased or otherwise acquired 
the common stock of [defendant], directly or beneficially, between May 
16, 2002 and September 8, 2006, inclusive, and were damaged thereby.”222 
Class objectors argued that “the ‘damaged thereby’ language render[ed]” 
the class definition improper, because the class could not be ascertained 
without “mini-trials on the merits to determine whether [defendant’s] 
alleged securities fraud has in fact caused damage to each claimant.”223 
The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the lower court had not abused its 
discretion in certifying the class as defined.
224
 “In fact,” the court noted, 
“the ‘damaged thereby’ language is routine in class definitions, and no 
court has found it to be problematic.”225 Describing the objectors’ concern 
about mini-trials as “misplaced,” the Fifth Circuit explained: “Potential 
class members incurred the alleged damages just by holding stock, and a 
quick look at the trading records is all that is required to determine 
whether someone did so.”226 This, said the court, was “a mechanical and 
objective standard, [and] in no way an individualized ‘causal’ 
determination on the merits.”227 Union Asset thus represents an 
encouraging contrast to decisions that have taken an unduly narrow and 
rigid approach to construing proposed class definitions. 
Crafting a clear and workable class definition is difficult. Frequently, 
plaintiffs need to conduct discovery before arriving at a definition that 
 
 
 219. Id. at 74. 
 220. Id. at 73–74, 77–78. For other recent examples, see, e.g., Chakejian v. Equifax Info. Servs., 
256 F.R.D. 492, 497–98 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Demmick v. Cellco Partnership, No. 06-2163 (JLL), 2010 
WL 3636216, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2010); In re ABMD Ltd., 439 B.R. 475, 482–84 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 2010); Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 188–89 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 
 221. 669 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Schuleman v. Union Asset Management 
Holding, A.G., 133 S. Ct. 317 (2012). 
 222. Id. at 639–40 (alteration by court of appeals). 
 223. Id. at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. (citations omitted). 
 226. Id. (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 227. Id. 
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takes into account the nuances of the case. In other situations, an 
inadequate class definition can often be fixed through simple word 
changes. Courts that have concerns about a class definition should not 
deny class certification without giving plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity 
to draft a workable definition. Many of the recent cases have not followed 
this approach. 
C. Heightened Scrutiny of Numerosity 
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue 
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if [] the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”228 Until 
recently, the so-called “numerosity” requirement rarely posed a roadblock 
to class certification, and defendants frequently stipulated to this element. 
Classes of forty or more had usually been deemed sufficient,
229
 and in 
some instances courts had upheld classes with as few as thirteen or twenty 
class members.
230
 Thus, the numerosity bar was not high. Indeed, as a 
practical matter, courts and defendants rarely needed to worry about 
numerosity: few plaintiffs’ lawyers wanted to waste their time pursuing 
class certification (with all of its hurdles) for a small number of claimants, 
so there was little reason to be concerned about a dearth of class members. 
Courts occasionally found numerosity problems,
231
 but these decisions 
tended to be outliers. 
Recently, however, some courts have given the numerosity element 
real teeth—not just in cases where the class truly was too small, but in 
cases where, despite a reasonable assumption that the class was large, 
plaintiffs were faulted for not putting forward sufficient evidence to 
establish the actual class size. Put another way, consistent with the general 
trend to require more evidentiary proof at the class certification stage, a 
number of courts now require exacting proof of numerosity, even when 
common sense would suggest that the class greatly exceeds the minimum 
number required under the case law. In some instances, numerosity was 
 
 
 228. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 229. Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979). 
 230. See, e.g., Dale Elecs. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534–36 (D.N.H. 1971) (finding 13 
class members sufficient); Rosario v. Cook Cnty., 101 F.R.D. 659, 661–62 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding 20 
class members sufficient). 
 231. See, e.g., Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding 
finding that numerosity was not satisfied in securities fraud case because plaintiffs offered only 
evidence of number of shares traded, not number of class members; appellate court held that plaintiffs 
could provide additional evidence to the district court). 
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one of several problems; in others, it was the sole rationale for denying 
certification. 
For instance, in Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
232
 the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court on numerosity grounds. The case involved a 
class of T-Mobile employees in Florida who claimed they were denied 
sales commissions. Plaintiffs’ evidence indicated that there were 
thousands of employees nationwide, but their proof did not address the 
number of such employees in Florida. The district court—“after first 
noting that, ‘as a general rule, one may say that less than twenty-one is 
inadequate [for a finding of numerosity], more than forty is adequate, and 
numbers falling in between are open to judgment based on other 
factors’”—found that “‘well over forty individuals fall within the class 
definition adopted by this Court.’”233 In reversing the district court and 
finding that numerosity was not satisfied, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
Yes, T-Mobile is a large company, with many retail outlets, and as 
such, it might be tempting to assume that the number of retail sales 
associates the company employed in Florida during the relevant 
period can overcome the generally low hurdle presented by Rule 
23(a)(1). However, . . . [i]n this case, the district court’s inference of 
numerosity for a Florida-only class without the aid of a shred of 
Florida-only evidence was an exercise in sheer speculation.
234
 
Nor is the Eleventh Circuit alone in this rigorous approach to 
numerosity. For example, the Third Circuit, in Marcus v. BMW of North 
America, LLC,
235
 reversed the district court’s certification of a class, 
finding that numerosity was not satisfied.
236
 There, the court of appeals 
found that the plaintiff had “offered sufficient company-wide evidence to 
the District Court to support a finding of numerosity for a nationwide 
class” of BMW owners with “run-flat” tires (“RFTs”), but that it could 
only “speculate” as to whether the number of class members in New 
Jersey was sufficient to satisfy numerosity.
237
 Among other things, 
plaintiffs showed that over 740,000 BMWs nationwide were equipped 
with RFTs during the class period. Those tires were manufactured by 
Bridgestone or one of six other manufacturers. Despite the fact that 
 
 
 232. 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 233. Id. at 1266–67 (quoting district court) (alteration in original). 
 234. Id. at 1267. 
 235. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 236. Id. at 588. 
 237. Id. at 595–96. 
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numerosity is normally satisfied with forty class members, that New 
Jersey is a relatively affluent and populous state, and that Bridgestone is a 
major tire manufacturer, the Third Circuit held that numerosity was not 
satisfied. As the court explained: 
[T]he District Court found that the New Jersey class met the 
numerosity requirement because “it is common sense that there will 
be more members of the class than the number of consumers who 
complained—probably significantly more,” and “common sense 
indicates that there will be at least 40.” That may be a bet worth 
making, but it cannot support a finding of numerosity sufficient for 
Rule 23(a)(1). . . . 
Of course, Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to offer direct 
evidence of the exact number and identities of the class members. 
But in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must show 
sufficient circumstantial evidence specific to the products, 
problems, parties, and geographic areas actually covered by the 
class definition to allow a district court to make a factual finding. 
Only then may the court rely on “common sense” to forgo precise 
calculations and exact numbers.
238
 
The court concluded that, “[g]iven the complete lack of evidence specific 
to BMWs purchased or leased in New Jersey with Bridgestone [run-flat 
tires] that have gone flat and been replaced, the District Court’s 
numerosity ruling crossed the line separating inference and 
speculation.”239 
The Tenth Circuit, in Trevizo v. Adams,
240
 took a similarly demanding 
approach. The facts of Trevizo centered around the execution of a search 
warrant at a Latino-owned business in Salt Lake City. The plaintiffs, 
thirty-three individuals who were subjected to a “SWAT-style police 
raid,” filed suit under § 1983, alleging “gross improprieties” by the 
officers, such as “physical and verbal abuse of persons at the scene, 
including pregnant women and children.”241 Among other things, the 
plaintiffs sought to certify a class action consisting of persons “who were 
subjected to the raid but failed to file suit.”242 The district court denied 
class certification, finding that numerosity was not met, and the Tenth 
 
 
 238. Id. at 596 (citations omitted). 
 239. Id. at 597. 
 240. 455 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 241. Id. at 1158–59. 
 242. Id. at 1158. 
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Circuit affirmed.
243
 In contrast to Vega and Marcus, the district court in 
Trevizo did not conclude that plaintiffs failed as a matter of proof. Rather, 
it concluded that eighty-four class members was “not such an 
overwhelmingly large number as to be prohibitive of joinder.”244 The 
Tenth Circuit upheld both the result and the district court’s reasoning.245 
Other courts have also shown a willingness to accept defendants’ 
challenges to numerosity.
246
 
In contrast to the foregoing cases, some courts have been willing to 
apply common sense, make reasonable assumptions, and permit plaintiffs 
to develop additional evidence when their existing evidence is deficient. 
For instance, in Pederson v. Louisiana State University,
247
 a suit alleging 
discrimination against women by Louisiana State University in 
intercollegiate athletics, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding 
at trial that plaintiff had not satisfied numerosity. The district court had 
provisionally certified a class, but expressed concern that numerosity had 
not been met. After trial, the lower court decertified the class, explaining 
that plaintiffs “failed to provide evidence that members of the intramural 
 
 
 243. Id. at 1163. 
 244. Id. at 1162. 
 245. Id. at 1162–63. 
 246. See, e.g., Turnage v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 307 F. App’x 918, 921–23 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming denial of class certification on numerosity grounds in private nuisance action against 
railroad after a chemical spill; the court of appeals noted that “[r]egardless of the actual number of 
plaintiffs in this case, their proximity to each other and the discrete and obvious nature of the harm 
make identifying and contacting them relatively easy”); B.N. ex rel. A.N. v. Murphy, No. 3:09-EV-
199-TLS, 2011 WL 4496510, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2011) (finding all requirements for (b)(2) class 
satisfied except for numerosity); Burkhart-Deal v. CitiFinancial, Inc., No. 8-1289, 2010 WL 457122, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that numerosity was met where 
approximately 700 of defendant’s employees potentially fell within the proposed class definition but 
where plaintiff proffered affidavits of only ten putative class members; the court added that “the record 
provide[d] absolutely no grounds for determining that joinder of putative class members would be 
impracticable, difficult, or inconvenient”); Feinman v. F.B.I., 269 F.R.D. 44, 49–51 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(denying class certification of plaintiffs who alleged improper withholding of information under the 
Freedom of Information Act on numerosity grounds where plaintiff “concede[d] that he [was] neither 
aware nor capable of determining the exact number of individuals who would fall within the scope of 
the proposed class,” and “[P]laintiff’s class size estimate of 200 lack[ed] a reasonable basis”) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted); Mays v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 274 F.R.D. 614, 619–20 (E.D. Tenn. 
2011) (“judicial economy, the geographical dispersion of the class members, the ease of identifying 
putative class members, and the practicality with which each individual putative class member could 
bring suit on their own weigh against” a finding of numerosity); Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 272 
F.R.D. 82, 99–100 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding numerosity not satisfied with respect to proposed 
“[i]ssues [c]lass” under Rule 23(c)(4)); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Svcs., Inc., No. 8-CV-1392 JLS 
(NLS), 2011 WL 5025152, at *7–9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011) (“[U]nsupported conjecture is 
insufficient to boost Plaintiff over the relatively low hurdle set by Rule 23(a)(1).”). 
 247. 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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and club teams had the desire or ability to compete at the varsity level.”248 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as follows: 
At trial, [plaintiffs] established that a number of current LSU female 
students had a desire to try out for varsity soccer or fast-pitch 
softball. [Defendants] admit that eight people showed up for varsity 
soccer tryouts. These eight, however, do not constitute the sum total 
of class members. The class consists of all “female students enrolled 
at LSU since 1993 and any time thereafter” who wish to participate. 
Plaintiffs established that, around the time of trial, well over 5,000 
young women were playing soccer or fast-pitch softball at the high 
school level in Louisiana. They also established that many former 
members of a Baton Rouge soccer club received scholarships to 
play intercollegiate soccer. As [defendants] point out, these women, 
because they are not students at LSU, are not members of the 
putative class. However, considering the talent pool in Louisiana 
established by these figures and the number of LSU students who 
come from Louisiana, [plaintiffs] have established that numerous 
future female LSU students will desire to try out for varsity soccer 
and fast-pitch softball . . . . Our independent review of the record 
satisfies us that the numerosity prong has been satisfied.
249
 
Similarly, the district court found numerosity satisfied in Verdow ex 
rel. Meyer v. Sutkowy.
250
 That case was an action on behalf of nursing 
home residents who claimed that their Medicaid applications were denied 
in violation of the Medicaid statute. Even though there were only six 
known class members, the district court found that numerosity was 
satisfied because the plaintiffs claimed a class of 226 by extrapolating the 
six known denials statewide based on the previous year’s percentages.251 
Several other cases have taken a similar common sense approach.
252
 
 
 
 248. Id. at 868. 
 249. Id. (paragraph break omitted). 
 250. 209 F.R.D. 309 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 251. Id. at 312. 
 252. See, e.g., Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent & Nursing Home, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 659, 662–
63, 663 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“The Court is . . . permitted [for purposes of numerosity] to make the 
common sense assumption that most residents at a nursing home receive medication or medical 
supplies at some point in their stay.”); Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 556 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(finding numerosity met where it was “reasonable to assume,” based on defendant’s national net sales 
figures, that a sufficient number of people in California purchased defendant’s product to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(1)); Lowery v. City of Albuquerque, 273 F.R.D. 668, 682–83 (D.N.M. 2011) (finding, based on 
evidence in the record, that class included “several hundred” members, thus satisfying numerosity); 
Welch v. Theodorides-Bustle, 273 F.R.D. 692, 695 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (class of Florida drivers satisfied 
numerosity; even though it was “impossible to know precisely” how many class members existed, the 
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Although the case law is conflicting, plaintiffs are nonetheless at risk of 
losing on class certification if their numerosity argument is based on 
inference or on appeal to common sense. The strict approach adopted by 
some courts represents yet another troublesome trend. Indeed, the large 
number of successful challenges to numerosity—which was once the least 
demanding requirement of Rule 23(a)—is one of the most dramatic recent 
developments. Given the small number of class members necessary to 
establish numerosity,
253
 the instances in which numerosity is a valid reason 
to reject class certification should be rare. Even if plaintiffs’ initial filing 
does not provide sufficient evidence of numerosity, courts should 
generally give plaintiffs an opportunity to make an adequate presentation. 
D. Heightened Scrutiny of Commonality 
Rule 23(a)(2) states that members of a class may sue as representatives 
only if “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”254 Prior to 
the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Dukes,255 commonality, like 
numerosity, was rarely an impediment to class certification. Courts were 
very liberal in finding a question of law or fact that qualified. Indeed, in 
cases involving Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common issues 
predominate over individual issues, defendants often chose to focus solely 
on predominance and frequently stipulated to commonality. Why fight 
over commonality when plaintiffs were required to meet a much higher 
predominance threshold? Thus, courts repeatedly emphasized the light 
burden imposed by commonality, referring to the requirement as one that 
“is easily met,”256 and as a requirement that should be “liberal[ly] 
constru[ed].”257 
 
 
court found “common sense . . . sufficient to determine that numerosity [was] amply proven”) (citation 
omitted); Flood v. Dominguez, 270 F.R.D. 413, 417 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (numerosity met on basis of 
seven named plaintiffs and 39 declarants; the court noted that “[a] court must rely on simple common 
sense when determining whether a class size meets the numerosity requirement”) (citation omitted); 
Foltz v. Del. State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 419, 422 (D. Del. 2010) (finding numerosity met by putative 
class of “present, prospective, and future” female students of defendant university who had been 
deterred from taking part in intercollegiate athletics; even though the number of class members could 
not “be calculated with any specificity, [it was], indisputably, very large”). 
 253. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
 254. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 255. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 256. Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Hochstadt v. 
Boston Scientific Corp., 708 F. Supp. 2d 95, 102 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 257. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1975). Accord, e.g., Jenkins v. 
Raymark, 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir 1986) (noting that the commonality “threshold [was] not high”). 
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The Supreme Court’s Dukes decision appears to have given new 
meaning to commonality. It has done so even though Wal-Mart focused 
only minimal attention in its certiorari petition on commonality or the 
other elements of Rule 23(a). Wal-Mart sought certiorari on two issues: 
(1) whether claims for monetary damages could be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2) (and, under what circumstances), and (2) “[w]hether the [district 
court’s] certification order conform[ed] to the requirements of Title VII, 
the Due Process Clause, the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.”258 In the body of its petition, 
Wal-Mart made only brief mention of commonality.
259
 The Court granted 
certiorari on Wal-Mart’s first issue but not on its second. Instead, the 
Court added a second issue of its own for the parties to brief: “Whether the 
class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 
23(a).”260 Not surprisingly, in the merits briefing, both Wal-Mart and 
various amici supporting it argued forcefully that commonality was not 
satisfied.
261
 This attention given to commonality in the briefing was well 
justified; even though the Court’s resolution of the (b)(2) issue made it 
unnecessary for the Court to consider commonality,
262
 it devoted extensive 
discussion to the issue in its opinion.
263
 
 
 
 258. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-
277). 
 259. See id. at 24 (arguing in conclusory terms that a lack of classwide proof of discriminatory 
intent on the part of Wal-Mart “destroys commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a)”); id. at 32 
(arguing that, “[c]ontrary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, it is not enough for the case to present 
mere common ‘questions’; the answers to those questions must be found in a lawful and fair trial 
proceeding.” (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
 260. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). 
 261. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at *18–32, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277, 2011 
WL 201045 (Jan. 20, 2011) (section of merits brief dedicated to commonality argument); id. at *22 
(“Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion system . . . will not support a finding of commonality, on a company-
wide basis, for purposes of Rule 23(a).”); Brief of Costco Wholesale Corporation as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at *10–13, No. 10-277, 2011 WL 288902 (Jan. 27, 2011) (arguing 
that the lower courts erred “in finding commonality on the basis of plaintiffs’ aggregated analysis”); 
Brief of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at *10, No. 10-277, 2011 WL 288901 (Jan. 27, 2011) (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s 
commonality test, the fact that employees are evaluated with some subjective components all but 
creates a presumption that a wide-scale class will be certified.”); Brief of the Association of Global 
Automakers, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *5, No. 10-277, 2011 WL 288899 (Jan. 
27, 2011) (urging Court to “clarify that the threshold showing of commonality required by Rule 
23(a)(2) rests on the weight of the pertinent evidence rather than mere assertion or a scintilla of 
supporting evidence”); cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of Civil Procedure Professors in Support of 
Respondents at *10, No. 10-277, 2011 WL 794121 (Mar. 1, 2011) (“[t]he provision of 23(a) most 
disputed in this case is the 23(a)(2) commonality inquiry”). 
 262. See infra Part III.F. 
 263. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–57. 
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In Dukes, a federal district court certified a class consisting of 
approximately one and one-half million current and former female Wal-
Mart employees. The putative class alleged systematic sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, manifested by 
unequal promotions or pay as compared with the company’s male 
employees. The women alleged that Wal-Mart maintained a “corporate 
culture” that “permit[ed] bias against women to infect . . . the discretionary 
decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—
thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common 
discriminatory practice.”264 While each side presented a wealth of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence supporting and opposing class treatment, 
the Court ruled in a 5–4 decision by Justice Scalia that commonality was 
not satisfied because of the potentially disparate questions underlying each 
putative class member’s claim.265 The Court found no evidence that Wal-
Mart “operated under a general policy of discrimination,” and no evidence 
that all of the company’s managers exercised their discretion in a common 
way such that each class member suffered a common injury.
266
 
The key to understanding the commonality holding in Dukes is the 
following language: 
That common contention . . . must be of such a nature that it is 
capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of 
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 
of each one of the claims in one stroke.
267
 
Thus, under the Dukes formulation, it is not enough that the question is 
common; rather, the question must be essential to the outcome of the case. 
This exacting standard led four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, 
to accuse the majority of “blend[ing] Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold 
[commonality] criterion with the more demanding [predominance] criteria 
of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevating the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no 
longer ‘easily satisfied.’”268 The dissent expressed concern that the “far 
 
 
 264. Id. at 2548. 
 265. The plaintiffs’ evidence included statistical evidence of pay and promotion disparities 
between men and women, 120 anecdotal reports of discrimination from female employees, and 
testimony from a sociologist “presenting a social framework analysis” on how the company fostered 
sex discrimination. Id. at 2549. The Court’s decision with respect to (b)(2) was unanimous. For 
discussion of this aspect of Dukes, see infra Part III.F. 
 266. 131 S. Ct. at 2554–56. 
 267. Id. at 2551 (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
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reaching” majority opinion improperly added a predominance requirement 
to class actions brought under (b)(1) and (b)(2).
269
 
The majority decision in Dukes cannot be squared with the text, 
structure, or history of Rule 23(a)(2). Nothing in the text of Rule 23(a)(2), 
or in the Advisory Committee Notes thereto, requires that the common 
question be central to the outcome.
270
 Instead of looking at the traditional 
methods of interpreting Rule 23(a)(2), the majority relied heavily on a law 
review article by Professor Nagareda.
271
 In a passage quoted by the Court, 
Nagareda argued that: 
What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of classwide 
proceedings to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution 
of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what 
have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.
272
 
The Court found this passage to be critical to understanding commonality. 
Indeed, the quote from Nagareda immediately precedes the Court’s 
conclusion that commonality requires a question “central to the validity of 
each one of the claims in one stroke.”273 
It is ironic that Justice Scalia, who typically rejects sources other than 
the plain language in interpreting statutes and rules
274—and who has 
criticized his colleagues for relying on law review articles
275—would 
author an opinion basing an interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2) on a 
commentator’s general discussion of “[w]hat matters to class 
 
 
 269. Id. at 2566. 
 270. Id. at 2562. 
 271. Id. at 2551, 2556, 2557; see Nagareda, supra note 150, at 131–33. 
 272. Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 150, at 132) (emphasis added by Court) 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2970 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (taking exception to the majority’s “reliance . . . on the Notes of the 
Advisory Committee in determining the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(d)”); 
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 60 (1994) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (“It is best . . . 
to apply the statute as written, and to let Congress make the needed repairs”); Koons Buick Pontiac 
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have often criticized the Court’s 
use of legislative history because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism. The Congressional Record 
or committee reports are used to make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were 
spoken or written by others (individual Members of Congress, congressional aides, or even 
enterprising lobbyists).”). 
 275. See, e.g., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1180 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (criticizing Justice Stevens’s “assert[ion] that . . . the 
‘no set of circumstances’ rule” of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), “never existed,” 
noting that “[f]or that head-snapping proposition, [Justice Stevens] relies upon no less weighty 
authority than a law-review article”). 
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certification.”276 Indeed, later in his opinion, Justice Scalia refused to give 
any weight to the Advisory Committee Notes in construing Rule 
23(b)(2).
277
 Even if it were clear that Nagareda was discussing 
commonality, a commentator’s opinion—without support from the rule 
itself—is of questionable weight. 
There is still a serious question as to whether Nagareda was even 
discussing commonality. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, 
interpreted the passage from Nagareda’s article as addressing Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance, not Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.
278
 Justice 
Ginsburg’s view is strongly supported by Professor Nagareda’s other 
scholarship. 
Specifically, Nagareda was an Associate Reporter for the American 
Law Institute’s project, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.279 
He was the principal author of chapter two, “Aggregate Adjudication.”280 
The very first section of chapter two provides, in black letter: 
§ 2.01 Definition of Common Issues 
Common issues are those legal or factual issues that are the same in 
functional content across multiple civil claims, regardless of 
whether their disposition would resolve all contested issues in the 
litigation.
281
 
Later, in the next section (2.02), the Aggregate Litigation project attempts 
to reformulate the predominance test by authorizing aggregate treatment 
“if the court determines that resolution of the common issue would . . . 
 
 
 276. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 150, at 
132) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 277. Id. at 2559 (“[I]t is the Rule itself, not the Advisory Committee’s description of it, that 
governs.”). See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 620 (2010) (noting recent concurring opinions by Justice Scalia in 
which Scalia expressed disapproval at the majority’s partial reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 30(d)); see also Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2498 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (joining majority opinion “except for its reliance on the Notes of the Advisory Committee 
as establishing the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)”) (citations omitted); Black 
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2970 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (taking exception to majority’s 
reliance on Advisory Committee Notes in determining the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 30(d)). 
 278. See 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Nagareda, supra note 150, at 131) (“Professor Nagareda, whose ‘dissimilarities’ inquiry the Court 
endorses, developed his position in the context of Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 279. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Am. Law Inst. 2010). 
 280. Id. § 2 at 76. 
 281. Id. § 2.01 at 76 (emphasis added). 
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materially advance the resolution of multiple civil claims by addressing 
the core of the dispute in a manner superior to other realistic procedural 
alternatives.”282 In the commentary to the text of section 2.02, the 
Aggregate Litigation project states: 
Section (a)(1) further confines aggregate treatment of a common 
issue in a class action to those situations in which that issue defines 
the core of the dispute presented by multiple civil claims, not 
merely its tangential or secondary dimensions. Identification of a 
common issue, the resolution of which “materially advances the 
resolution” of such claims, thus goes significantly beyond 
identification of the minimal commonality that is among the general 
requirements for certification of a class action under current rules 
of civil procedure.
283
 
As the Aggregate Litigation project confirms, Nagareda viewed (a)(2) 
commonality as a minimal requirement. The majority thus relied on an 
erroneous interpretation of Nagareda’s scholarship in its newly-minted 
definition of commonality. As a result, apart from being a dubious source 
for construing Rule 23(a)(2), Nagareda’s article was not even interpreted 
correctly by the majority in its reformulation of commonality. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion has conflated commonality and 
predominance. This new interpretation of commonality should not 
significantly impact (b)(3) classes, which require both commonality and 
predominance. The Dukes decision, however, could have a significant 
impact on (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, effectively imposing a predominance 
requirement where the drafters of Rule 23 chose not to include one. 
The full reach of Dukes remains to be seen, and not surprisingly, the 
results are mixed. As noted, in theory, Dukes should have less impact in 
(b)(3) cases. In fact, the Dukes commonality test appears to have had a 
greater impact in (b)(2) cases than in (b)(3) cases. Numerous courts in 
(b)(3) cases have denied motions to decertify in light of Dukes.
284
 Other 
courts in (b)(3) cases have granted certification in the first instance post-
 
 
 282. Id. § 2.02(a)(1) at 82. 
 283. Id. § 2.02 cmt., at 84 (emphasis added). 
 284. See, e.g., Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2011 WL 3793962, at *3–4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 
2011); Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 168–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Johnson v. Gen. 
Mills, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 519, 521–22 (C.D. Cal. 2011); In re TFT-LCD (FlatPanel) Antitrust Litig., No. 
M 07-1827 SI, 2012 WL 253298, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012); Driver v. Apple Ill., LLC, No. 06 C 
6149, 2012 WL 689169, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2012). 
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Dukes.
285
 By contrast, several courts in (b)(2) cases have rejected class 
certification based on Dukes’ commonality standard.286 There are, 
however, courts in (b)(2) cases that have rejected defendants’ post-Dukes 
commonality arguments and granted certification.
287
 Conversely, a few 
courts have denied certification of (b)(3) classes based on Dukes’ 
commonality holding.
288
 In short, the post-Dukes commonality cases are 
mixed, but early indications suggest a greater impact in (b)(2) cases than 
in (b)(3) cases. (The post-Dukes case law under (b)(1) is too sparse to 
draw even preliminary conclusions.) At a minimum, commonality almost 
certainly will become a standard part of a defendant’s attack on class 
certification.
289
 
 
 
 285. See, e.g., Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 577 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); Bauer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 561–64 (W.D. Wis. 2012); In re Bank of 
Am. Corp. Secs., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 286. See, e.g., M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012) (reversing district 
court’s grant of (b)(2) certification of class alleging systemic constitutional violations in state foster 
care system; the Fifth Circuit noted that “[a]lthough the district court’s analysis may have been a 
reasonable application of pre-Wal-Mart precedent, the Wal-Mart decision has heightened the standards 
for establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), rendering the district court’s analysis insufficient”); 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Haddock, 460 F. App’x 26, 28–29 (2d Cir. 2012); Ellis v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2011); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 
481, 493, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2012); cf. DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(reversing hybrid (b)(2) and (b)(3) certification of class under Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act and related claims where, “[i]n the absence of identification of a policy or practice that affects all 
class members in the manner Wal-Mart requires, the district court’s analysis is not faithful to the 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(a) commonality”). 
 287. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Dukes by finding commonality satisfied because “[t]he incremental causal 
effect . . . of those company-wide policies—which is the alleged disparate impact—could be most 
efficiently determined on a class-wide basis.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Connor B. ex rel. 
Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33–35 (D. Mass. 2011); Marrilley v. Bonham, No. C-11-02418-
DMR, 2012 WL 851182, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012); Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. 3:12-CV-00138-ST, 
2012 WL 3322680, at *6–10 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2012); Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 174–
75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Cf. Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295 (RMB), 2011 WL 
5007976, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (granting motion for preliminary approval of revised consent 
decree in (b)(2) case alleging discrimination against defendant’s female employees; the court found 
commonality satisfied, noting that the class included only “317 officer-level women [who] were all 
employed at a single location, where pay and promotion decisions were subject to a single ultimate 
decision-maker”). For further discussion on the impact of Dukes on commonality, see Mary Kay Kane, 
The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1042–46 (2012). 
 288. See, e.g., Stockwell v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C-08-5180 PJH, 2011 WL 
4803505, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil No. 08-6292 
(RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011). 
 289. In addition to its potentially enormous impact on Rule 23(a)(2), Dukes could also alter the 
interpretation and application of other aggregation devices. For example, joinder of plaintiffs or 
defendants under Rule 20(a) requires, among other things, “[a] question of law or fact common to” all 
plaintiffs (Rule 20(a)(1)) or all defendants (Rule 20(a)(2)). Similarly, Rule 42 permits consolidation of 
actions before the court if, among other things, those actions “involve a common question or law or 
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In sum, the majority turned a minimal requirement into one that could 
significantly impact class certification, especially in the (b)(2) context. It 
did so based almost entirely on a misreading of a law review article. 
E. New Approaches to “Adequacy of Representation” 
The “adequacy of representation” requirement, which governs both 
class representatives and class counsel, is set forth in Rule 23(a)(4). That 
provision requires that “the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”290 Because class actions are 
representative actions, “adequacy” is the glue that holds a class together 
and ensures due process for absent class members.
291
 The system breaks 
down—and potential due process issues arise—if either the class 
representative or class counsel is incompetent, suffers from a conflict of 
interest, fails to assert claims with sufficient vigor, or suffers from other 
flaws that will detract from a full presentation of the merits. 
This author has supported the need for careful scrutiny of adequacy and 
has criticized courts that do not take the requirement seriously.
292
 Class 
representatives and class counsel are fiduciaries to the class, and courts 
have an obligation to scrutinize their adequacy even if the parties do not 
contest the issue.
293
 
In recent years, several courts have begun scrutinizing adequacy with 
great care.
294
 For instance, in Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. 
Ashford Gear, LLC,
295
 the district court had opined that only “‘egregious’” 
 
 
fact[.]” The Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006), allows transfer to a district court for 
coordinated pretrial proceedings when, among other factors, actions pending in multiple federal courts 
“involv[e] one or more common questions of fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Courts must now consider 
whether Dukes’ rigorous Rule 23(a)(2) commonality test will apply to other rules and statutes that 
include a commonality requirement, and if not, why there is a distinction in interpreting the same 
words. 
 290. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Rule 23 was amended in 2003 to add subdivision (g), which directly 
addresses adequacy of class counsel. As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 
amendments, “[t]his subdivision recognizes the importance of class counsel, states the obligation to 
represent the interests of the class, and provides a framework for selection of class counsel.” 
 291. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 
of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent 
class members.”); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (under Due Process Clause, class 
members must “in fact [be] adequately represented by the parties who are present.”). 
 292. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of 
Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671 (2004). 
 293. Id. at 680. 
 294. See Bruce Braverman, The ‘Adequate Representative’ Requirement Gains Some Teeth, 12 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 945 (2011). 
 295. 662 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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misconduct by class counsel would render counsel inadequate.
296
 In 
vacating the district court’s certification order, the Seventh Circuit, in an 
opinion by Judge Posner, held that the correct standard is whether class 
counsel’s misconduct “creates a serious doubt that counsel will represent 
the class loyally.”297 This new standard espoused by Judge Posner properly 
addresses the due process issues discussed above. 
There is, however, a disturbing trend in “adequacy” jurisprudence. That 
case law focuses not on the ability of class representatives and counsel to 
vigorously represent the class, but on counsel’s selection of the causes of 
action to assert. The argument is that, by not bringing all potentially viable 
claims, the representatives and counsel have (1) impermissibly “split” 
claims, thereby prohibiting class members (pursuant to res judicata) from 
later bringing those omitted claims, or (2) subjected class members to the 
risk that collateral estoppel could essentially nullify their remaining 
(unfiled) claims.
298
 
As Professor Edward Sherman has noted,
 
plaintiffs and class counsel 
omit claims for many reasons, including difficult evidentiary or merits 
issues, to prevent removal of the case to federal court, or for other venue 
or jurisdictional reasons.
299
 They also sometimes omit claims to enhance 
the likelihood of class certification. For example, plaintiffs and class 
counsel might omit claims for damages to bolster the chances for 
certification of an injunctive or declaratory class under Rule 23(b)(2). Or 
they might omit claims, such as fraud, that pose predominance issues 
under Rule 23(b)(3), particularly when they have other causes of action 
(such as breach of warranty or violation of a consumer protection statute) 
that address the same conduct and seek similar relief but do not pose 
predominance or manageability problems.
300
 Several recent cases, 
however, have concluded that, by omitting potentially viable claims, the 
 
 
 296. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). 
 297. Id. (emphasis added). Other decisions holding class representatives and counsel to high 
standards include CE Design, Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 
2011); Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 2006); and Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 
637 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 298. See generally KLONOFF, ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 477 (“[O]ne vital objective of 
a class-action judgment is to foreclose further adjudication of claims that were—or could have been—
adjudicated in the class action (res judicata or claim preclusion), as well as issues that were actually 
determined in, and were necessary to the adjudication of, the class action (collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion).”). 
 299. Edward F. Sherman, “Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion and 
Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483 (2011). 
 300. Id. 
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class representatives and class counsel are inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4), 
thus requiring the denial of class certification. 
This line of reasoning is not entirely new. A couple of district court 
cases from the 1980s adopted this approach,
301
 but they were largely 
ignored by courts and class action defense counsel and remained as 
outliers for many years. Few defendants thought to challenge the adequacy 
of class counsel or class representatives on this ground. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court held, in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond,
302
 that a failure of plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action 
alleging race discrimination to establish a pattern or practice of race 
discrimination did not bar class members from bringing individual claims 
of race discrimination against the same defendant. The Court reasoned: 
The [defendant] argues that permitting [the individual class 
members] to bring separate actions would frustrate the purposes of 
Rule 23. We think the converse is true. The class-action device was 
intended to establish a procedure for the adjudication of common 
questions of law or fact. If the defendant’s theory were adopted, it 
would be tantamount to requiring that every member of the class be 
permitted to intervene to litigate the merits of his individual 
claim.
303
 
Some commentators have read Cooper to undermine arguments against 
adequacy, given the Court’s willingness to permit the individual actions 
despite a res judicata argument.
304
 Other commentators have found the 
 
 
 301. Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y 1982) (stating that 
“a serious question of adequacy of representation arises when the class representatives profess 
themselves willing . . . to assert on behalf of the class” only certain breach of warranty claims for 
personal injury or property damage, while forgoing claims for death, personal injury, property damage, 
and the like, at the risk of preventing class members from later litigating those claims, in order to 
ensure commonality of the class); Pearl v. Allied Corp., 102 F.R.D 921, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1984) 
(plaintiffs, who deleted personal injury claims in a suit alleging damages from foam insulation in 
homes, held to be inadequate because “class members whose claims would be abandoned by the 
plaintiffs may find themselves precluded from asserting those claims in subsequent actions”). 
 302. 467 U.S. 867 (1984). 
 303. Id. at 880. 
 304. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, “Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for 
Preclusion and Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 485 (2011) (“Following Cooper, it 
could be said that a ‘class action suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief does not bar 
subsequent individual damage claims by class members, even if based on the same events.’” (quoting 
Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996)); Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class 
Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 321–22 (2011) (“Without 
explicitly addressing the general ban on claim splitting, the Cooper Court permitted the absent class 
members to pursue individual claims of discrimination even though those claims were transactionally 
related to the pattern claims adjudicated in the class action. Thus, it implicitly assumed that claim 
preclusion did not bar the absent class members’ individual claims . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE DECLINE OF CLASS ACTIONS 783 
 
 
 
 
case to have little bearing on the adequacy issue.
305
 In any event, Cooper 
certainly did not offer encouragement to defendants who were considering 
whether to make an adequacy argument based on res judicata concerns. 
Nonetheless, without any change either in Rule 23 or in relevant Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, defendants began raising adequacy arguments based 
on omitted claims. Courts, moreover, started taking those arguments 
seriously. 
In an important decision in 1999, a federal district court in Texas found 
the class representative to be inadequate for deleting damages claims in a 
race discrimination suit under Rule 23(b)(2). The decision, Zachery v. 
Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc.,
306
 distinguished Cooper and 
reasoned as follows: 
The Court is not concerned [as was the Court in Cooper] with what 
would happen if the class in this case is certified and fails to prevail 
on its class action for disparate treatment . . . . If a court certifies a 
class in this case and the class prevails [on the injunctive claim], no 
one will receive compensatory or punitive damages because the 
[named] Plaintiffs have unilaterally chosen not to seek them. 
Whether this bars the other class members from later seeking 
compensatory damages is an issue that greatly concerns the 
Court.
307
 
The approach in Zachery received significant traction when, in 2008, 
the Fifth Circuit cited the case with approval and applied its reasoning. In 
McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc.,
308
 the Fifth Circuit held that denial of 
class certification was proper in a race discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and back pay 
relief (which was permitted in a (b)(2) class in the Fifth Circuit prior to 
Dukes).
309
 They did not, however, bring claims for compensatory or 
punitive damages. Citing Zachery, the Fifth Circuit stated that “if the price 
of a Rule 23(b)(2) disparate treatment class both limits individual opt-outs 
 
 
 305. See, e.g., Tobias B. Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 
730 (“Cooper . . . is a Title VII opinion, not an opinion about the preclusive effects of class action 
judgments”). 
 306. 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
 307. Id. at 243. 
 308. 519 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 309. See infra notes 336–49 and accompanying text. 
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and sacrifices class members’ rights to avail themselves of significant 
legal remedies, it is too high a price to impose.”310 
Other recent cases have reached similar results. For instance, in Cooper 
v. Southern Co.,
311
 seven African American employees, past and present, 
of Southern Company and its subsidiaries sued for unlawful discrimination 
on the basis of race. The seven plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all 
former and present African American employees on the theory that 
Southern Company and its three subsidiaries had “common policies and 
practices” that “foster[ed] a pattern or practice of race discrimination.”312 
The plaintiffs argued on appeal, inter alia, that the district court erred in 
refusing to certify either a (b)(2) class allowing back pay (with no (b)(3) 
class for damages) or a “hybrid class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive 
relief, while severing the damages phase of the proceedings by allowing 
opt-outs for damages.”313 The Eleventh Circuit indicated that omitting 
damages claims to enhance the likelihood of certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) raised issues about whether “the named plaintiffs would 
adequately represent interests of the other putative class members[.]”314 
Similarly, in In re Teflon Products Liability Litigation,
315
 an Iowa 
district court held that named plaintiffs were inadequate because they had 
“abandon[ed] their original claims for medical monitoring and expressly 
disavow[ed] any current claim for personal injury.”316 According to the 
court, the possibility that a subsequent court could determine that the 
 
 
 310. Lufkin, 519 F.3d at 283. It should be noted, however, that the McClain case has had a 
complicated history, so its impact on adequacy of representation is not entirely clear. As the case first 
came to the Fifth Circuit, the district court had denied class certification of plaintiffs’ disparate 
treatment claims, but granted certification to a pair of disparate impact claims, which were eventually 
tried before the district judge. See Lufkin, 519 F.3d at 272. The Fifth Circuit remanded on multiple 
grounds, but the class certification of the disparate impact claims was neither contested nor disturbed 
by the Fifth Circuit. The case was remanded for the lower court to correct an overly vague permanent 
injunction, and to calculate by formula the back pay to which each class member was entitled. See 
McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., No. 9:97CV63 2010 WL 455351 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2010) 
(entering final judgment with re-crafted injunction and individualized awards of back pay), aff’d, 649 
F.3d 374, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 589 (2011). The case went up on appeal once more on the issue of 
attorneys’ fees, and the Fifth Circuit found error in the district court’s fee determination, remanding 
the case yet again. See 649 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 589 (2011). 
 311. 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 312. Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 313. Id. at 720. 
 314. Id. at 721. 
 315. 254 F.R.D. 354 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 316. Id. at 367. 
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claims were barred by res judicata “prevent[ed] the named plaintiffs’ 
interests from being fully aligned with those of the class.”317 
In Dukes, the Supreme Court, in dictum, appeared to lend some support 
to these cases in the context of collateral estoppel. The Dukes plaintiffs 
sought back pay, but not compensatory damages, arguing that by not 
seeking compensatory damages, the class could be certified under 
(b)(2).
318
 The Dukes plaintiffs’ willingness to forgo class claims for 
compensatory damages in hopes of obtaining certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) led the Court to express concern about the risk of precluding class 
members from seeking compensatory damages in the future: 
In this case . . . the named plaintiffs declined to include employees’ 
claims for compensatory damages in their complaint. That strategy 
of including only back pay claims . . . created the possibility . . . that 
individual class members’ compensatory-damages claims would be 
precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart 
from [because (b)(2) does not allow opt-outs]. If it were determined, 
for example, that a particular class member is not entitled to back 
pay because her denial of increased pay or a promotion was not the 
product of discrimination, that employee might be collaterally 
estopped from independently seeking compensatory damages based 
on that same denial.
319
 
Not all courts have found adequacy concerns based on omitted claims. 
A number of courts have held that, if some claims are amenable to class 
treatment, but others are not (and are, therefore, not included as part of the 
class action), the doctrine of claim splitting does not apply. For example, 
in Sullivan v. Chase Investment Services, Inc.,
320
 the plaintiffs sued several 
financial services companies over allegedly fraudulent marketing of 
investment services.
321
 In holding that the class could be maintained 
 
 
 317. Id. at 368. Accord, e.g., Miller v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 202 F.R.D. 195, 203 (D. Md. 2001) 
(finding that plaintiffs’ willingness to cede “compensatory and punitive damages claims [which were 
in their original complaint] raises serious questions regarding the ability of the named plaintiffs to 
represent the putative class adequately”); Rader v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 524, 
5229 (D. Nev. 2011) (denying class certification because, inter alia, the plaintiff, in opting to “throw 
away” emotional distress claims that could be a “major component of class recovery,” would preclude 
class members from pursuing them and create “insurmountable conflict between his own interests and 
that of the class he wishes to represent”). 
 318. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011). See discussion of (b)(2), infra 
notes 336–49 and accompanying text. 
 319. Id. (emphases in original). 
 320. 79 F.R.D. 246 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
 321. Id. at 265. 
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without risking res judicata on claims that were unsuitable for class 
treatment, the court explained: 
[Plaintiffs] who have claims not raised in this class action because 
the claims are unsuitable for class treatment can bring those claims 
on an individual basis, and res judicata will not bar those claims 
because absent class members had no opportunity to litigate those 
issues in this lawsuit. 
 What defendants have characterized as ‘splitting’ causes of 
action is perfectly appropriate under Rule 23. It is not uncommon 
for defendants to engage in a course of conduct which gives rise to a 
variety of claims, some amenable to class treatment, others not. 
Those claims that are amenable should be prosecuted as class 
actions in order to realize the savings of resources of courts and 
parties that Rule 23 is designed to facilitate. . . . Class 
representatives must press all claims which can be prosecuted on a 
class basis, but they need not and should not press for certification 
of claims that are unsuitable for class treatment.
322
 
In another case, an Ohio state court held that the class representatives were 
adequate to represent cigarette smokers in a class suit seeking economic 
damages for alleged fraud, even though the complaint omitted personal 
injury claims.
323
 As the court reasoned: 
Because only certain types of claims are suitable for class treatment, 
the plaintiffs in a class action may be limited to pursuing only some 
of their claims. For that reason, a class action ‘is one of the 
recognized exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting.’324 
Several other courts are in accord.
325
 
 
 
 322. Id. (emphasis added). 
 323. Marrone v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., No. 03CA0120-M 2004 WL 2050485, at *5–7 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2004). 
 324. Id. at *6 (quoting Gunnels v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 432 (4th Cir. 2003)) (citations 
omitted). 
 325. See, e.g., Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (a judgment in a class action 
“binds the class members [only] as to matters actually litigated” and not as to “any claim . . . that was 
not addressed in the class action”) (citations omitted); Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 
F.3d 402, 428 n.16 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Piecemeal certification of a declaratory-relief-only class does not 
present a problem of preclusion for class members who wish to pursue damages claims”); Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Services Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 432 (4th Cir. 2003) (“a class action, ‘of course, is one of the 
recognized exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting’” (citing 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 131.40[3][e][iii] (2002)); In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 219 F.R.D. 661, 
669 (D. Kan. 2004) (rejecting adequacy argument where class counsel did not pursue a fraud claim 
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The cases finding adequacy issues because plaintiffs have omitted 
certain claims are troublesome. Indeed, the notion that lawyers must assert 
all conceivable claims to avoid adequacy attacks—and that they cannot 
strategically select the claims that are best for the client—is the antithesis 
of effective advocacy.
326
 Moreover, instead of attempting to minimize the 
res judicata and collateral estoppel risks for the omitted claims, these 
courts deny certification based merely on a fear that there might be issue 
or claim preclusion. A court certifying a class, however, can take a number 
of steps to minimize the likelihood of serious adverse repercussions 
because of omitted claims. These include the following: 
 If the court wants to establish that all claims not brought are 
preserved, it can “provid[e] that any judgment in the certified 
action would be without prejudice, either from issue preclusion 
or from merger or bar, to the ability of class members to pursue 
any claims not raised in the complaint itself.”327 Any reservation 
of rights should, as a matter of fairness, apply equally to class 
members and defendants so that neither is bound beyond the 
claims actually litigated.
328
 
 If the issue or claim preclusion concern is only about a parallel 
action or a specific cause of action, the reservation can be 
narrower to so reflect.
329
 
 
 
because of difficulties posed for class certification, stating: “This is not a case where the class 
representatives are pursuing relatively insignificant claims while jeopardizing the ability of class 
members to pursue far more substantial, meaningful claims”). 
 326. Cf. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, WINNING JURY TRIALS: TRIAL TACTICS AND 
SPONSORSHIP STRATEGIES 32–35 (NITA 3d ed. 2007) (discussing cost of “overtrying” by failing to 
screen evidence that is presented to a jury). 
 327. Wolff, supra note 305, at 776; accord, e.g., Sherman, supra note 299, at 502. 
 328. The author disagrees with Professor Wolff’s assertion that normally the reservation should 
protect only class members and not defendants. Wolff, supra note 305, at 792–94. For example, under 
Wolff’s approach, assume a case in which the class seeks only certification of injunctive claims under 
(b)(2) and omits damages claims under (b)(3). If the class wins the (b)(2) case and an issue adjudicated 
therein later arises in individual suits, the individual plaintiffs could obtain issue preclusion. If the 
class loses on the issue, however, defendants could not seek issue preclusion against the individual 
class members. See id. Such uneven treatment would be unfair and reminiscent of the “one way 
intervention” that Rule 23 was designed to eliminate when it was promulgated in 1966. See London v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003) (“One-way intervention occurs when the 
potential members of a class action are allowed to await . . . final judgment on the merits in order to 
determine whether participation [in the class] would be favorable to their interests” (quoting Am. Pipe 
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974)) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (alteration 
and ellipsis by Court of Appeals)). 
 329. Under Professor Wolff’s approach, where there are parallel class actions in state and federal 
court, a state court “could provide in its certification order that nothing in any judgment or dismissal of 
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 If claims are omitted because they would defeat class 
certification, the court can identify the omitted claims in its order 
and find that they would not have been suitable for class 
certification. 
 If certain claims are omitted because they are factually or legally 
weak, the court can so find and thus establish that the class 
members are not prejudiced by the omission of such problematic 
claims. 
 If the omitted claims are not suitable for class certification but 
are too small to be brought individually, the court could note on 
the record the absence of prejudice to the class members. 
 If the court remains concerned (notwithstanding the above tools) 
about the omission of claims for damages in a (b)(2) action, it 
could allow such claims by permitting notice and opt out under 
(b)(2).
330
 
In short, the court can fashion an order that addresses the omitted 
claims and attempts to minimize the risk of issue and claim preclusion. It 
need not overreact by dismissing the class allegations on adequacy 
grounds. 
F. Cutting Back on Rule 23(b)(2) 
Dukes was a watershed opinion not only on commonality but also on 
Rule 23(b)(2). Unlike the commonality decision, which divided the Court 
5–4, the Court’s (b)(2) ruling was unanimous.331 In the long run, the (b)(2) 
ruling may be as important as the commonality ruling. 
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action when “the party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole[.]”332 Unlike (b)(3), which is 
 
 
the action it has certified would have any preclusive impact upon the parallel action currently pending 
in federal court.” Wolff, supra note 305, at 772. 
 330. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1304 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(exercising discretion to allow class member to opt out of mandatory limited-fund class); Eubanks v. 
Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the language of former Rule 23(d)(5) (now 
23(d)(1)(E)) is “broad enough to permit the court to allow individual class members to opt out of a 
(b)(1) or (b)(2) class when necessary to facilitate the fair and efficient conduct of the litigation” (citing 
Suffolk, 907 F.2d at 1304)). 
 331. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
 332. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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intended primarily for actions seeking monetary relief,
333
 subdivision 
(b)(2) was “intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or 
refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of an 
injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the 
legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is 
appropriate.”334 In explaining Rule 23(b)(2), the Advisory Committee’s 
Note states that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the 
appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money 
damages.”335 The issue in Dukes was whether (b)(2) certification was 
proper notwithstanding the claim for back pay. 
Prior to Dukes, courts took several approaches in analyzing the 
permissibility of monetary claims under (b)(2), but no court held that back 
pay was an impermissible remedy under (b)(2). Most circuits followed the 
Fifth Circuit’s restrictive approach in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum,336 which 
allowed monetary claims under (b)(2) only if the claims were “incidental” 
to the declaratory or injunctive relief.
337
 Under the Allison approach, 
“incidental damages should be only those to which class members 
automatically would be entitled once liability to the class (or subclass) as a 
whole is established,” and liability for such damages “should not require 
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s 
case.”338 Even under Allison, however, back pay was permissible under 
(b)(2) because the court deemed the remedy to be “equitable” in nature, 
and therefore akin to declaratory or injunctive relief.
339
 The Fifth Circuit 
later held, in a race discrimination case construing Allison, that damages 
stemming from allegedly discriminatory insurance pricing were 
“incidental,” because they could be calculated mechanically through a 
formula or grid. “The prevalence of variables common to the class,” the 
court noted, made “damage computation virtually a mechanical task.”340 
 
 
 333. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–59. 
 334. Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 amendments to Rule 23. The Notes add that, although 
“(b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases,” such cases are “illustrative” of that subdivision’s intended 
application. 
 335. Id. 
 336. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 337. Id. at 415; accord, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 651 (6th Cir. 
2006); Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 330 n.25 (4th Cir. 2006); Lemon v. Int’l 
Union of Operating Eng’rs, 216 F.3d 577, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 338. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (citations omitted). 
 339. Id. 
 340. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ala. v. Blue Bird 
Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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The Second Circuit, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,
341
 
adopted a more expansive view of Rule 23(b)(2), holding that a district 
court should assess the appropriateness of (b)(2) certification in light of 
“the relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case.”342 Under this so-called ad hoc test, back pay 
could be recovered, but so could other types of potentially significant 
damages, as well, even if they were more than “incidental.” The Second 
Circuit, seizing upon the language of the Advisory Committee Notes, 
stated that the issue was whether the injunctive or declaratory relief was 
“predominant[]” in terms of the benefit to the class.343 The Ninth Circuit 
en banc adopted a similar approach in Dukes, holding that a class may 
seek monetary damages under (b)(2) as long as such damages are not 
“‘superior [in] strength, influence or authority’ to injunctive or declaratory 
relief.”344 
The Supreme Court in Dukes rejected the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
reliance on the “predominance” standard set out in the Advisory 
Committee Notes. The Court noted that “it is the Rule itself, not the 
Advisory Committee’s description of it, that governs.”345 It also rejected 
Allison’s conclusion that back pay was recoverable under (b)(2) because it 
is an equitable remedy, noting that “[t]he Rule does not speak of 
‘equitable’ remedies generally but of injunctions and declaratory 
judgments.”346 According to Dukes, “individualized monetary claims 
belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”347 Noting that (b)(3), but not (b)(2), affords the 
protections of notice and opt-out, the Court left open the possibility that 
the assertion of any monetary claims under (b)(2), even if incidental, 
would violate the class members’ due process rights.348 The Court did not 
decide the issue, however, because it found that claims for back pay could 
not be characterized as “incidental” given the “individualized” nature of 
such relief.
349
 
It is surprising that the four Justices who dissented in Dukes on the 
commonality prong said nothing about the Supreme Court’s far-reaching 
 
 
 341. 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 342. Id. at 164 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 345. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (alterations in original). 
 346. Id. at 2560. 
 347. Id. at 2558. 
 348. Id. at 2559 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)). 
 349. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560. 
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(b)(2) ruling, which is more restrictive than any federal circuit court 
decision. As noted, Allison, which had been attacked by various courts and 
commentators as being too rigid,
350
 permitted back pay claims under 
(b)(2), and other Fifth Circuit case law permitted other damages claims as 
well in (b)(2) civil rights cases.
351
 Indeed, every circuit to address the issue 
had permitted back pay in a (b)(2) discrimination action.
352
 It is especially 
surprising that Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the dissenting opinion on 
commonality, and had years of experience litigating sex discrimination 
claims,
353
 would join the majority’s (b)(2) analysis without comment. In 
any event, Dukes has now established the controlling approach for 
analyzing (b)(2) classes. 
It is too early to know what the full impact of the (b)(2) ruling in Dukes 
will be. The early cases appear to be mixed.
354
 Some courts have rejected 
(b)(2) actions that seek money in addition to injunctive or declaratory 
relief.
355
 Certainly, contrary to the prevailing view pre-Dukes, plaintiff 
classes will no longer be able to seek back pay under (b)(2) if the back pay 
claims raise individualized issues. But the potential impact of Dukes goes 
beyond back pay claims. Many other forms of monetary relief had been 
 
 
 350. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions 
Alive: How Allison v. Citgo’s Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII 
Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 405, 419 (2005) (criticizing Allison on grounds that, 
inter alia, the “restrictive predomination requirement jeopardizes employees’ ability to obtain full 
relief” in Title VII cases); W. Lyle Stamp, Comment, Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison 
Behind for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 411, 411 (2003) (criticizing Allison’s “unduly 
stringent requirements”). 
 351. See supra Part III.F (discussing In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 
2004)). 
 352. See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 650 (6th Cir. 2006); Cooper v. 
S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 720 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds; Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 
U.S. 454, 457 (2006); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999); Kirby v. 
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 699–700 (8th Cir. 1980); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 
333, 342 (10th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 353. Prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg successfully argued several 
landmark cases on equal protection and gender equality, including Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1973) (striking down federal law requiring different criteria for male and female military spousal 
dependency) and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding state law granting automatic 
exemption from jury duty to all women who requested it resulted in an unconstitutional 
underrepresentation of women in jury venires and violated the criminal defendant’s right to a trial by 
jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community). 
 354. See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a 
Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1036–41 (2012) (discussing post-Dukes jurisprudence 
under Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 355. See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 262–70 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the 
district court’s holding that proposed medical monitoring class did not meet requirements of (b)(2) or 
(b)(3)); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-6292 (RBK/AMD) 2011 WL 6256978 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 
2011); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 279 F.R.D. 598 (D. Kan. 2012) (redefining 
a (b)(2) class to certify damages claims under (b)(3)). 
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permitted pre-Dukes as part of (b)(2) actions, including statutory 
damages
356
 and declaratory relief resulting in recalculation of retirement 
benefits.
357
 The validity of these precedents is now open to question.
358
 
G. Heightened Scrutiny of Predominance 
Most class actions are brought under Rule 23(b)(3).
359
 Rule 23(b)(3) 
authorizes a class action when the court finds: (1) “that the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members,” and (2) “that a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”360 When (b)(3) was first introduced in 1966, it was 
considered “the most complicated and controversial portion” of modern 
Rule 23.
361
 Today, most class actions are certified under (b)(3).
362
 Yet, in 
recent years, the courts have made it far more difficult to certify class 
actions under (b)(3) by summarily finding, after identifying significant 
individualized issues, that predominance cannot be satisfied. They do so 
without carefully weighing those individualized issues against the 
common issues.  
Two lines of cases in which the predominance requirement has often 
been fatal to class certification are those involving common law fraud 
claims and those implicating the laws of multiple jurisdictions. These two 
areas are discussed below. A third topic discussed below relates to 
individualized damages. Prior to Comcast, courts had generally held that 
the need for individualized proof of damages did not defeat class 
certification.
363
 Comcast now raises a serious question on that score. 
 
 
 356. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 462 (N.D. Cal. 
1994) (allowing plaintiffs to seek minimum statutory damages as incidental to the primary injunctive 
relief sought under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 357. See, e.g., Berger v. Xerox Corp. Retirement Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 358. See, e.g., Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 582, 591–93 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (court held that 
actual, punitive, and limited statutory damages were “incidental” but that claims for monetary damages 
available only to a subclass of senior citizens and disabled persons were not). 
 359. KLONOFF ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 30. 
 360. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 361. Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 178 (1970). 
 362. KLONOFF ET AL., CASEBOOK, supra note 40, at 30. 
 363. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[N]umerous courts 
have recognized that the presence of individualized damages issues does not prevent a finding that 
common issues in the case predominate.” (citations omitted; alteration in original)); Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 23 contains no suggestion that 
the necessity for individual damage determinations . . . forecloses class certification.”); Smilow v. 
Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Where, as here, common 
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1. Fraud Cases 
Many courts have adopted essentially a per se view that fraud suits 
involving questions of individual reliance are not suitable for class 
certification.
364
 The Fifth Circuit first articulated this principle in 1996 in 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
365
 stating that “a fraud class action 
cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue.”366 Seven 
years later that Circuit was similarly emphatic, stating at the very 
beginning of its opinion in Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance 
National Indemnity Insurance Co.,
367
 that “[f]raud actions that require 
proof of individual reliance cannot be certified [under Rule 23(b)(3)] 
because individual, rather than common, issues will predominate.”368 Put 
another way, regardless of the importance of the common issues, questions 
of individual reliance are so paramount that no common issues can justify 
certification. 
Sandwich Chef was a fraud-based putative RICO class action by a 
company that operated delicatessens in a number of states, alleging that 
141 casualty insurance companies charged class members excessive 
premiums on workers’ compensation insurance policies. A major issue 
was whether the class members were aware that carriers were charging 
them more than the filed premium rates and nonetheless agreed to those 
charges. The court noted that  
[d]efendants [were] entitled to attempt to undercut [the class 
members’ proof that they detrimentally relied on the invoices as 
reflecting the filed rates] with evidence that might persuade the trier 
of fact that policyholders knew the amounts being charged varied 
 
 
questions predominate regarding liability, then courts generally find the predominance requirement to 
be satisfied even if individual damages issues remain.” (citations omitted)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 306 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Even wide disparity among class members as to the 
amount of damages suffered does not necessarily mean that class certification is inappropriate” 
(citation omitted)). 
 364. An important exception is in certain securities fraud cases, where courts do not require proof 
of individualized reliance from each class member. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the 
Court held that a presumption of reliance applies when trading occurs in an “efficient” market that 
accurately reflects all publicly disclosed information in the price of the stock. See KLONOFF, 
NUTSHELL, supra note 15, at 359–62; infra Part IV.A. 
 365. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 366. Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 
 367. 319 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 368. Id. at 211. 
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from rates filed with regulators and that they had agreed to pay such 
premiums.
369
 
Finding no basis for a presumption of reliance, the court held that the 
district court had improperly certified the class.
370
 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, citing with approval the Fifth Circuit’s 
language in Castano, held that the district court had erred in certifying a 
consumer protection class action involving issues of individualized 
reliance.
371
 Numerous other cases have taken a rigid view that 
predominance is defeated—virtually automatically—when individualized 
reliance issues exist.
372
 
Other courts, while not using such emphatic language, have made clear 
that the burden on the class to satisfy predominance would be onerous. For 
instance, in McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co.,
373
 the Second Circuit 
held that a case alleging false advertising by tobacco companies was not 
suitable for class certification because “reliance [on the ads as the reason 
for smoking was] too individualized to admit of common proof.
374
 
Not all courts have taken such a strict approach. As the Eleventh 
Circuit stated in Klay v. Humana, Inc.,
375
 “the simple fact that reliance is 
an element in a cause of action is not an absolute bar to class 
certification.”376 Thus, for example, some courts have recognized that 
class certification is appropriate in fraud cases that involve uniform 
misrepresentations or omissions.
377
 Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes 
 
 
 369. Id. at 220. 
 370. Id. at 224. The rationale of Sandwich Chef has been criticized. See, e.g., Leah Bressack, 
Note, Small Claim Mass Fraud Actions: A Proposal for Aggregate Litigation Under RICO, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 579, 592 (2008) (criticizing the approach to RICO taken in Sandwich Chef and other cases on 
the grounds that “requir[ing] individualized proof of reliance[] generally precludes class certification,” 
thereby “forc[ing] individualized adjudications that will never occur.”). The Supreme Court later held 
that a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim for mail fraud did not need to show reliance, either as an 
element of the claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation. See Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). 
 371. In re St. Jude Med. Inc., Silzone Heart Valve Prods. Liab. Litig., 522 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 372. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 434 (4th Cir. 2003); McManus 
v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 549–50 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 373. 522 F.3d. 215 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 374. Id. at 225; accord, e.g., UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 132–37 (2d Cir. 
2010) (relying on McLaughlin in overturning certification of a fraud claim). 
 375. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 376. Id. at 1258. 
 377. See, e.g., Moore v. Painewebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1255 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) 
(“[E]vidence of materially uniform misrepresentations is sufficient to demonstrate the nature of the 
misrepresentation; an individual plaintiff’s receipt of and reliance upon the misrepresentation may then 
be simpler matters to determine”); In re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Invs. 
Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 255 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding class certification proper notwithstanding 
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to Rule 23 make precisely this point. Although the Notes state that a fraud 
suit may be inappropriate for certification if there are “material 
variation[s] in the representations” or “in the kinds or degrees of reliance” 
by class members, the Notes further provide that a “a fraud perpetrated on 
numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an 
appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the 
need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages 
suffered by an individuals within the class.”378 A number of courts have 
specifically recognized that the Advisory Committee Notes support 
certification in certain types of fraud cases.
379
 
In an important unpublished opinion, Jenson v. Fiserv Trust Co.,
380
 the 
Ninth Circuit explicitly departed from courts that find individualized 
reliance to be fatal to predominance. The class consisted of investors who 
made investments and lost money and who claimed that they were victims 
of a Ponzi scheme.
381
 A subclass consisted of investors who made those 
investments through defendant Fiserv’s accounts. Fiserv argued that a 
fraud case based on alleged oral misrepresentations could not be certified 
and that the district court erred in certifying the subclass. The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed, finding that the “‘center of gravity’” of the fraud 
predominated over the existence of individualized communications.
382
 It 
noted that “[t]he Ponzi scheme itself would have to be proved or 
controverted over and over were the case not to proceed as a class 
action.”383 It emphasized that “common issues do not necessarily fail to 
predominate simply because reliance must be shown.”384 
 
 
oral representations where case focused on standardized letters); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 178 F.R.D. 
431, 436 (D. Del. 1998) (noting, in finding predominance despite reliance issues, that “[i]n this case 
. . . it is fair to assume that most individuals who opened up credit card accounts after receiving the 
offer from [defendant] did so because . . . of the [annual percentage rate]”); Shankroff v. Advest, Inc., 
112 F.R.D. 190, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting in certifying class that “the facts as alleged show that 
defendant’s course of conduct concealed material information from an entire putative class”). 
 378. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 379. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a 
test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust 
laws”) (citation omitted); Miles v. Am. Online, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 297, 304 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (although 
the Advisory Committee Notes warn that some fraud cases might not be suitable for class certification, 
the Notes “also find it appealing to use a class device to resolve cases involving ‘fraud perpetrated on 
numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations’”) (citation omitted); PaineWebber, 306 
F.3d at 1253 (“fraud actions must . . . be separated into two categories: fraud claims based on uniform 
misrepresentations . . . and fraud claims based on individualized misrepresentations”). 
 380. 256 Fed. App’x 924 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 926 (quoting In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 383. Id. (citation omitted). 
 384. Id. (citation omitted). 
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It may well be that, under the particular circumstances in Castano and 
Sandwich Chef, individual issues outweighed common issues. Indeed, 
Castano involved a problematic, newly minted tort theory: “addiction as 
injury.”385 The problem in Castano, Sandwich Chef, and similar cases, 
however, is that the courts reach the conclusion against class certification 
without carefully balancing the common issues against the individual 
issues. As the Ninth Circuit’s Jenson decision reflects, a class action may 
avoid the need to retry, for each class member, the core theory of liability, 
or at least the underlying alleged misconduct. Only by balancing that 
benefit against the time and effort required to prove reliance for each class 
member can a proper decision be made on predominance. If the case 
involves alleged uniform written communications, for example, the 
reliance issues may be quite manageable. The notion adopted by some 
courts that fraud cases involving individualized reliance are per se 
unsuitable flies in the face of the Advisory Committee Notes, which 
makes clear that in fraud cases, the facts of each case must be 
considered.
386
 As one court stated in another context, “the mere fact that 
questions peculiar to each individual member of the class action remain 
after the common questions of the defendant’s liability have resolved does 
not dictate the conclusion that a class action is impermissible.”387 
2. Choice-of-Law 
The treatment of fraud and reliance by some courts finds an exact 
parallel in cases involving the laws of multiple states. Multiple states’ laws 
may be implicated in nationwide or other multi-state class actions based 
on state-law claims, such as consumer protection acts, negligence, unjust 
enrichment, fraud, or breach of contract. Various choice-of-law 
approaches frequently dictate that the law of each class member’s home 
state will govern.
388
 Numerous courts hold that when the laws of multiple 
states are involved and are not uniform, class certification is essentially 
 
 
 385. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 n.24 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 386. See supra note 378. 
 387. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 388. Choice-of-law principles may point to the various jurisdictions in which class members find 
themselves, based upon the “nature of the claims involved,” or upon “a contextual determination that 
the jurisdiction in which each class member is found has the most significant interest in controlling the 
resolution of that class member’s claim or, similarly, has the most significant relationship to the 
underlying dispute.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 279, § 2.05, 
cmt. b, at 131. Under a second approach, the laws of the class members’ jurisdictions might be 
grouped into a limited number of patterns. Id. Alternatively, a single state’s law might apply, assuming 
that the choice is not arbitrary and that defendant was on notice of the applicable legal standard. Id. 
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per se inappropriate. Some courts base their decision on a lack of 
predominance. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Stirman v. Exxon Corp.,
389
 
“[i]n order for common issues to predominate”390 the state laws at issue 
“must be uniform in [the] necessary aspects . . . .”391 Other courts base 
their decision on a failure to show that the class action would be 
manageable, as required by Rule 23(b)(3)(D).
392
 
A recent example of this rigid approach to choice-of-law is the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC,393 discussed 
above.
394
 The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision granting 
defendants’ motion to deny class certification, without affording plaintiffs 
any opportunity to conduct discovery, because the laws of the 50 states 
were involved.
395
 Although the court purported not to rule out completely 
the possibility that a case could satisfy predominance despite the 
application of multiple states’ laws,396 it in fact left little room for 
certifying classes involving the laws of multiple states. For example, the 
court quoted a prior Sixth Circuit case stating that “‘[i]f more than a few 
of the laws of the fifty states differ,’” then “‘the district judge would face 
an impossible task of instructing a jury on the relevant law.’”397 It also 
quoted a Seventh Circuit opinion holding that “‘[b]ecause these claims 
must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions,’” the class 
was unmanageable.
398
 The fact that the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs 
were not entitled even to limited discovery relating to predominance 
underscored that any significant choice-of-law issues are, in the Sixth 
Circuit’s view, fatal to certification. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, several courts were willing to certify class 
actions, notwithstanding choice-of-law issues. For instance, in In re 
Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
399
 the Wyoming district court sharply 
criticized courts that were unwilling to certify class actions involving 
multiple states’ laws. The suit was a nationwide product liability class 
 
 
 389. 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 390. Id. at 564–65. 
 391. Id. at 565 n.9. 
 392. Examples include Castano, 84 F.3d at 743–44 (relying on manageability as well as 
predominance); and In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 324 (S.D. 
Ill. 2007) (same). 
 393. 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 394. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 395. Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 946–47. 
 396. Id. at 947. 
 397. Id. at 948 (quoting In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 398. Id. (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 399. 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995). 
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action against Copley Pharmaceutical alleging that its drug Albuterol was 
contaminated.
400
 Focusing on manageability under the superiority 
component of Rule 23(b)(3), the court held that certification was 
appropriate. It stated that “the decision whether to attempt to manage a 
class under differing laws is committed to the discretion of the trial 
court.”401 The court emphasized that only one defendant had been sued, 
that the product had been safely manufactured by other generic drug 
companies, and that Copley had admitted that some of its product was 
contaminated and that it was liable for injuries resulting from that 
contamination.
402
 The court cited several cases, primarily from the 1980s, 
stating that choice-of-law issues did not render a case per se unsuitable for 
class certification.
403
 
Even more recently, courts have occasionally suggested that choice-of-
law issues are not necessarily fatal.
404
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Klay v. Humana, Inc.
405
 is illustrative. Although the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the district court abused its discretion in certifying state breach of 
contract claims on a nationwide basis, it made clear that choice-of-law was 
not the concern. The court stated that “if the applicable state laws can be 
sorted into a small number of groups, each containing materially identical 
legal standards, then certification of subclasses embracing each of the 
dominant legal standards can be appropriate.”406 With respect to breach of 
contract, the court said that “[a] breach is a breach is a breach, whether 
you are on the sunny shores of California or enjoying a sweet autumn 
breeze in New Jersey.”407 
As with reliance in a fraud suit, there should be no per se rule that 
choice-of-law issues defeat class certification. Assuming that a single 
state’s law does not apply (for instance, the law of the defendant’s 
principal place of business), the court should carefully analyze the 
circumstances of the case based on: (1) the extent of variations in the state 
laws (and the number of states’ laws at issue); (2) the ability to minimize 
differences through subclasses; and (3) the strength of the common issues. 
 
 
 400. Id. at 457. 
 401. Id. at 465 (citation omitted). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 466. 
 404. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[P]redominance is not defeated merely because different states’ laws apply to different class 
members’ claims.”) (citations omitted). 
 405. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 406. Id. at 1262 (citation omitted). 
 407. Id. at 1263 (citation omitted). 
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Although Rhone-Poulenc suggests that even nuances are critical,
408
 a 
proper inquiry should focus not on nuances but on whether the laws are 
the same in “functional content.”409 Of course, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show, through a precise analysis of the applicable laws and a 
proposed case management plan, that common issues predominate and 
that the trial of the case would be manageable. 
3. Individualized Damages Issues 
Prior to Comcast, most courts had recognized that the presence of 
individualized damages issues normally did not defeat class 
certification.
410
 After Comcast, this proposition has arguably been called 
into question. In Comcast, the Court stated: 
[I]t is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating 
certification, respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that 
damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without 
presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage 
calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the 
class.
411
 
This language can be read to suggest that individualized damages issues 
raise serious predominance concerns. On the other hand, the dissent in 
Comcast stressed that the majority opinion did not contradict the “nigh 
universal” body of case law holding “that individual damages calculations 
do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”412 In part, the 
disagreement between the majority and dissent on this point stemmed 
from the unusual procedural posture of the case: plaintiffs had not 
contested the proposition that class certification would be inappropriate if 
individualized damages issues existed.
413
 
 
 
 408. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 409. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.05(b)(2), 129 (Am. Law Inst. 
2010). 
 410. See supra note 363. 
 411. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 412. Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Amgen Inc. v. 
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013) (“Rule 23 . . . does not require a 
plaintiff seeking class certification to prove that each ‘elemen[t] of [her] claim [is] susceptible to 
classwide proof.” (citation omitted; alterations in original)). 
 413. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) 
(citing plaintiffs’ brief). 
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It remains to be seen whether Comcast will now cause lower courts to 
depart from the traditional rule that individualized damages issues 
normally do not defeat class certification. Courts and commentators are 
already divided on what the impact of the case will be.
414
 If courts begin to 
require, as a prerequisite to class certification, that plaintiffs provide a 
methodology for proving damages on a classwide basis, this will be yet 
another major impediment to class certification. 
H. Settlement Certification 
In many cases, plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants are able to agree 
upon the terms of a classwide settlement even before the court has 
certified a class.
415
 Indeed, the very uncertainty over whether a class would 
even be certified often helps to bring the two sides to the bargaining table. 
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
416
 a putative class action involving 
alleged injuries from asbestos, the Supreme Court held that, when class 
certification is sought simultaneously with approval of a classwide 
settlement, the parties cannot avoid rigorous compliance with Rule 23. 
Although the Court said that, in the settlement context, “a district court 
need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable 
management problems [when certification is sought under Rule 23(b)(3)],” 
the Court concluded that the other requirements of Rule 23 (including the 
four requirements of Rule 23(a) and the other requirements of (b)(3) 
(excluding manageability)) “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention 
 
 
 414. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, From Cable TV to 
Washing Machines: The Supreme Court Cracks Down on Class Actions, 14 BNA Insights 10 (May 24, 
2013) (arguing that it “follows from the Comcast decision that plaintiffs must put forth a method 
sufficient to calculate damages on a classwide basis in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions”); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Precarious Status of Class Action Litigation after Comcast v. Behrend, Apr. 8, 2013, 
http://pointoflaw.com/columns/2013/04/the-precarious-status-of-class-action-antitrust-litigation-after-
comcast-v-behrend.php (“Will [Comcast] be treated as a misadventure in pleading or a major 
revolution in the proof of damages in consumer class actions? Only time will tell.”); see also Roach v. 
T. L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10-cv-0591, 2013 WL 1316452, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (finding 
that Comcast required denial of class certification where plaintiffs failed to offer a “damages model 
susceptible of measurement across the entire class”); but see Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc., 716 
F.3d 510, 514–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that district court abused its discretion in denying class 
certification because of individualized damages and finding that Comcast did not change prior case 
law holding that individualized damages ordinarily do not defeat class certification); Munoz v. PHH 
Corp., No. 1:08-cv-0759-AWI-BAM, 2013 WL 2146925, at *24 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) (“The 
Comcast decision does not infringe on the longstanding principle that individual class member damage 
calculations are permissible in a certified class under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 415. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (“68 percent of the federal [class action] settlements 
in 2006 and 2007 were settlement classes”). 
 416. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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in the settlement context.”417 The Court based its decision, inter alia, on 
the text of Rule 23(b)(3), which does not differentiate for certification 
purposes between a litigation class and a settlement class.
418
 Applying the 
predominance requirement to the settlement class before it, the Court held 
that the “sprawling class the District Court certified” failed to satisfy that 
requirement.
419
 The Court flatly rejected the argument that a settlement 
class should be approved—without regard to the certification 
requirements—as long as it was fair: 
[C]ourts must be mindful that the Rule as now composed sets the 
requirements they are bound to enforce. . . . Federal courts . . . lack 
authority to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard 
never adopted—that if a settlement is “fair,” then certification is 
proper. . . . [C]ertification cannot be upheld [in this case], for it rests 
on a conception of Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements irreconcilable with 
the Rule’s design.420 
A number of courts have invalidated settlements in light of Amchem. 
For example, in In re Grand Theft Auto Video Game Consumer 
Litigation,
421
 the district court decertified a settlement class of consumers 
pursuing fraud claims, holding that Rule 23(b)(3) predominance was 
defeated by the need to prove individualized reliance and the need to apply 
multiple states’ laws.422 The court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG,
423
 which in turn relied heavily on 
Amchem.
424
 Echoing Amchem, the Grand Theft Auto court stated that 
“[t]rial manageability issues aside, . . . the ‘requirements of [Rule 23(a) 
 
 
 417. Id. at 620 (emphasis added). 
 418. Id. at 622–25. In addition to relying on the Rule’s text, the Amchem Court noted that, if a 
class could be certified without satisfying the requirements for a litigation class, “[c]lass counsel 
confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer. . . .” 
Id. at 621 (citation omitted). See also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.06 cmt. 
a, at 213 (Am. Law Inst. 2010); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). In addition to finding that predominance was not satisfied, 
the Court also found that the putative class failed to meet Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation 
requirement. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625–28. 
 419. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622–23. 
 420. Id. at 620. 
 421. 251 F.R.D. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 422. Id. at 146. 
 423. 443 F.3d 253, 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]nquiry into the fairness of a settlement cannot supplant 
the inquiries under Rules 23(a) and (b) regarding whether the requirements for class certification have 
been met.” (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619–21)) (citation omitted). 
 424. See supra notes 416–20 and accompanying text. 
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and (b)] should not be watered down by virtue of the fact that the 
settlement is fair or equitable.’”425 
Likewise, in In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation,
426
 the district 
court relied heavily on Amchem in refusing to certify a settlement class of 
plaintiffs who had ingested an allegedly dangerous dietary supplement. 
The court stated: 
 In Amchem, the Court . . . rejected the argument . . . that 
certification requirements are relaxed when litigation is to be 
obviated by a settlement. “[P]roposed settlement classes sometimes 
warrant more, not less, caution on the question of certification.” . . . 
 Application here of Rule 23 standards reveals that the proposed 
certification is deficient for, inter alia, some of the same reasons 
addressed in Amchem.
427
 
The refusal of some courts to certify settlement classes is not the only 
consequence of Amchem. Many recent mass actions have settled outside of 
the class action process. For instance, the highly publicized multidistrict 
Vioxx and Zyprexa pharmaceutical claims settled without class 
certification.
428
 In his concurring opinion in Sullivan v. DB Investments, 
Inc.,
429
 Judge Scirica related this phenomenon to Amchem. He opined that 
class settlement of mass tort cases had become problematic as a result of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion, “leading some practitioners to avoid the 
class action device.”430 Judge Scirica further noted that “some observers 
believe there has been a shift in mass personal injury claims to aggregate 
non-class settlements.”431 
This alternative settlement route is troublesome: unless the court 
chooses to treat a case as akin to a class action and thus carefully reviews 
 
 
 425. Grand Theft Auto, 251 F.R.D. at 146 (quoting Denney, 443 F.3d at 270). 
 426. 231 F.R.D. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 427. Id. at 170 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 n.16). For additional examples of courts either 
refusing to certify or decertifying settlement classes based on Amchem, see, e.g., In re Literary Works 
in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 249–57 (2d Cir. 2011), on remand from 130 S. Ct. 
1237 (2011); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Motor Fuel 
Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 263 (D. Kan. 2010); and Gilliam v. HBE Corp., 204 
F.R.D. 493 (M.D. Fla. 2000). 
 428. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
506, 507 n.5, 513 (2011). 
 429. 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Murray v. 
Sullivan, 132 S. Ct. 1876 (2012). 
 430. Id. at 334. 
 431. Id. (citing Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 801 (2010)) 
(additional citations omitted). 
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the settlement and the amount of attorneys’ fees,432 the settling plaintiffs 
receive none of the protections that Rule 23(e) and Rule 23(h) provide for 
class actions, including judicial evaluation of the fairness of the settlement 
and the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.433 As Judge Scirica stated: “[The 
increase in large non-class settlements] is significant, for outside the 
federal rules governing class actions, there is no prescribed independent 
review of the structural and substantive fairness of a settlement including 
evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest, and counsel’s 
allocation of settlement funds among class members.”434 
Some courts, notwithstanding Amchem, have relaxed the Rule 23 
criteria for settlement classes. For instance, one district court has noted in 
the choice-of-law context that “courts are more inclined to find the 
predominance test met” when the case involves a settlement class rather 
than a litigation class.
435
 Other courts have emphasized Amchem’s holding 
that the manageability component of (b)(3) does not apply to (b)(3) 
settlement classes without grappling with possible predominance issues 
posed by the particular case. The Third Circuit took this latter approach in 
a recent en banc decision, Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.
436
 In upholding 
a settlement class despite state law differences, the court noted: “The 
correct outcome is even clearer for certification of a settlement class 
because the concern for manageability that is a central tenet in the 
 
 
 432. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009) (“[T]he 
Vioxx global settlement may properly be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the 
Court equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for reasonableness.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-
1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (court reviewed reasonableness of fees 
because the private settlement “has many of the characteristics of a class action and may be properly 
characterized as a quasi-class action subject to general equitable powers of the court” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (to the same effect). 
 433. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar 
Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 175, 194 (2003) (“Consolidated cases that involve 
hundreds or thousands of claimants involve an even greater problem because all of the protections of 
class actions have been eliminated”); Willging & Lee, supra note 431, at 803 (“[F]ew, if any, of the 
special procedural protections available to class members are afforded to litigants who settle their 
cases in a nonclass consolidated settlement.” (footnote omitted)); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010) (“[B]ecause 
these claims are not certified as class actions, they proceed in a procedural no man’s land—somewhere 
in between individual litigation and class action litigation, but without the protections of either.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 434. Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 334 (Scirica, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
 435. Ersler v. Toshiba Am. Inc., No. CV-07-2304, 2009 WL 454354, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 
2009) (citation omitted). 
 436. 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Murray v. Sullivan, 132 S. Ct. 
1876 (2012). 
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certification of a litigation class is removed from the equation.”437 The 
court stated that “we can find no persuasive authority for deeming the 
certification of a class for settlement purposes improper based on 
differences in state law.”438 The court reached this conclusion 
notwithstanding numerous cases holding, in the trial context, that the 
existence of multiple state laws defeats predominance as well as 
manageability.
439
 Indeed, in Amchem itself, the Court quoted the Third 
Circuit’s decertification order, which noted that “[d]ifferences in state law 
. . . compound [the] disparities” among class members.440 
The Second Circuit’s recent decision in In re American Intern. Group, 
Inc. Securities Litigation
441
 is another example of a court focusing on 
Amchem’s manageability holding as a way to approve a settlement. There, 
the district court had refused to certify a (b)(3) class because it found that 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not apply to the plaintiffs’ 
securities fraud claims, and therefore, that predominance was not 
satisfied.
442
 The Second Circuit, however, held that, under Amchem, “a 
settlement class ordinarily need not demonstrate that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption applies to its claims in order to satisfy the 
predominance requirement.”443 The court reasoned that, since “a securities 
fraud class’s failure to satisfy the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
primarily threatens class certification by creating ‘intractable management 
problems’ at trial,” and since “settlement eliminates the need for trial,” the 
class’s failure to qualify for the Basic v. Levinson presumption did not 
preclude certification of a settlement class.
444
 This case, however, ignores 
the fact that—putting aside manageability—reliance issues raise a 
predominance problem,
445
 and Amchem held that predominance must be 
satisfied even for settlement classes. 
 
 
 437. Id. at 302; see also In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529–30 (3d Cir. 
2004) (upholding certification of a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3) and reasoning that differences 
in state law do not present manageability problems when a case settles). 
 438. Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 304. 
 439. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 349–52 
(D.N.J. 1997); Marshall v. H & R Block Tax Servs. Inc., 270 F.R.D 400, 407–10 (S.D. Ill. 2010); In re 
Prempro, 230 F.R.D. 555, 561–63 (E.D. Ark. 2005); see also supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 440. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 441. 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 442. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 443. 689 F.3d at 232. 
 444. Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). 
 445. See supra Part III.G.1. 
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Numerous commentators have been critical of Amchem.
446
 For 
example, prominent plaintiff lawyer Elizabeth Cabraser has stated: “[T]he 
multibillion-dollar settlement, rejected by the Supreme Court, was lost 
forever, and thousands of claimants who would gladly have traded their 
pristine due process rights for substantial monetary compensation have 
been consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos 
bankruptcies.”447 
As indicated above, the rigorous scrutiny of Rule 23’s requirements 
presents a number of practical problems in the settlement certification 
context. First, as Judge Scirica observed, Amchem has led some 
practitioners to avoid the class action route altogether,
448
 resulting in an 
increase in mass actions settling outside the class action process.
449
 The 
settling plaintiffs are thus deprived of the protections of Rule 23(e) and 
Rule 23(h). Moreover, requirements that are important only in the context 
of litigation should not play a role in the settlement context. Amchem’s 
conflation of class settlement with class litigation undermines the benefits 
of avoiding litigation and may result in plaintiffs being unable to pursue 
socially beneficial settlements.
450
 
In 1996 the Advisory Committee proposed creating a fourth type of 
class under Rule 23(b), often referred to as the “settlement class.” The 
proposed rule provided that “the parties to a settlement [may] request 
certification under subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even 
though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for 
purposes of trial.”451 As the draft Advisory Committee Notes stated 
regarding that proposed rule: 
 
 
 446. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1475 (2005); Joseph W. Gelb, Yoav M. Griver & Seth C. Berman, Class Action Settlements in the 
Aftermath of Amchem Products and Ortiz, 55 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1441–43 (2000); Alex Raskolnikov, Is 
There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545 
(1998); cf. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF 
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 127 (1995) (“I cannot agree 
with those who would have the courts attempt to treat mass tort cases on a one-by-one basis, as though 
they were two-car accidents.”); but see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 372 (2000) (noting 
that Amchem and Ortiz have “chilled the use of the more manipulative devices by which defendants 
and class counsel could structure a settlement that maximized their interests at the expense of the class 
members—most notably, the ‘settlement class action’” (footnote omitted)). 
 447. Cabraser, supra note 446, at 1476. 
 448. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring), cert. 
denied sub nom. Murray v. Sullivan, 132 S. Ct. 1876 (2012). 
 449. See supra notes 429–30 and accompanying text. 
 450. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009) (discussing the benefits of settlement). 
 451. Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(4), 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1997). 
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[C]ertification of a (b)(3) class is affected by the many differences 
between settlement and litigation of class claims or defenses. 
Choice-of-law difficulties, for example, may force certification of 
many subclasses, or even defeat any class certification, if claims are 
to be litigated. Settlement can be reached, however, on terms that 
surmount such difficulties. Many other elements are affected as 
well. A single court may be able to manage settlement when 
litigation would require resort to many courts. And, perhaps most 
important, settlement may prove far superior to litigation in 
devising comprehensive solutions to large-scale problems that defy 
ready disposition by traditional adversary litigation. Important 
benefits may be provided for those who, knowing of the class 
settlement and the opportunity to opt out, prefer to participate in the 
class judgment and avoid the costs of individual litigation.
452
 
The ALI’s project, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, for 
which this author served as Associate Reporter, also addresses this precise 
problem. Under the ALI’s approach, “[i]n any case in which the parties 
simultaneously seek certification and approval of the settlement, the case 
need not satisfy all of the requirements for certification of a class for 
purposes of litigation.”453 Instead, the court may approve the settlement if 
it finds that the relief afforded by the settlement is fair, that the class 
members are treated equitably, and that the settlement was negotiated at 
arm’s length; and if it further finds that “significant common issues exist,” 
that “the class is sufficiently numerous to warrant classwide treatment,” 
and that “the class definition is sufficient to ascertain who is and who is 
not included in the class.”454 Importantly, under the ALI approach, “[t]he 
court need not conclude that common issues predominate over individual 
issues” in order to approve a settlement class.455 This approach would 
prevent outcomes like the one in Grand Theft Auto,
456
 where courts feel 
 
 
 452. Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(4) advisory committee’s note. The proposal was abandoned 
following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION § 3.06 cmt. a, at 215 (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (citing 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1997)); see Linda 
S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 615 (1997) (discussing proposed Rule 23(b)(4)); Christopher J. Willis, Collision Course or 
Coexistence? Amchem Products v. Windsor and Proposed Rule 23(b)(4), 28 CUMB. L. REV. 13 (1997) 
(criticizing the proposal). 
 453. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.06(a), 212 (Am. Law Inst. 2010). 
 454. Id. § 3.05(a), 204; § 3.06(b), 212. 
 455. Id. § 3.06(b), 212. 
 456. See supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text. 
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constrained to reject a class settlement because of predominance issues 
that were irrelevant in the settlement context. 
I. Issues Classes 
One of Rule 23’s tools to help courts resolve common issues is Rule 
23(c)(4). Under that provision, a court can certify particular issues even if 
individualized issues remain for adjudication. As Rule 23(c)(4) provides, 
“[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.”457 The Advisory Committee Notes 
state: 
This provision recognizes that an action may be maintained as a 
class action as to particular issues only. For example, in a fraud or 
similar case the action may retain its “class” character only through 
the adjudication of liability to the class; the members of the class 
may thereafter be required to come in individually and prove the 
amounts of their respective claims.
458
 
This rule has created significant conflict and confusion among the courts 
and thus is not frequently utilized.
459
 
One line of cases views (c)(4) as a “housekeeping” rule that does not 
alter the usual predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). In other words, 
the case as a whole must still satisfy the predominance test. A leading case 
for this view is Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
460
 a putative class 
action brought by smokers. In that case, the court rejected the district 
court’s attempt to try certain liability and damages issues: 
A district court cannot manufacture predominance through the 
nimble use of subdivision (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the 
interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of 
action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of 
(b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to 
sever the common issues for a class trial. Reading [R]ule 23(c)(4) as 
allowing a court to sever issues until the remaining common issue 
predominates over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate 
 
 
 457. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 458. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note. 
 459. See Edward F. Sherman, “Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion 
and Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 497 n.90 (2011) (citing other commentary); 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 cmt. a, at 84 (2010). 
 460. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
808 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:729 
 
 
 
 
the predominance requirement of [R]ule 23(b)(3); the result would 
be automatic certification in every case where there is a common 
issue, a result that could not have been intended.
461
 
Several courts have followed Castano’s approach.462 For instance, in 
Arch v. American Tobacco Co.,
463
 the district court denied certification of 
a class of Pennsylvania smokers, holding that the entire case must satisfy 
the predominance requirement before common issues may be severed for 
trial. The court stated: 
Before a district court may certify common issues pursuant to 
(c)(4), the court must first find that a cause of action, as a whole, 
satisfies the predominance requirement of (b)(3). After the court 
determines that (b)(3) has been satisfied as to the whole cause of 
action, then the court may use (c)(4) as a “housekeeping rule . . . to 
sever common issues for trial.” Plaintiffs cannot read the 
predominance requirement out of (b)(3) by using (c)(4) to sever 
issues until the common issues predominate over the individual 
issues.
464
 
Some courts refuse to certify issues classes by misperceiving the very 
purpose of such classes. For instance, in In re Genetically Modified Rice 
Litigation,
465
 the court refused to certify an issues class, finding that “a 
trial limited to common issues would not resolve any individual plaintiff’s 
claims.”466 Given that issues classes are designed precisely to avoid 
resolving any claims (hence the term “issues classes”), this reasoning 
ignores the basic premises underlying certification of issues classes. As 
Genetically Modified Rice suggests, some courts are simply averse to 
making substantial use of Rule 23(c)(4). 
 
 
 461. Id. at 745 n.21; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). One 
commentator has stated, regarding the combined effect of Castano and Rhone-Poulenc on certification 
of issues classes: “In the late 1990s, the salutary trend toward issue litigation stopped short, following 
a prominent pair of court of appeals decisions . . . . [C]ourts have repeatedly rejected class certification 
when cases have required resolution of individual issues of any significance.” Jon Romberg, Half a 
Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 
23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 252 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 462. See, e.g., Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 237 F.R.D. 581 (W.D. Tex. 2006); Kreger v. Gen. Steel 
Corp., No. 07-575, 2010 WL 2902773 (E.D. La. July 19, 2010); Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 256 F.R.D. 
580 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.R.D. 209 (D. Conn. 1999). 
 463. 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 464. Id. at 496 (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d at 745 n.21). 
 465. 251 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
 466. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). 
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Other courts, however, have taken a different approach. The Second 
Circuit, for example, stated in McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co.
467
 
that “a court may employ [subsection] (c)(4) to certify a class as to 
common issues that do exist, ‘regardless of whether the claim as a whole 
satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.’”468 The key issue, 
according to the Second Circuit, is whether the case as a whole will be 
“materially advance[d].”469 In McLaughlin, the Second Circuit decertified 
a class of former smokers who brought a RICO action against cigarette 
manufacturers, holding that certification could not be based on Rule 
23(c)(4): 
We recognize that a court may employ Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a 
class as to common issues that do exist, “regardless of whether the 
claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement.” Nevertheless, in this case, given the number of 
questions that would remain for individual adjudication, issue 
certification would not “reduce the range of issues in dispute and 
promote judicial economy.” Certifying, for example, the issue of 
defendants’ scheme to defraud, would not materially advance the 
litigation because it would not dispose of larger issues such as 
reliance, injury, and damages.
470
 
Along the same lines, the ALI explains: 
[The] aggregate treatment of a common issue will materially 
advance the resolution of multiple civil claims more frequently 
when the issue concerns “upstream” matters focused on the 
generally applicable conduct of those opposing the claimants in the 
litigation, as distinct from “downstream” matters focused on those 
claimants themselves.
471
 
 
 
 467. 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 468. Id. at 234 (quoting Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001)); 
accord, e.g., In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 469. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 234. 
 470. Id. (citations omitted); accord, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 
2008) (declining to find predominance satisfied and citing McLaughlin in noting that “issue 
certification” is inappropriate “where the predominance of individual issues is such that limited class 
certification would do little to increase the efficiency of the litigation”); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 
F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003) (holding that certification of select issues for class treatment was 
inappropriate; such an approach would not materially advance the disposition of the litigation given 
that additional proceedings would “still be required to determine issues of causation, damages, and 
applicable defenses”). 
 471. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 cmt. a, at 84 (Am. Law Inst. 
2010) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., MCL4TH § 21.24, at 273 (4th ed. 2004); BARBARA J. 
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The Third Circuit, noting the conflict among the circuits, has taken a 
different approach. In Gates v. Rohn & Haas Co.,
472
 the court articulated 
eight non-exclusive factors that should guide whether issue certification is 
appropriate.
473
 These factors include, among several others: (1) “the 
impact partial certification will have on the constitutional and statutory 
rights” of the parties; (2) “the repercussions certification of an issue(s) 
class will have on the effectiveness and fairness of resolution of [the] 
remaining issues”; and (3) “the efficiencies to be gained by granting 
partial certification in light of realistic procedural alternatives.”474 
Some courts have made genuine use of issues classes. For instance, the 
Seventh Circuit has been receptive to issues classes in cases involving 
environmental harm
475
 and employment discrimination.
476
 In the 
environmental context, the court (in an opinion by Judge Posner) held in 
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp.
477
 that the trial court properly 
certified two issues in a case alleging groundwater contamination: 
(1) “whether [defendant] leaked [the substance at issue] in violation of 
law,” and (2) “whether [the substance] reached the soil and groundwater 
beneath the homes of the class members.”478 Without citing Rule 23(c)(4), 
the court noted that, after the classwide resolution of the common issues, 
“[t]he individual class members will still have to prove the fact and extent 
of their individual injuries.”479 Nonetheless, the fact that individual issues 
would remain did not mean that an issues class was inappropriate: 
If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the 
claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which 
 
 
ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR 
JUDGES 10 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 3d ed. 2010) (“The test is whether the resolution of common issues 
advances the litigation as a whole, as opposed to leaving a large number of issues for case-by-case 
adjudication.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 831–32 
(1997) (describing more readily certified “upstream cases” as those in which “the harm is alleged to be 
some uniform course of conduct by the defendant, from which everything else follows,” and 
differentiating “downstream” cases, where courts must “find fact after fact with regard to each 
individual plaintiff”). For further discussion of these issues, see Romberg, supra note 461, at 251–53 
(2002) (criticizing Castano and Rhone-Poulenc, explaining the utility of issues classes, and discussing 
“downstream cases”). 
 472. 655 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 473. Id. at 273 (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 2.02–05 (2010)). 
 474. Gates, 655 F.3d at 273; see also Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200–202 
(3d Cir. 2009) (also listing a variety of criteria relevant to (c)(4) certification). 
 475. See Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 476. Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004); McReynolds v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
 477. 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 478. Id. at 911. 
 479. Id. at 912. 
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is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it makes 
good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those 
issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-
specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.
480
 
Similarly, in a post-Dukes race discrimination case, the Seventh 
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, held that the district court had 
erred in refusing to certify an issues class.
481
 The issue in dispute was 
whether “the defendant has engaged and is engaging in practices [violating 
the antidiscrimination laws] that have a disparate impact (that is, a 
discriminatory effect, though it need not be intentional) on the members of 
the class.”482 Although the court recognized that individualized suits for 
back pay and damages might be necessary (in the event (b)(3) could not be 
used for the monetary claims), it had “trouble seeing the downside of . . . 
limited [issue] class . . . treatment.”483 Thus, the court held that resolution 
of the disparate impact issue “can most efficiently be determined on a 
class-wide basis.”484 
Mirroring the disagreement among the circuits, commentators have 
taken a variety of divergent positions with regard to issues classes—
drawing on the differing approaches espoused in Castano and McLaughlin 
and their respective progeny.
485
 Views range from endorsement of 
Castano’s strict approach486 to zealous support for certification of issues 
classes as a means to efficiently resolve critical and widespread societal 
 
 
 480. Id. at 911. 
 481. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012). 
 482. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483. 
 483. Id. at 492. 
 484. Id. at 491. 
 485. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the 
Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 238–40 (2003) (emphasizing the Rule’s qualification, “[w]hen 
appropriate,” and arguing that “issue classes to split off the question of liability from the calculus of 
monetary relief are ‘appropriate’ when underlying substantive law itself marks a clear separation of 
those two facets of class members’ claims”), and Jenna G. Farleigh, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing 
Issue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1630 (2011) (proposing that the Supreme Court 
articulate a “multifactor balancing test to assist lower courts in making decisions on issue class 
appropriateness”), and Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class 
Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 334 (2002) 
(strongly supporting the use of issues classes), with Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action 
End Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 712 (2003) (“Rule 23(c)(4)(A), in its current form, simply cannot 
authorize an issue class action end-run around the predominance requirement for class actions that 
otherwise would fail to satisfy that requirement.”). 
 486. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 485, at 711–12. 
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issues without diluting the litigation “in a sea of individual 
consequences.”487 
The strict Castano approach is difficult to defend. If Rule 23(c)(4) is 
merely a “housekeeping” device, then plaintiffs would never utilize it. 
Why certify just an issue if the entire case satisfies predominance? 
Plaintiffs will gain far more leverage over defendants for settlement 
purposes—and will greatly simplify their path to recovery in the event of a 
trial—if they try the entire case, not just one or two isolated issues. The 
approach of Genetically Modified Rice Litigation is equally unsound. As 
noted, the very purpose of an issues class is to resolve discrete issues, not 
to resolve claims. 
The “materially advance” test urged by some courts and commentators 
is a sensible one. There is no use in adjudicating an issue if the case as a 
whole would not benefit. That test properly avoids the need for the court 
to determine whether the common issues in the case predominate over the 
individualized issues. The Third Circuit’s multi-factor approach, by 
contrast, provides insufficient guidance, especially given that the myriad 
factors are not exclusive. The “materially advance” test accomplishes the 
essence of what the Third Circuit is trying to achieve, but without the 
complications. 
Wholly apart from the rigid Castano approach to Rule 23(c)(4), the 
certification of issues classes is complicated by the Seventh Amendment. 
That Amendment provides in relevant part that “no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.”488 The so called 
“Reexamination Clause” received little attention until the mid-1990s, 
when two federal appellate decisions relied on the Seventh Amendment as 
a reason for decertifying classes that bifurcated certain class issues and left 
other issues to individualized adjudication.
489
 Both courts—the Seventh 
Circuit in Rhone-Poulenc and the Fifth Circuit in Castano—were 
concerned that the juries hearing the individual issues would have to 
reconsider the classwide findings in the process.
490
 Writing for the court in 
Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner rested the court’s holding on the premise 
that subsequent juries in that case would need to decide such issues as 
comparative negligence and proximate causation, resulting in de facto 
 
 
 487. Romberg, supra note 461, at 334. 
 488. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, cl. 2. 
 489. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303–04 (7th Cir. 1995); Castano v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750–51 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 490. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303; Castano, 84 F.3d at 747. 
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reexamination of the classwide verdict.
491
 In addition, addressing the 
Seventh Amendment issue more generally, Judge Posner stated: 
The right to a jury trial in federal civil cases, conferred by the 
Seventh Amendment, is a right to have juriable issues determined 
by the first jury impaneled to hear them . . . and not reexamined by 
another finder of fact. . . . How the resulting inconsistency between 
juries could be prevented escapes us.
492
 
In Castano, the Fifth Circuit invoked essentially the same reasoning. The 
court emphasized the specific individual issues in the case, such as 
proximate causation and damages, in squarely rejecting (on Seventh 
Amendment grounds) the proposal that such individual issues be decided 
by a second jury or group of juries. The court stated: “The Seventh 
Amendment entitles parties to have fact issues decided by one jury, and 
prohibits a second jury from reexamining those facts and issues.”493 
Some commentators have supported the Castano and Rhone-Poulenc 
approach to the Seventh Amendment. For instance, one commentator, 
citing Castano, has argued that “[b]ifurcated trial plans . . . raise serious 
constitutional issues under the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination 
Clause.”494 
For the most part, however, courts and commentators have been critical 
of invoking the Seventh Amendment as a reason not to certify an issues 
class. For instance, one court has noted that the strict approach taken by 
some circuits would “effectively eviscerate[]” Rule 23(c)(4) and would 
conflict with the Advisory Committee Notes’ endorsement of issues 
classes.
495
 A number of commentators have expressed similar views. For 
instance, Professor Tobias Wolff stated the following with respect to 
Castano: 
Perhaps the court was proceeding on some misguided instinct that it 
should not be possible to accomplish through successive lawsuits 
what the Seventh Amendment would prevent a court from doing in 
a single, bifurcated proceeding. (This instinct was misguided, of 
 
 
 491. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Castano, 84 F.3d at 750 (footnote omitted). 
 494. Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 845, 882 
n.229 (2010). 
 495. In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995). Accord, e.g., Valentino v. 
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996); Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 
F.2d 686, 692–97 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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course, because the Supreme Court had already rejected that 
proposition some twenty years earlier.)
496
 
Similarly, Professor Woolley has argued that “the Reexamination Clause 
should not pose a serious obstacle to the use of issue classes.”497 He 
reasoned that: 
[T]he separate trial of overlapping issues does not necessarily 
violate the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause. The Clause 
requires only that later juries respect the formal findings of the first 
jury. Within these broad parameters, the Clause does not prohibit 
later juries from independently evaluating evidence on a previously 
decided issue in order to decide a related issue. For that reason, the 
Clause allows a jury charged with deciding the issue of comparative 
negligence to rehear evidence presented to an earlier jury on the 
defendant’s negligence, provided the later jury understands that the 
formal findings of the earlier jury are binding. . . . The separate trial 
of overlapping issues may not always be desirable. But there is no 
sound basis for concluding that the convocation of a second jury in 
such circumstances will necessarily lead to violation of the Seventh 
Amendment. Reliance on the Seventh Amendment Reexamination 
Clause thus obscures the real issue: Will certification of an issue 
class assist in the fair and accurate determination of a particular 
controversy?
498
 
The Third Circuit employed similar reasoning in In re Paoli Railroad Yard 
PCB Litigation,
499
 stating: “[T]he Seventh Amendment prohibition is not 
against having two juries review the same evidence, but rather against 
having two juries decide the same essential issues.”500 
 
 
 496. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 
736 (2005) (citing Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination 
Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 517–42 (1998), and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333–
37 (1979)). 
 497. Woolley, supra note 496, at 500. 
 498. Id. at 542 (Professor Woolley also notes that Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining 
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498–99 (1931), on which the Fifth and Seventh Circuits relied in Castano and 
Rhone-Poulenc, “applie[d] an approach far more liberal than that of the Fifth and Seventh Circuit.” Id. 
at 522.). Accord, e.g., Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 
AKRON L. REV. 813, 832 (2004) (“The Seventh Amendment does not prohibit separate juries from 
considering ‘overlapping’ evidence . . . . What the Seventh Amendment guarantees is that separate 
juries will not decide the same issue.” (emphasis added)). 
 499. 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 500. Id. at 453 n.5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Like the strict rules-based approach to (c)(4), the rigorous application 
of the Seventh Amendment is troublesome. The focus should be solely on 
whether successive juries are deciding the same issues, not on whether 
they are merely hearing overlapping evidence. 
J. Defendants’ Ability to Eliminate Class Actions Through Arbitration 
Clauses 
Perhaps the most compelling class action is the so-called “negative 
value suit.” A negative value suit is one in which the “stakes to each class 
member [are] too slight to repay the cost of suit.”501 In such cases, the 
class members have no practical remedy without a class action.
502
 The 
Supreme Court in Amchem emphasized this precise point: 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to 
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or 
her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.503 
The Court made a similar point in Deposit Guaranty National Bank of 
Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper,
504
 explaining that “[w]here it is not 
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a 
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may 
be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action 
device.”505 Put another way, the class action device permits “the 
aggregation of the claims of a large number of persons who have similar 
or identical claims, none of which—standing alone—would justify the 
suit.”506 Without the class action device, a company or individual could 
 
 
 501. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 502. See, e.g., Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action 
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1809 (2009) (“[N]egative value claims rarely settle—aggregately or 
individually—without certification.” (footnote omitted)); Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a 
World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1839, 1861 (2006) (“It is well understood that aggregation is the key to the viability of many claims 
routinely brought as class actions, particularly what are termed the negative value claims, in which the 
transaction costs of prosecuting individual actions make enforcement impossible absent 
aggregation.”). 
 503. Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 504. 445 U.S. 326 (1980). 
 505. Id. at 339. 
 506. Fiss, supra note 1, at 24. 
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cause small harm to many people, knowing that the costs of bringing 
individual suits would be too great to warrant hiring an attorney and filing 
a lawsuit. The class action empowers the injured parties, providing them 
with a vehicle for recovering the harm suffered and serving as a deterrent 
against similar conduct in the future. 
To avoid classwide litigation, businesses are now inserting arbitration 
clauses in a variety of contexts, requiring arbitration of disputes and 
prohibiting class action suits either in court or in arbitration.
507
 As one 
commentator has stated: 
Developed in the late 1990s . . . the [class action] waiver works in 
tandem with standard arbitration provisions to ensure that any claim 
against the corporate defendant may be asserted only in a one-on-
one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding. More virulent strains of the 
clause force the would-be plaintiff to waive even her right to be 
represented as a passive, or absent, class member in the event some 
other injured person manages to commence a class proceeding.
508
 
Arbitration clauses have become common in consumer contracts; one 
2010 study found that companies inserted such clauses into seventy-five 
percent of such contracts.
509
 
Arbitration clauses have the support of federal law. The Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), in particular, embodies a strong federal policy 
favoring arbitration. Under section 2 of the FAA, agreements to arbitrate 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”510 Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,511 a 
number of courts had held that provisions prohibiting classwide arbitration 
 
 
 507. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005) (noting that starting in late 1990s, 
corporate counsel was encouraged “to consider redrafting contracts to include provisions requiring 
consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class actions or even group arbitrations”); 
Christina Johnson, Comment, Employment and Consumer Arbitration Agreements: Does It Limit Your 
Ability to Bring or Participate in a Class Action?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 273, 277 (2010) (noting 
“onslaught” of arbitration agreements in standardized contracts); Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, 
Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a 
Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 220–25 (2008) (discussing the history of class actions and 
arbitration clauses). 
 508. Gilles, supra note 507, at 375–76. 
 509. Johnson, supra note 507, at 278 (citing Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Unlikely to Use 
Arbitration With Each Other, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B4). 
 510. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 511. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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were unconscionable under state law.
512
 In Concepcion, the Court rejected 
this reliance on state unconscionability law, holding that the FAA’s 
savings clause preempted an unconscionability defense.
513
 
The Supreme Court had explored these issues prior to Concepcion, 
albeit without reaching so broadly. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,
514
 the Court confronted a contractual arbitration 
provision that neither provided for, nor precluded, classwide arbitration.
515
 
A panel of arbitrators had determined that the provision allowed classwide 
arbitration, pursuant to a supplemental agreement between the parties that 
provided the panel with this decision-making authority.
516
 The Supreme 
Court, however, rejected this determination, finding that the panel had 
overstepped the bounds of the FAA.
517
 The Court then set forth a broader 
rule, holding that under the FAA, where an arbitration provision is silent 
as to the parties’ intent on the issue, a party may not be subjected 
involuntarily to classwide arbitration.
518
 The Court explicitly stated: “[A] 
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration 
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to 
do so.”519 
One year later, the Court issued its opinion in Concepcion. The case 
involved a claim by Vincent and Liza Concepcion for $30.22 in sales tax, 
an amount they claimed that AT&T wrongfully charged when it offered 
“free” phones.520 The Concepcions attempted to pursue class litigation, but 
AT&T had asserted an arbitration clause that barred both class litigation 
and arbitration.
521
 The district court, relying on the California Supreme 
 
 
 512. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006); Scott v. Cingular 
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007) (en banc); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18 
(Mo. 2010); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006). 
 513. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742. 
 514. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 515. See id. at 1765 (quoting arbitration clause). 
 516. Id. at 1766. The panel relied on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, in which a plurality of 
the Supreme Court held that “[a]rbitrators are well situated” to determine whether a particular 
arbitration provision allows classwide arbitration. 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) (plurality opinion); see 
also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (holding that the purported 
illegality of a contract containing an arbitration clause was to be determined by the arbitrator rather 
than the state court). 
 517. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770. 
 518. Id. at 1775. 
 519. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 520. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–45 (2011). 
 521. Id. 
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Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,522 denied AT&T’s 
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was 
unconscionable under California law.
523
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
holding that the FAA “does not expressly or impliedly preempt California 
law governing the unconscionability of class action waivers in consumer 
contracts of adhesion.”524 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that such a 
state-law unconscionability defense was in fact preempted by the FAA.
525
 
The Court reasoned, inter alia, that when Congress enacted the FAA, it 
did not even envision the concept of classwide arbitration.
526
 With respect 
to the FAA generally, the Court noted that “our cases . . . have repeatedly 
described the Act as ‘embod[ying] [a] national policy favoring 
arbitration.’”527 And, drawing on Stolt-Nielsen, along with the Court’s 
prior FAA jurisprudence striking down various limitations on arbitration 
provisions,
528
 the Court stated that “California’s Discover Bank rule 
similarly interferes with arbitration.”529 Moreover, sounding the Rhone-
Poulenc blackmail theme, the Court noted that “class arbitration greatly 
increases risks to defendants” and is “no different” than “the risk of ‘in 
terrorem’ settlements that class actions entail” in the courtroom setting.530 
 
 
 522. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. In Discover Bank, the 
court fashioned a rule that rendered class action waivers in certain consumer contexts essentially per se 
unconscionable: “[W]hen [a class action or class arbitration] waiver is found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums 
of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” 
113 P.3d at 1110. 
 523. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 524. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 525. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755–56. 
 526. Id. at 1751. 
 527. Id. at 1749 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)). 
 528. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (holding that the FAA preempted a 
California law requiring that parties exhaust certain administrative remedies prior to arbitration); see 
also Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–47 (holding that a challenge to the validity of an 
agreement containing an arbitration clause must be decided by the arbitrator, not a court, regardless of 
whether the challenge is brought in state or federal court); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that the federal district court abused its discretion in denying 
arbitration pending the disposition of related state action); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576 (2008) (holding that the FAA’s statutory grounds for judicial modification or vacatur are the 
exclusive grounds under which parties can seek expedited review of an arbitration award). 
 529. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
 530. Id. at 1752. 
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The Court also noted that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher 
stakes of class litigation.”531 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan) rejected the majority’s reasoning and noted the important 
benefits of class actions. Without class arbitration, the dissent noted, such 
claims would not be pursued: 
What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the 
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a 
$30.22 claim? See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action 
is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”).532 
More recently, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
533
 the Court 
issued another setback to those seeking classwide dispute resolution. In 
that case, which involved the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA),
534
 
consumers contended that the statute’s statement of “a right to sue a credit 
repair organization” meant that the CROA was not subject to the FAA. 
The issue arose after the defendant moved to compel arbitration of a 
federal court class action based on an arbitration clause containing a class 
action waiver. The suit alleged that CompuCredit, in issuing credit cards, 
misrepresented the credit card’s limit and also misrepresented the extent to 
which the credit card would rebuild the consumer’s poor credit history. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the language of the 
CROA was not sufficiently clear to exclude the statute from the reach of 
the FAA. Thus, the arbitration clause was enforceable.
535
 Only Justice 
Ginsburg dissented.
536
 
In the first federal appellate court decision to interpret Concepcion in 
depth, Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
537
 plaintiffs attempted to argue that 
a ban on class action arbitration should not be enforceable if plaintiffs can 
 
 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 533. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 534. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(a) (2006). 
 535. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. at 672–73. 
 536. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court was unanimous, however, in its reversal of 
another case (not in the class action context) in which West Virginia’s highest court had “held 
unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or 
wrongful death against nursing homes.” Marmet Heath Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 
1202 (2012) (per curiam). The Court stated that the West Virginia court’s holding “was both incorrect 
and inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of this Court.” Id. at 1203. 
 537. 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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provide concrete proof that bringing an individual action would not be cost 
effective. The Eleventh Circuit held that such an argument was foreclosed 
by Concepcion: 
[I]n light of Concepcion, state rules mandating the availability of 
class arbitration based on generalizable characteristics of consumer 
protection claims—including that the claims “predictably involve 
small amounts of damages,” that the company’s deceptive practices 
may be replicated across “large numbers of consumers,” and that 
many potential claims may go unprosecuted unless they may be 
brought as a class—are preempted by the FAA, even if they may be 
“desirable.”538 
Would-be class plaintiffs fared only slightly better in Coneff v. AT&T 
Corp.,
539
 a post-Concepcion case from the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs filed a 
class complaint in federal court, and the district court denied AT&T’s 
motion to compel arbitration “on state-law unconscionability grounds, 
relying primarily on the [arbitration] agreement’s class-action waiver 
provision.”540 The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding that the 
agreement was substantively unconscionable, finding that the 
unconscionability argument was preempted by the FAA.
541
 Interestingly, 
however, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to 
evaluate plaintiffs’ “procedural unconscionability arguments.”542 
In the wake of Concepcion, commentators’ predictions about the future 
of classwide arbitration have varied considerably. Professor Colin Marks, 
addressing the various possible interpretations of Concepcion, stated as 
follows: 
[A]lthough there is support for interpreting the Concepcion decision 
narrowly, it is more likely that a broader interpretation was 
intended. However, the metes and bounds of this opinion have yet to 
be explored. Nonetheless, under [a] broad interpretation, the effect 
on consumers will be to discourage individuals from seeking redress 
for their claims. The decision may actually encourage businesses to 
breach contractual obligations with impunity when the individual 
 
 
 538. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 539. 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 540. Id. at 1157. 
 541. Id. at 1157–61. 
 542. Id. at 1161. See also Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 233 
(3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a Pennsylvania state law, similar to the California state law in Concepcion, 
was “clearly preempted” by the FAA). 
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sums owed are too small to justify—in the mind of a reasonable 
consumer—the time and effort to seek a remedy.543 
Several commentators have echoed Professor Marks’s prediction 
regarding Concepcion’s practical consequences in the consumer 
context.
544
 Professor David Schwartz goes so far as to argue that 
Concepcion effectively “destroys consumer and employment class 
actions.”545 
Some commentators, however, have suggested that, in at least some 
circumstances, “Concepcion is not necessarily the death knell for 
classwide arbitration.”546 Yet even such qualified optimism seems 
misplaced in light of the Court’s post-Concepcion decision in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
547
 In that case, plaintiffs—
merchants who accept American Express cards—attempted to sue the 
defendant credit card company for violating federal antitrust laws. The 
arbitration agreement between the parties, however, provided that “[t]here 
shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class 
action basis.”548 
 
 
 543. Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 544. See, e.g., Dirk W. de Roos & Russell O. Stewart, Legal Trends and Best Practices in Class 
Arbitration, COLO. LAW. 47, 52 (2011) (suggesting that Concepcion “is likely to result in more 
arbitrations of consumer contracts and greater use of class action waivers,” and further stating that 
“[a]bsent some legislative changes to the FAA’s breadth of preemption, Concepcion also may 
substantially curtail class actions in contractual disputes”); Ronald W. Novotny, Drafting Class 
Arbitration Waivers After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 66 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 44 (2012) (“[F]or 
employers who have not yet decided to implement a mandatory arbitration program, the Concepcion 
case provides another significant incentive for doing so.”); see also, e.g., Donald R. Frederico & 
Clifford H. Ruprecht, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Is Feeney Finis?, 55-4 BOSTON B.J. 13, 15 
(2011) (noting “the need for class proceedings to vindicate small-dollar consumer claims,” and 
suggesting that after Concepcion challenges to arbitration clauses containing class action waivers on 
grounds of “fraud, duress or similar state law doctrines would often raise individual issues, even if 
otherwise successful, [and thus] may preclude class certification”). 
 545. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 267 
(2012). 
 546. Don Zupanec, Class Arbitration—Federal Arbitration Act—Title VII Claim, 26 No. 10 FED. 
LITIGATOR 9 (2011). See also Daniel Fisher, After Arbitration Ruling, Watch Warren’s Consumer 
Bureau, FORBES, Apr. 27, 2011, www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/04/27/after-arbitration-ruling 
-watch-warrens-consumer-bureau/ (“[c]orporate attorneys best not gloat too much” over Concepcion 
because consumers do better in arbitration than in class actions); Andrew J. Trask, Arbitration Strategy 
After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 40 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 110, Jan. 23, 2012 
available at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/products_liability/trask-bna 
.pdf (criticizing dire comments about Concepcion as “hyperbole” and arguing that the decision “has 
hardly killed the [class action] device”). 
 547. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 548. Id. at 2308 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 
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The district court granted defendant’s motion to compel individual 
arbitration, but a sharply divided Second Circuit held that the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion did not “require that all 
class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable.”549 The appellate court 
concluded that the mandatory class action waiver clause before it was 
unenforceable because the plaintiffs had demonstrated that “the practical 
effect of enforcement would be to preclude [plaintiffs’] ability to bring 
federal antitrust claims.”550 The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc, 
with five judges dissenting. 
In a 5–3 decision by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed. The 
majority rejected the notion that there should be a case-by-case analysis of 
whether a class action waiver renders it impossible to vindicate federal 
rights. “[T]he antitrust laws,” wrote the Court, “do not guarantee an 
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”551 
Additionally, rejecting the Second Circuit’s attempt to distinguish 
Concepcion, the Court found that Concepcion “all but resolve[d] this 
case.”552 Notably, the American Express Court described Concepcion as 
having established “that the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration 
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value 
claims.”553 
Justice Kagan wrote the dissent in American Express (for herself and 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg). In her dissent, she criticized the majority 
for ignoring the Court’s precedents establishing the effective vindication 
doctrine, and in particular for the majority’s focus on curtailing the use of 
class actions. The fact that the arbitration agreement explicitly prohibited 
class arbitration, Justice Kagan wrote, was “only part of the problem”; the 
“agreement also disallow[ed] any kind of joinder or consolidation of 
claims or parties.”554 In sum, 
 The Court today mistakes what this case is about. To a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the 
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to 
be dismantled. So the Court does not consider that Amex’s 
 
 
 549. In re Am. Express Merch.’s Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2304 
(2013). 
 550. Id. 
 551. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309. 
 552. Id. at 2312. 
 553. Id. at 2312 n.5. 
 554. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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agreement bars not just class actions, but “other forms of cost-
sharing . . . that could provide effective vindication.” . . . 
 As a result, Amex’s contract will succeed in depriving Italian 
Colors of any effective opportunity to challenge monopolistic 
conduct allegedly in violation of the Sherman Act. . . . In the hands 
of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become . . . a 
mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious 
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.
555
 
In short, American Express shut the door on one of the few viable ways 
in which lower courts could have limited or distinguished Concepcion. 
The combined effect of Concepcion and American Express is to deal a 
crippling blow to the adjudication of many kinds of small-claims cases. 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND AVENUES FOR REFORM 
A. Exceptions to the Trends 
It would be a mistake to conclude, even with all of the case law trends 
discussed in Part III, that class actions are dead. To begin with, in some of 
the areas discussed above, the courts are in conflict.
556
 Thus, plaintiffs can 
attempt to avoid some of the worst federal case law by filing in circuits 
that are most receptive to class actions.
557
 Indeed, such a strategy is 
confirmed by the empirical research of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) 
regarding post-CAFA filings: 
The FJC data show that, while every circuit experienced some post-
CAFA increase in diversity class action filings, the growth varied 
dramatically. The district courts within the Ninth Circuit saw by far 
the biggest post-CAFA increase, growing nearly sixfold from 2004. 
Given lawyers’ perception of the Ninth Circuit as relatively liberal 
on class certification, the disproportionate growth of filings in its 
districts should come as no surprise. Nor is it surprising to see large 
jumps in diversity class action filings within the Third Circuit, 
where they nearly quadrupled, and within the Second and Eleventh 
 
 
 555. Id. at 2320 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
 556. For instance, as this article has shown, courts are in conflict over how to address class 
definitions, numerosity, and issues classes. 
 557. See, e.g., York-Erwin, supra note 74, at 1804–05 (“Many more nationwide classes are filed 
originally in favorable federal circuits since removal now appears inevitable.”); see also note 91 supra 
and accompanying text. 
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Circuits, where they more than doubled. The growth was much 
smaller in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.
558
 
In addition, as Professor Howard Erichson observes, this type of forum 
shopping can take place not only between, but also within individual 
circuits. Specifically, there were significant post-CAFA increases in the 
number of class actions filed in the Central District of California, the 
Northern District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the 
Eastern District of New York, and the District of New Jersey.
559
 Erichson 
suggests that “[t]his forum selection is consistent with the perception of 
the Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits as providing relatively favorable law 
on class actions, and may also reflect perceptions of particular federal 
district judges.”560 
Moreover, courts are receptive to certifying certain kinds of cases even 
in the current climate (although some of these cases may be impacted by 
Concepcion and American Express).
561
 For instance, securities fraud suits 
involving securities traded on a major stock exchange are commonly 
certified.
562
 Such cases tend to involve overarching issues that impact all 
class members, and seek damages that can be easily calculated. Under 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
563
 a “presumption of reliance” attaches when the 
stock trades in an “efficient market.”564 This presumption avoids the 
problem that “requiring proof of individualized reliance from each 
member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would prevent such 
 
 
 558. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 
1613 (2008) (citing Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The Impact of the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Third Interim Report to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (2007)) (footnotes omitted). 
 559. Id. at 1614 (footnote omitted). 
 560. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 561. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class 
Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-
should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions/ (quoting Professor Brian Fitzpatrick as saying that 
the consequences of Concepcion “could be staggering” because “virtually all class actions today occur 
between parties who are in transactional relationships with one another” who are “able to enter 
arbitration agreements with class action waivers,” and “[o]nce given the green light, it is hard to 
imagine any company would not want its shareholders, consumers and employees to agree to such 
provisions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 562. See, e.g., In re Bank of Am. Corp. Secs., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Washington Mut. Mortg.-Backed Secs. Litig., 276 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Wash. 
2011); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 280 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Lumen v. Anderson, 280 F.R.D. 451 (W.D. Mo. 2012). 
 563. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 564. Id. at 246–48. 
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plaintiffs from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues 
would overwhelm the common ones.”565 
The Court has recently addressed the Basic presumption in Amgen Inc. 
v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds.
566
 There, the Court held 
that a securities class action plaintiff does not need to prove, at the class 
certification stage, that the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations were 
material. Although a plaintiff “certainly must prove materiality to prevail 
on the merits,” it need not do so at the class certification stage because 
“Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class 
predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in 
favor of the class.”567  
Also noteworthy is the Supreme Court’s decision in Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.
568
 There, the Court held that a securities 
fraud plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s misconduct caused the 
economic loss at issue (a concept known as “loss causation”) in order to 
certify a class.
569
  
Along similar lines, the passage of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
570
 has not resulted in the extinction of 
securities class actions. Although the PSLRA certainly did impose some 
elevated requirements for securities plaintiffs, securities cases nonetheless 
remain among the types of cases most commonly found to be amenable to 
class treatment.
571
 
At bottom, securities fraud class actions continue to thrive. In cases in 
which the efficiency of the market is not obvious, courts may require strict 
 
 
 565. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (quoting Basic, 485 
U.S. at 242) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). See also supra note 364 and 
accompanying text (discussing certification of fraud claims). 
 566. 133. S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 567. Id. at 1191 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that several Justices appear ready to 
consider whether Basic should be overruled. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 
S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “recent evidence suggests that [the Basic] 
presumption may rest on a faulty economic premise.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1209 n.4 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the “Basic decision itself is questionable,” but that the Court had not been 
asked to revisit it in that case); cf. id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
“holding does not merely accept what some consider the regrettable consequences of the four-Justice 
opinion in Basic; it expands those consequences from the arguably regrettable to the unquestionably 
disastrous”). 
 568. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 569. Id. at 2186. 
 570. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 571. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 818 (2010)) (finding that securities class actions 
represented, by a broad margin, the largest category of settlement classes in 2006 and 2007). 
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evidentiary proof at the class certification stage.
572
 But in most major 
securities fraud cases, plaintiffs should be able to establish an efficient 
market with little difficulty. 
Similarly, wage and hour cases are commonly certified. Many wage 
and hour cases take the form of collective actions, as provided for by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act
573
 (rather than Rule 23 class actions). “Unlike a 
class action under Rule 23(b), in which potential plaintiffs are included in 
the class unless they opt-out, a Section 216(b) collective action requires 
potential plaintiffs to affirmatively opt-in to the suit by filing a written 
consent with the court.”574 Most courts have found that FLSA collective 
actions are not affected by the Supreme Court’s (b)(2) ruling in Dukes. 
Specifically, although some courts have held otherwise, the great body of 
case law, both pre- and post-Dukes, holds that the “rigorous analysis” 
required for class certification does not apply to collective actions.
575
 
Another area in which class actions retain at least some measure of 
their former vitality is in cases brought under the Employee Retirement 
 
 
 572. See, e.g., Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 
2011) (applying “rigorous analysis” in affirming class certification of securities claims), aff’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 573. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 574. Nehmelman v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citation 
and internal quotations omitted). 
 575. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186 CW, 2011 WL 
5242977, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011) (denying defendants’ motion to decertify FLSA collective 
action; the court stated that Dukes “does not stand for the proposition that an employer is entitled to an 
individualized determination of an employee’s claim for back pay in all instances in which a claim is 
brought as a collective or class action”); Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 821, 
828 (D. Md. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s invocation of Dukes and conditionally certifying FLSA 
collective action; noting “Rule 23 standards are generally inapplicable to FLSA collective actions”); 
Robinson v. Ryla Teleservices, Inc., No. CA 11-131-KD-C, 2011 WL 6667338, at *3–4 (S.D. Ala. 
Dec. 21, 2011) (same); Winfield v. Citibank, 843 F. Supp. 2d 397, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (conditionally 
certifying collective action, the court noted that “numerous courts . . . have refused to apply Dukes on 
motions for conditional certification under the FLSA”) (citing cases); but see MacGregor v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., No. 2:10-CV-03088, 2011 WL 2981466, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2011) (finding the 
reasoning in Dukes “illuminating” in the context of a proposed FLSA collective action, the district 
court denied certification, noting that “if there is not a uniform practice but rather decentralized and 
independent action by supervisors that is contrary to the company’s established policies, individual 
factual inquiries are likely to predominate and judicial economy will be hindered rather than promoted 
by certification of a collective action”); Blaney v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 3:10-CV-
592-FDW-DSC, 2011 WL 4351631, at *8–10 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2011) (to similar effect); see also 
Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (post-Comcast case reversing 
district court’s denial of certification in wage and hour case); cf. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) (observing that “Rule 23 [class] actions are fundamentally 
different from collective actions under the FLSA” (citation omitted)). 
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Income Security Act (“ERISA”).576 The same might be said, to a lesser 
extent, with respect to antitrust claims.
577
 
Indeed, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the Supreme 
Court has been uniformly anti-class action. As noted above, in 
Halliburton, the Court rejected cases that required a plaintiff to prove loss 
causation at the class certification stage.
578
 Also, as noted, in Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, the Court held that proof 
of the materiality of alleged misrepresentations was not a prerequisite to 
class certification under the fraud on the market theory.
579
 In Smith v. 
Bayer Corp.,
580
 the Court held that a federal district court, after denying 
class certification, could not enjoin a West Virginia state court from 
certifying a similar class against the same defendant.
581
 And in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
582
 the Court held 
that a federal court could certify a Rule 23 class action in a suit under New 
York’s no-fault insurance law (seeking statutory interest and penalties on 
insurance benefits allegedly owed to plaintiffs), even though section 
901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules prohibits a class 
action suit to recover a statutory penalty or minimum recovery (unless 
specifically authorized by statute).
583
 These four cases expand plaintiffs’ 
ability to bring class actions.
584
 Nonetheless, in terms of their practical 
 
 
 576. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). For examples of post-Dukes decisions granting certification 
of ERISA classes, see Bauer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 562–64 (W.D. Wis. 2012) 
(certifying (b)(3) class but denying certification under (b)(2) because individualized damages 
calculations would be necessary); Meznarich v. Morgan Waldron Ins. Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:10-CV-
02532 2011 WL 4634021, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2011) (certifying ERISA class under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A); court rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiffs had not shown the commonality 
required by Dukes); and Merrimon v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 845 F. Supp. 2d 310, 326–27 (D. Me. 
2012) (certifying ERISA class under (b)(3)). 
 577. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying 
(b)(3) damages class and (b)(2) injunction class in case alleging illegal conspiracy to fix vitamin prices 
and limit supply); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431 2011 WL 3563385, at *16 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 11, 2011), and 282 F.R.D. 126, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (certifying (b)(3) classes of direct and 
indirect purchasers, respectively, of pharmaceuticals); In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 276 F.R.D. 364, 375 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying (b)(3) class of direct purchasers). 
 578. See supra notes 568–56 and accompanying text. 
 579. 133. S. Ct. 1184 (2013); see also supra notes 566–67 and accompanying text. 
 580. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 581. Id. at 2382. 
 582. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 583. Id. at 1437–38 (plurality opinion); 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2011). 
 584. See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a 
Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1030–31 (2012) (concluding that “there is no 
overarching theme or theory underlying the Court’s most recent class-action jurisprudence,” but rather 
that cases like Dukes, Concepcion, Shady Grove, and Bayer “presented circumstances that allowed the 
Court to develop differing determinations, some of which may appear to be class-action friendly and 
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importance, these cases pale in comparison with Concepcion, American 
Express, Dukes, and Amchem. Moreover, the Court’s insistence on 
deciding the procedurally flawed Comcast case—instead of dismissing it 
as improvidently granted—strongly suggests that several Justices are 
determined to cut back on class actions whenever they can. Indeed, Justice 
Kagan, in her dissent in American Express, suggested that a majority of 
the Court was “bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23.”585 
B. Possible Approaches to the Recent Trends 
As discussed above, plaintiffs can sometimes avoid adverse precedents 
by carefully selecting the federal circuit in which to file. In addition, as 
noted, certain kinds of cases remain amenable to certification. 
Nonetheless, plaintiffs face a serious uphill battle in many contested class 
actions. As Part III discussed, some courts have gone too far in restricting 
class actions. Cases such as Dukes, Concepcion, American Express, 
Castano, and Hydrogen Peroxide do more than adopt new rules. They 
suggest a suspicion about class actions generally, premised on the 
assumption that the class action is a blunt instrument to coerce settlement 
and secure large attorneys’ fee awards.586 Considerations such as the 
“pressure” on defendants to settle or the availability of attorneys’ fees 
should play no part in either the decision whether to grant Rule 23(f) 
review or in the decision whether to certify a class. As the plurality noted 
in Shady Grove, “[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule 
entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his 
claim as a class action.”587 Or, as the Eleventh Circuit stated in Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., “[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a 
court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit.”588 
With respect to the Hydrogen Peroxide and Szabo issues, while it is 
appropriate to demand that plaintiffs support class certification with 
 
 
others of which appear to favor class opponents”). Cf. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 
1345 (2013) (holding that a putative class plaintiff’s stipulation that he will seek less than $5 million in 
damages does not defeat federal jurisdiction under Class Action Fairness Act). Knowles was a 
unanimous decision that does not cut one way or the other on the viability of class actions generally. 
 585. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 586. See, e.g., supra note 530 and accompanying text. 
 587. Allstate, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 588. 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). Accord In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust 
Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Given [our] conclusions regarding the 
soundness of the class under Rule 23, the dissent’s comments about the possibility that certification 
will coerce defendants into settlement are largely inapposite . . . . Meanwhile, the dissent 
underestimates the powerful policy considerations that favor [class] certification . . . .”). 
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evidence, the court should not weigh competing evidence as part of the 
class certification process. Moreover, some courts have taken too stringent 
an approach to the class definition, numerosity, commonality, adequacy 
(based on omitted claims), (b)(2), (b)(3), issues classes, and settlement 
classes. Finally, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Concepcion and 
American Express are especially troublesome and will have far-reaching 
consequences. 
There is no easy solution to the issues discussed in this Article. Indeed, 
the proper approach will differ from issue to issue. On some issues, courts 
can alter their approach as a matter of case law. On other issues—those on 
which the Supreme Court has rendered a decision or where there is an 
unresolved conflict among the circuits—a rule change may be required.589 
And with respect to arbitration and the FAA, congressional action is 
necessary. 
To be more specific, with respect to the heightened evidentiary 
standards of proof (the Hydrogen Peroxide issue), a change in the 
prevailing circuit court approach will require either a definitive Supreme 
Court pronouncement or a rule change. With respect to the class 
definition, district courts have discretion to be more liberal in reviewing 
class definitions (and in allowing plaintiffs to revise flawed definitions). 
As for numerosity, courts should hold plaintiffs to a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, but not at the expense of common sense, or by 
requiring direct proof where circumstantial evidence suffices. Both the 
class definition and numerosity cases tend to be very fact-specific. Neither 
Supreme Court review nor rule change appears necessary. With regard to 
commonality, the Supreme Court has already spoken in Dukes. Any 
change in the approach to commonality will have to be by rule change. 
With respect to adequacy concerns based on omitted claims, district courts 
have discretion to address possible issue and claim preclusion concerns up 
front, as opposed to denying class certification based on the lack of 
adequate representation. 
Rule 23(b)(2) is more complicated. The Supreme Court has left open 
the question whether even “incidental” damages are permitted in a (b)(2) 
action.
590
 Certainly, (b)(2) actions involving individualized damages 
appear foreclosed by Dukes as a matter of due process. But there are at 
least two ways that courts can structure a (b)(2) action without running 
afoul of Dukes. First, courts can certify “hybrid” classes: a (b)(2) class for 
 
 
 589. As a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the author is loath to urge specific 
proposals in the context of a law review article. 
 590. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011). 
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injunctive and declaratory relief and a (b)(3) class for damages.
591
 Second, 
courts could address Dukes’ due process concerns by providing notice and 
opt-out rights in (b)(2) actions involving non-incidental monetary 
claims.
592
 
In applying the predominance test (e.g., to fraud cases involving 
reliance or to cases involving multiple states’ laws), district courts have 
the leeway to weigh these individualized issues against the common issues 
in the case. Although some appellate courts suggest that reliance or 
choice-of-law issues are per se fatal on predominance (or manageability) 
grounds, a district court should not be faulted for rigorously comparing 
common issues to individual issues. With respect to individualized 
damages, Comcast is sufficiently unclear that, unless and until the 
Supreme Court offers more definitive guidance, courts can continue to 
apply the general rule that individualized damages do not defeat class 
certification. 
In the class settlement context, changing the ground rules set forth in 
Amchem—a decision based on the language of Rule 23—would require a 
rule change. With respect to issue classes, the conflicts regarding Rule 
23(c)(4) and the Seventh Amendment could be resolved by the Supreme 
Court, or addressed by a rule change. Of course, the Supreme Court would 
have the last word on whether any such rule change comports with the 
Seventh Amendment. 
Finally, because Concepcion and American Express were based on 
interpretations of the FAA, the only viable approach to address those 
rulings is through legislation. A rule change will not work. 
CONCLUSION 
The class action device, when used responsibly by capable counsel 
under the watchful eye of the court, provides a powerful remedy for 
achieving mass justice. For small-claim cases, it provides the only vehicle 
for recovery, absent a public enforcement action. The threat of a class 
action also provides deterrence against wrongdoing. For wrongdoing that 
inflicts harm sufficient to warrant individual lawsuits, a class action avoids 
the need to resolve the same common issues repeatedly for each claimant. 
 
 
 591. See, e.g., Easterling v. Conn. Dept. of Corrs., 278 F.R.D. 41 (D. Conn. 2011) (post-Dukes 
case certifying “hybrid” (b)(2)/(b)(3) classes). 
 592. See, e.g., Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1304 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(allowing opt-outs in mandatory class); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that courts have discretion to permit opt-outs in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2) (permitting notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE DECLINE OF CLASS ACTIONS 831 
 
 
 
 
In adjudicating class action issues, courts should return to basic principles; 
they should not lose sight of the fact that the class action can be a useful 
and efficient device. And they should not allow an abstract concern about 
blackmail settlements or the possibility of abuse by class counsel to raise 
the overall bar for certification.  
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APPENDIX A: OUTCOMES OF CASES APPEALED UNDER RULE 23(f) 
BETWEEN NOV. 30, 1998 AND MAY 31, 2012
593
 
District Court certified at least one class; 
Court of Appeals affirmed certification 
of at least one class Cite Circuit Date 
Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc. 511 F.3d 554 6th 12/18/07 
Beck v. Boeing Co. 60 Fed.Appx.38 9th 2/25/03 
Behrend v. Comcast Corp. 655 F.3d 182 3d 8/23/11 
Bertulli v. Independent Ass’n of Continental 
Pilots 242 F.3d 290 5th 2/13/01 
Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. 181 F.3d 832 7th 6/22/99 
Brown v. Kelly 609 F.3d 467 2d 6/24/10 
Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc. 376 F.3d 656 7th 7/16/04 
Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc. 399 F.3d 620 6th 3/2/05 
Chiang v. Veneman 385 F.3d 256 3d 9/20/04 
Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. 
Amgen Inc. 660 F.3d 1170 9th 11/8/11 
Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp. 253 F.3d 1324 11th 6/15/01 
Daffin v. Ford Motor Co. 458 F.3d 549 6th 8/18/06 
De Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc. 497 F.3d 1214 11th 8/31/07 
DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn 594 F.3d 1188 10th 2/8/10 
Drayton v. Western Auto Supply Co. 2002 WL 32508918 11th 3/11/02 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 603 F.3d 571 9th 4/26/10 
Feder v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. 429 F.3d 125 5th 10/24/05 
Gates v. Towery 430 F.3d 429 7th 11/29/05 
Gray v. Hearst Communications, Inc. 444 Fed.Appx. 698 4th 8/25/11 
Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc. 348 F.3d 417 4th 10/30/03 
In re Constar International Inc. Securities 
Litigation 585 F.3d 774 3d 10/29/09 
In re DVI, Inc. Securities Litigation 639 F.3d 623 3d 3/29/11 
In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Securities 
Litigation 574 F.3d 29 2d 7/22/09 
In re Household International Tax Reduction Plan 441 F.3d 500 7th 3/20/06 
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation 305 F.3d 145 3d 9/5/02 
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust 
Litigation 280 F.3d 124 2d 10/17/01 
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front–Loading Washer 
Products Liability Litigation 678 F.3d 409 6th 5/3/12 
 
 
 593. Defendant classes are not included in this table. Nor are cases included in which Rule 23(f) 
review was sought and denied. Examples of cases excluded for this reason include Chamberlan v. 
Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005); and In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134 (2d 
Cir. 2001). This appendix includes only published cases (including cases found on LEXIS and 
Westlaw). Finally, because courts do not always cite Rule 23(f), it is difficult to be sure that every 
single case has been located. 
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In re Xcelera.com Securities Litigation 430 F.3d 503 1st 12/13/05 
In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability 
Litigation 644 F.3d 604 8th 7/6/11 
Klay v. Humana, Inc. 382 F.3d 1241 11th 9/1/04 
Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Management Co. LLC 571 F.3d 672 7th 7/7/09 
Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc. 504 F.3d 718 9th 9/20/07 
McManus v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. 320 F.3d 545 5th 2/14/03 
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp. 319 F.3d 910 7th 2/11/03 
Olden v. LaFarge Corp. 383 F.3d 495 6th 9/7/04 
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman 606 F.3d 391 7th 5/20/10 
Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A. 667 F.3d 900 7th 1/27/12 
Schleicher v. Wendt 618 F.3d 679 7th 8/20/10 
Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant 
Group, Inc. 659 F.3d 234 2d 9/26/11 
Staton v. Boeing Co. 327 F.3d 938 9th 4/29/03 
Tardiff v. Knox County 365 F.3d 1 1st 4/9/04 
Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray 208 F.3d 288 1st 3/31/00 
White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp. 75 Fed.Appx. 972 5th 10/2/03 
 Total Number of Cases in this Category: 43 
District Court certified at least one 
class; Court of Appeals reversed, 
leaving no class certified Cite Circuit Date 
Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen 600 F.3d 813 7th 4/7/10 
Anderson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban 
Development 554 F.3d 525 5th 12/31/08 
Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank 545 F.3d 570 7th 9/24/08 
Beck v. Maximus, Inc. 457 F.3d 291 3d 8/4/06 
Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp. 257 F.3d 475 5th 7/25/01 
Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 231 F.3d 970 5th 10/27/00 
Bonlender v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 286 Fed.Appx. 414 9th 7/22/08 
Carter v. West Pub. Co. 225 F.3d 1258 11th 9/7/00 
Casas v. American Airlines, Inc. 304 F.3d 517 5th 9/17/02 
CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, 
Inc. 637 F.3d 721 7th 3/18/11 
City of Hialeah, Fla. v. Rojas 311 F.3d 1096 11th 11/8/02 
Colbert v. Dymacol, Inc. 302 F.3d 155 3d 8/28/02 
Cole v. General Motors Corp. 484 F.3d 717 5th 4/10/07 
Coleman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 296 F.3d 443 6th 7/22/02 
Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. 
Ashford Gear LLC 662 F.3d 913 7th 11/22/11 
Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 543 F.3d 141 3d 9/12/08 
De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 342 F.3d 301 3d 9/8/03 
Dechert v. Cadle Co. 333 F.3d 801 7th 6/24/03 
Doiron v. Conseco Health Ins. Co. 279 Fed.Appx. 313 5th 5/28/08 
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Durant v. Servicemaster Co. 109 Fed.Appx. 27 6th 8/11/04 
Elizabeth M. v. Montenez 458 F.3d 779 8th 8/15/06 
Franze v. Equitable Assurance 296 F.3d 1250 11th 7/11/02 
Friedman v. Market Street Mortg. Corp. 520 F.3d 1289 11th 3/20/08 
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP 368 F.3d 356 4th 5/12/04 
Gene & Gene, L.L.C. v. BioPay, L.L.C. 624 F.3d 698 5th 10/22/10 
Gene And Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC 541 F.3d 318 5th 8/14/08 
Gilchrist v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 390 F.3d 1327 11th 11/18/04 
Glover v. Standard Federal Bank 283 F.3d 953 8th 3/21/02 
Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of America 672 F.3d 402 6th 2/10/12 
Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp. 442 F.3d 188 4th 3/14/06 
Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County 581 F.3d 511 7th 9/8/09 
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani 251 F.3d 1230 9th 5/30/01 
Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Alabama, Inc. 443 F.3d 1330 11th 3/29/06 
Heimmermann v. First Union Mortg. Corp. 305 F.3d 1257 11th 9/18/02 
Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 574 F.3d 169 3d 7/23/09 
In re Allstate Ins. Co. 400 F.3d 505 7th 3/8/05 
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 288 F.3d 1012 7th 5/2/02 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation 552 F.3d 305 3d 12/20/08 
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation 471 F.3d 24 2d 12/5/06 
In re LifeUSA Holding Inc. 242 F.3d 136 3d 3/5/01 
In re Lockheed Martin Corp. 412 Fed.Appx. 892 7th 3/15/11 
In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export 
Antitrust Litig. 522 F.3d 6 1st 3/28/08 
In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation 432 F.3d 1 1st 12/13/05 
In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation 544 F.3d 474 2d 9/30/08 
In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litigation 589 F.3d 585 3d 12/21/09 
In re Simon II Litigation 407 F.3d 125 2d 5/6/05 
In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. 425 F.3d 1116 8th 10/12/05 
In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. 522 F.3d 836 8th 4/9/08 
In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay 
Litigation 571 F.3d 953 9th 7/7/09 
Isaacs v. Sprint Corp. 261 F.3d 679 7th 8/14/01 
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Intern. Inc. 195 F.3d 894 7th 10/25/99 
Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 634 F.3d 883 7th 2/14/11 
Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co. 243 F.3d 1277 11th 3/7/01 
Langbecker v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. 476 F.3d 299 5th 1/18/07 
Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc. 255 F.3d 138 4th 6/26/01 
Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 350 F.3d 1018 9th 12/1/03 
London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 340 F.3d 1246 11th 8/7/03 
Luskin v. Intervoice-Brite Inc. 261 Fed.Appx. 697 5th 1/8/08 
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M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry 675 F.3d 832 5th 3/23/12 
Madison v. Chalmette Refining, L.L.C. 637 F.3d 551 5th 4/4/11 
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. 475 F.3d 418 1st 1/29/07 
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co. 522 F.3d 215 2d 4/3/08 
Mims v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. 590 F.3d 298 5th 12/9/09 
Murray v. Auslander 244 F.3d 807 11th 3/13/01 
Nafar v. Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc. 339 Fed.Appx. 216 3d 8/5/09 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Haddock 460 Fed.Appx. 26 2d 2/6/12 
O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 319 F.3d 732 5th 2/7/03 
Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance 
Telecom, Inc. 487 F.3d 261 5th 5/16/07 
Parra v. Bashas’, Inc. 536 F.3d 975 9th 7/29/08 
Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp. 241 F.3d 417 5th 2/5/01 
Piazza v. Ebsco Industries, Inc. 273 F.3d 1341 11th 11/30/01 
Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors 209 F.3d 1276 11th 4/20/00 
Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Michigan 654 F.3d 618 6th 8/12/11 
Powers v. Lycoming Engines 328 Fed.Appx. 121 3d 3/21/09 
Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush 221 F.3d 1266 11th 8/11/00 
Rahman v. Chertoff 530 F.3d 622 7th 6/26/08 
Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & 
Correction 81 Fed.Appx. 550 6th 11/18/03 
Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & 
Correction 435 F.3d 639 6th 1/24/06 
Regents of University of California v. Credit 
Suisse First Boston 482 F.3d 372 5th 3/19/07 
Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories 283 F.3d 315 5th 2/15/02 
Robertson v. Monsanto Co. 287 Fed.Appx. 354 5th 7/18/08 
Robinson v. Texas Auto. Dealers Ass’n 387 F.3d 416 5th 10/5/04 
Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp. 385 Fed.Appx. 423 6th 1/12/09 
Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. 211 F.3d 1228 11th 5/11/00 
Sacred Heart Health Systems, Inc. v. Humana 
Military Healthcare  601 F.3d 1159 11th 3/30/10 
Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc. 357 F.3d 392 3d 2/5/04 
Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat. 
Indem. Ins. Co. 319 F.3d 205 5th 1/21/03 
Sher v. Raytheon Co. 419 Fed.Appx. 887 11th 3/9/11 
Smith v. Texaco, Inc. 263 F.3d 394 5th 8/22/01 
Spano v. The Boeing Co. 633 F.3d 574 7th 1/21/11 
Stirman v. Exxon Corp. 280 F.3d 554 5th 2/1/02 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc. 249 F.3d 672 7th 5/4/01 
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 547 F.3d 742 7th 10/28/08 
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly and Co. 620 F.3d 121 2d 9/10/10 
Unger v. Amedisys Inc. 401 F.3d 316 5th 2/17/05 
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Vallario v. Vandehey 554 F.3d 1259 10th 2/4/09 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 350 F.3d 1181 11th 11/14/03 
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. 564 F.3d 1256 11th 4/7/09 
Vizena v. Union Pacific R. Co. 360 F.3d 496 5th 2/26/04 
Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 
of America 453 F.3d 179 3d 6/30/06 
West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. 282 F.3d 935 7th 3/7/02 
 Total Number of Cases in this Category: 101 
District Court denied certification 
entirely; Court of Appeals affirmed, 
leaving no class certified Cite Circuit Date 
Am. Seed Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co. 271 Fed.Appx. 138 3d 4/1/08 
Arreola v. Godinez 546 F.3d 788 7th 10/14/08 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 339 F.3d 294 5th 7/16/03 
Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc. 422 F.3d 307 5th 8/23/05 
Benavides v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. 636 F.3d 699 5th 3/23/11 
Blades v. Monsanto Co. 400 F.3d 562 8th 3/7/05 
Corley v. Orangefield Independent School Dist. 152 Fed.Appx. 350 5th 10/13/05 
Delodder v. Aerotek Inc. 2012 WL 862819 9th 3/15/12 
Garcia v. Johanns 444 F.3d 625 DC 3/31/06 
Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co. 655 F.3d 255 3d 8/25/11 
Gonzalez v. Asset Acceptance, LLC 308 Fed.Appx. 429 11th 1/26/09 
Grimes v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc. 331 Fed.Appx. 630 11th 1/30/07 
Guy v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County 
Government 2012 WL 1592745 6th 5/2/12 
Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications 435 F.3d 219 2d 1/10/06 
In re Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation 654 F.3d 748 7th 8/17/11 
Johnston v. HBO Film Management, Inc. 265 F.3d 178 3d 9/14/01 
Love v. Johanns 439 F.3d 723 DC 3/3/06 
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP 617 F.3d 743 3d 8/16/10 
Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation 493 F.3d 521 5th 7/19/07 
McNair v. Synapse Group Inc. 672 F.3d 213 3d 3/6/12 
Monahan v. City of Wilmington 49 Fed.Appx. 383 3d 10/18/02 
Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc. 306 F.3d 1247 2d 10/10/02 
Myers v. Hertz Corp. 624 F.3d 537 2d 10/27/10 
New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali 
Series 2006-QO1 Trust 2012 WL 1481519 2d 4/30/12 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. 259 F.3d 154 3d 8/6/01 
Pastor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co 487 F.3d 1042 7th 5/23/07 
Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate 100 Fed.Appx. 296 5th 6/7/04 
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Brands Corp. 
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc. 379 F.3d 654 9th 8/10/04 
Rattray v. Woodbury County, IA 614 F.3d 831 8th 8/5/10 
Rodney v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 146 Fed.Appx. 783 6th 8/22/05 
Smith v. University of Washington, Law School 233 F.3d 1188 9th 12/4/00 
Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 461 F.3d 598 5th 8/18/06 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund 
v. Bombardier Inc. 546 F.3d 196 2d 10/14/08 
Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. 445 F.3d 311 4th 3/9/06 
Turner v. Beneficial Corp. 242 F.3d 1023 11th 2/22/01 
Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 571 F.3d 935 9th 7/7/09 
Wiesfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp. 84 Fed.Appx. 257 3d 1/9/04 
Williams v. Veolia Transp. Services, Inc. 379 Fed.Appx. 548 9th 5/14/10 
Zinser v. Accufix Research Institute, Inc. 253 F.3d 1180 9th 6/15/01 
 Total Number of Cases in this Category: 39 
District Court denied certification 
entirely; Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding the lower court erred in denying 
certification Cite Circuit Date 
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp. 572 F.3d 221 5th 6/19/09 
Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. 358 F.3d 469 7th 2/13/04 
Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. 623 F.3d 708 9th 9/27/10 
Brown v. Nucor Corp. 576 F.3d 149 4th 8/7/09 
Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc. 513 F.3d 1314 11th 1/17/08 
Cliff v. Payco General American Credits, Inc. 363 F.3d 1113 11th 3/25/04 
Cordes & Co. Financial Services, Inc. v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc. 502 F.3d 91 2d 9/11/07 
Edwards v. The First American Corp. 385 Fed.Appx. 629 9th 6/21/10 
Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc. 632 F.3d 971 7th 1/18/11 
Hagan v. Rogers 570 F.3d 146 3d 6/19/09 
In re Monumental Life Ins. Co. 365 F.3d 408 5th 4/2/04 
Lindsay v. Government Employees Ins. Co. 448 F.3d 416 DC 5/26/06 
McKowan Lowe & Co., Ltd. v. Jasmine, Ltd. 295 F.3d 380 3d 6/26/02 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. 672 F.3d 482 7th 2/24/12 
Messner v. Northshore University 
HealthSystem 669 F.3d 802 7th 1/13/12 
Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. 434 F.3d 948 7th 1/17/06 
Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. 331 F.3d 13 2d 6/2/03 
Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 275 Fed.Appx. 672 9th 4/25/08 
Sheinberg v. Sorensen 606 F.3d 130 3d 5/28/10 
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Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, 
Inc. 323 F.3d 32 1st 3/7/03 
Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp. 655 F.3d 1013 9th 8/22/11 
Stillmock v. Weis Markets, Inc. 385 Fed.Appx. 267 4th 7/1/10 
United Steel, et al v. ConocoPhillips Co. 593 F.3d 802 9th 1/6/10 
Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc. 568 F.3d 1350 11th 5/28/09 
Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, 
LLC 617 F.3d 1168 9th 8/17/10 
Yokoyama v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. 594 F.3d 1087 9th 2/8/10 
 Total Number of Cases in this Category: 26 
 
 Total Number of Cases in All Categories: 209 
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